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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Ever since George W. Bush came to power in January 2001 there has been a 
burgeoning interest in his religiosity and its political implications. This interest joined 
favourably with an already remarkable amount of attention given towards religion and 
politics in the United States. But to many, George W. Bush added a new dimension 
and a fresh anxiety to an area perpetually fraught with concern for the religious-
political union. The common inference was that Bush, unlike any other president, 
with his seemingly overt display religiosity was in complete accord with the agenda 
of Conservative Christians, most notably the Religious Right. In conjunction with one 
another it was deemed that American democracy was under threat. From the erosion 
of social policy to the broader risk of a theocratic takeover it had been argued that 
George W. Bush was in a sense at its core. In keeping with what had arguably been an 
unpopular presidency the arguments were consistently pejorative and predominantly 
concerned in extremes. So pervasive was this approach that it was clear that the field 
of study required, not an antithesis but, a more balanced perspective. To assist in 
reclaiming a more objective analysis, examination of the 2000 presidential campaign 
found that contrary to current argument there were strong indications that what had 
been mistaken for a theocratic agenda and a religious framework was actually rooted 
firmly in the secular. Examination of certain events, relationships and circumstances 
offer a new insight into the relationship. From this it is possible to see that what had 
occurred was political expediency and not necessarily religious purpose.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The relationship between religion and politics has always been a tense one in 
American civic culture. From its inception the American republic was distinguished 
by an attempt to separate the two spheres by constitutional framers who feared 
sectarianism in a religiously pluralistic society. This separation, however, was not a 
rejection or subjugation of either religion or politics but a recognition of the influence 
that each would continue to have as the United States developed. Therefore, there was 
an ongoing attempt, from the passage of the constitution through the political and 
legal development of the Republic, to restrain religion’s role in the state and 
conversely government’s power over religion.   
In practice the interaction could not be halted. For both the individual and the 
community, religion was too important to be a marginal force. Shaping both 
individual and civic character religion’s moral teachings, laws and traditions 
inevitably “influence public affairs albeit in an indirect way”.1  Equally, politics 
would have to assert its own dominion as religious constituencies were organise
political relationships between the government and other institutions, between the 
government and individuals expanded. The two spheres could never be fully separate, 
as the Constitution envisaged there would always be an uneasy cohabitation.  
d and 
Encounters over this dynamic between religion and politics could be testing, 
as with the Scopes trial in 1926 over the teaching of evolution and the decades-long 
battle over temperance and Prohibition. Other interchanges could be more positive, as 
in the civil rights movement of the 1960s when the church became the centre of the 
movement as a meeting place, a symbol of freedom and expression, and a location of 
communal strength that lay beyond the reach of the white power structure.  
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However, it was in the 1970s and 1980s that a more cohesive religious 
movement, seeking to reshape American politics, emerged. Chiefly a revolt against 
the excesses and permissiveness of the 1960s counterculture, the Religious Right 
deliberately focused upon becoming political as a way of combating the assault upon 
American moral values that they perceived. In 1976 Southern evangelicals in 
particular made their political influence known in their support for the openly devout 
Southern Baptist Jimmy Carter. In 1980 the steady shift of the religious voter from 
Democrat to Republican, prompted in part by Carter’s refusal to back a constitutional 
ban on abortion, resulted in the Religious Right accounting for “two-thirds of [Ronald 
Reagan’s popular vote] lead over Jimmy Carter”.2  
The Religious Right was distinguished from other politicised movements in 
religion by the breadth of the issues that it was willing to undertake and the strength 
with which it could do so. The Religious Right had the grass roots organisation, 
structure and facilities for an unprecedented potential to influence politics, seeking to 
“take back” America from the “secular humanists that ran the government”.3 
Intellectual think tanks, political lobbies, media institutions, and key media and 
political figures, in addition to burgeoning finances, established links with and offered 
outlets for the new political activism of the religious movement.   
Inevitably, this expansion would be challenged by others who were critical of 
strong religious influence. Inevitably, given the breadth of the Religious Right’s 
concerns, this response was also on a wide range of issues.  Abortion, education, 
school prayer, pornography, and welfare were all viewed as potential battlegrounds 
for a “conservative” enemy whose political action was motivated on the basis of 
religious and not secular belief. There was also criticism from within the religious 
community, with the Religious Left offering an alternative moral vision to the agenda 
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of the Religious Right; however, this was restricted - perhaps ironically - by a self-
limiting conception of religion and politics that the Religious Right had shattered: 
“Most religious liberals were Democrats, which meant they were members of a party 
reluctant to promote any religious movement that could be defined as exclusive, or 
that could be accused of trying to create a religious establishment”.4  
To examine the complexity of this relationship, where religion and politics 
intersected and crossed over one another, this thesis will take the narrative up to the 
21st century, focusing on the George W. Bush Presidential campaign of 2000. This 
focus has emerged because of several distinctive features of both candidate and 
campaign. One of the most discussed aspects of the Bush Presidency was his 
relationship with religious forces, in particular the Religious Right. To a burgeoning 
body of critics it was clear that Bush’s perceived rhetorical petitioning, strong voter 
support, and a number of ties to key religious figures went beyond a shared faith. 
Observers including Esther Kaplan, Kevin Philips, David Domke, Stephen Mansfield, 
and Barbara Victor asserted that there was a new political framework, in some cases, 
going as far as to allege that a “theocracy” was being established. “An elected leader 
who believes himself in some way to speak to God, a ruling political party that 
represents religious true believers and seeks to mobilize the churches, the conviction 
of many voters in that Republican Party that government should be guided by 
religion, and on top of it all, White House implementation of domestic and 
international agendas that seem to be driven by religious motivations and biblical 
world views.”5 This, according to Kevin Philips was the fulfilment of the criteria for a 
theocracy.  
While there might be variations in the expression of this hypothesis, the 
underlying premise was consistent: this particular fusion of religion and politics was a 
 3
threat to American democracy. Bush’s dedication to “maintaining fealty with 
religious Conservatives” was, according to Kaplan, a “first principle”.6 The “cost of 
this collaboration”,7 was the “corrosive effects on [American] democracy”,8 that 
would return America to the dark ages. Kevin Philips went further. He spoke of a 
“potent change in [America’s] domestic and foreign policy making”, shaped by 
“religion’s new political prowess”9 in the Bush administration. Stephen Mansfield 
stated that the “stage was already set” and that Bush came “armed with an 
understanding of church and state that the Reagan revolution and thinkers on the 
Religious Right had taught him”. There is no evidence specifically for this allegation, 
but Mansfield is clear upon one point: “Bush [let] faith frame his presidency”.10 
Viewed by and describe in various outlets as a right-wing, fundamentalist, evangelical 
Christian George W. Bush would escort and promote the causes of religion in the 
American political and social system.  
This work takes exception with these notions. It was the campaign that defined 
the place of the religious relationship in the politics of George W. Bush. On some 
level, Bush’s personal faith was a guiding principle, as it had been for previous 
presidents, but this was not an unconditional determinant of action. Contrary to the 
portrayal of a theocracy, there was never a complete accord in which religious aims 
and political endeavors were incontrovertibly aligned. The context of this far more 
pragmatic, secular relationship is too complex to be described in the narrow terms 
used by Kaplan and others. The intricate interplay of history, political expediency, 
personality, and group identity, as well as the varying motivations and aspirations of 
actors, led to a new, specific relationship between religion and politics.   
Chapter One, “South Carolina: a Turning Point in Strategy”, focuses upon the 
early part of the 2000 Presidential primaries. This was the catalyst for the 
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Bush/Religious Right alliance. Suffering an early and comprehensive defeat in the 
preceding New Hampshire primary, the campaign had to get back on course at all cost 
raising the significance of the contest in South Carolina. This demand meant aligning 
with and appealing to one of the state’s strongest and most active political 
constituencies, the Religious Right. Their strength and political activism offered Bush 
a lifeline which, guided principally by events and political necessity, Bush seized 
through his advantages of religious observance and proclamation. Bush the 
compassionate moderate had to re-align and accept a perpetual association, in image 
if not political reality, with the Religious Right.  
Chapter Two, “Ralph Reed: a Pragmatic Addition to the Campaign”, focuses 
on a key figure in the Bush/Religious Right alliance. Reed’s pivotal role in shoring up 
religious support offers a valuable insight into the pragmatic nature of the campaign. 
The campaign activity of Reed, former executive director of the Christian Coalition, is 
the best example of the method used by the Bush campaign to obtain and use the 
support of the Religious Right. The approach was, however, one of stealth, and there 
was a palpable distance between the campaign and the Religious Right. Reed’s 
involvement enables us to recognize the deliberate employment and targeting of 
religious forces for political gain, rather than the elevation of religion for religion’s 
sake.  
Chapter Three, “Strategy not Scripture”, looks at the broader, fundamental 
aspects of Bush’s religious identity. Under scrutiny, Bush fits few of the religious 
descriptions applied to him. Detached from the rightist and fundamentalist labels he 
emerges as a more moderate and secular individual. Even the elementary description 
of evangelical is open to discussion. Bush’s religiosity cannot be denied but the claim 
that he promoted religion with a view to alter policy and promote the aims of a 
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specific religious faction is erroneous. In addition to this the wider body of 
evangelical, conservative Christians is briefly considered. By expanding upon 
narrower terms like the Religious Right we can better challenge the notion of Bush’s 
apparent command of the faith base. 
This thesis adds a sense of balance to the debate over religious belief and 
political representation through the vital case study of the campaign of George W. 
Bush in 2000. Without the comprehensive approach advocated in this work, certain 
conceptions merely furnish the polemics for deriding an arguably unpopular 
president. Ultimately we are prevented from seeing the intricacy involved in these 
relationships. Whatever we may think of George W. Bush as an individual, a more 
nuanced, less polemical critique deserves attention. This is a matter of strategy not 
scripture.
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
SOUTH CAROLINA: A Turning Point in Strategy 
 
 
The state of South Carolina had seen a long history of strong religious 
activism as organised religion rooted itself into the states political machine.i 
Republican conventions and precinct meetings were dominated by religious factions. 
Local chapters of the Christian Coalition as well as other conservative Protestant 
organisations and pro-life groups provided a solid grass roots body of activists. As a 
result, operational control was often in the hands of the religious base. Whether for 
state primary or gubernatorial races the Religious Right was a visible and dynamic 
force vital to a Republican candidate’s success. Consequently the state of South 
Carolina had become a firm footing for candidates who proffered a religious 
approach.   
In 2000 George W. Bush made such an approach. However, the circumstances 
and details surrounding Bush’s petitioning of the Religious Right’s support require a 
carefully nuanced approach. In 2000 there was a sense of urgency added to the 
requirement of placating the state’s Religious Right. For George W. Bush South 
Carolina was a turning point in strategy, a turning point whose actions and outcomes 
identifies Bush as a pragmatic politician who successfully courted the states religious 
base. The dynamics of religion and politics at this salient point in the 2000 election 
help demonstrate Bush’s political use of religion.   
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 The Catalyst: Iowa and the New Hampshire Republican presidential primaries 
 
For Texas Governor George W. Bush the 2000 presidential election campaign 
began with success. Victory in the opening round of the Iowa Caucus on 24, January 
with 41%ii of the vote was a substantial result, the greatest margin of victory since 
Bob Dole’s victory over Pat Robertson in 1988 (See Table 1). For most observers, 
Iowa was nothing more than affirmation that George W. Bush was the most credible 
Republican front runner. To state governors, Republican senators, the Party leadership 
in Congress and the Republican majority within the House of Representatives, the 
result was an encouraging indication that they had chosen correctly and Bush would 
progress quite comfortably through the primary season.  
 
Table 1.iii 
IOWA CAUCUS  Monday, January 24, 2000 
 
Republican Candidates  Votes  Percentage 
     
George W. Bush (R-TX)  35,384  41.0% 
Steve Forbes (R-NJ)   26,338  30.5% 
Alan Keyes (R-MD)   12,329  14.3% 
Gary Bauer (R-VA)   7,367  8.5% 
John McCain (R-AZ)   4,035  4.7% 
Orrin Hatch (R-UT)   888  1.0%  
 
This rise to power had been assumed much earlier, long before Bush 
effectively joined the presidential race on March 2, 1999 with the announcement of 
his exploratory committee; his rating was in the ascendancy. As early as 1994 the idea 
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for his running for office had been considered; actual planning starting in 1996-7.iv 
This had been aided by “two decades of Bush candidacies and incumbencies” from 
which the “GOP political and financial leadership was closely intertwined with the 
family and its chief fund-raisers and advisors”.v Bush’s real force came from his 
campaign finances, which observers saw as his major strength. This was evident on 
July 15, 1999, when Bush chose to abstain from campaign finance limitations due to 
the burgeoning weight of his assets. It took just three months for Bush to amass some 
$25 million, a figure that would eventually increase to $191 million.vi This amount of 
capital dwarfed those in competition with him, giving Bush a less restricted approach 
to the campaign. In addition to the campaign finances Bush was bolstered by 
endorsements by former New Hampshire governor John Sununu; Jack Kemp, former 
vice presidential candidate and congressman; Elizabeth Dole, wife of Senator Robert 
Dole and not surprisingly Bush’s father; former president George H. W. Bush.   
The accumulative effect of these elements led to the strong feeling amongst 
Republicans and observers of a coronation for George W. Bush. This notion assisted 
and fed into Bush’s general election strategy, in which everything was self-
confidently tailored for the November general elections. This became known as the 
“fifty state approach”. The caucuses and primaries were the foreground for the wider 
horizon of success for the Bush campaign. Buoyed by the Iowa victory, Bush moved 
to New Hampshire for the second round of the nomination process in confident mood.  
But the overall strategy was flawed. The shift away from the more closed, 
party member dominated Iowa caucus to the less restrictive, open nature of the New 
Hampshire primary should have featured more prominently in any projected strategy, 
but this was not the case. In part, self assurance, though natural following victory, 
seemed to be dismissive of the fundamental idea that these elections were individual 
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states of affairs. Therefore, the subsequent primary in New Hampshire instead of 
being acknowledged as presenting a completely different prospect was less 
considered.  
To add to this the Republican field was not seen as significant competition for 
Bush, a view held in particular by Bush’s political strategist Karl Rove. Most of the 
candidates were viewed as “damaged goods, having attempted the race before”.vii 
This was not the case, however, for Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona. 
McCain had a proven political track record and a credible public appeal based largely
on his experiences as a POW in Vietnam. McCain had opted to miss the Iowa c
focusing instead on New Hampshire. Unlike Bush, with his sizable campaign war 
chest, McCain had to focus more narrowly his resources; Bush’s fifty state approach 
financially inconceivable for McCain. Karl Rove predicted McCain would not be able 
to keep pace in New Hampshire. This was a curious projection, not only because of 
some polls
 
aucus 
viii which had Bush trailing but because of history.ix For these reasons the 
New Hampshire primary should also have been viewed as Bush’s first real 
confrontation; the curtain raiser for the Republican contest. It was not. In short, there 
was little or no consideration for Bush achieving anything other than success, both in 
the short and long term. Although premature, Iowa appeared to confirm this. 
 
It was highly unanticipated then that on February 1, 2000 George W. Bush lost 
the New Hampshire primary to Senator John McCain by a margin of 49% to 31%x 
(see table 2.). Despite Bush’s advantages, none were sufficient to carry the state. The 
result was the worst for a front runner in modern New Hampshire history and it 
appeared that the “Bush juggernaut had sprung a leak”.xi Bush’s failure to win what 
was considered one of the bellwether states shattered the notion of a coronation for 
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Bush and altered the dynamics of the election. The incident was brief, but it sent 
shock waves throughout the Bush campaign.  
 
 
Table 2.xii 
 
NEW HAMPSHIRE: Republican Primary 
 
Candidates   votes   percentage 
 
John McCain   115,490  49% 
George W. Bush  72,262   31% 
Steve Forbes   30,197   13% 
Alan Keyes   15,196   6% 
Gary Bauer   1,656   1% 
Others    2,001   1% 
 
 
Almost all demographic groups chose Senator McCain over George W. Bush. 
Even establishment elements thought to be aligned to Bush were absent. Registered 
Republicans voted 44% for McCain, 35% for Bush. Those describing themselves as 
Conservative voted to 37 to 35% and evangelicals 32 to 31%; part observant 
Christians 47 to 33% and high income voters 49 to 33%xiii, voted overwhelmingly 
against Bush in favour of McCain.  
The New Hampshire primary was an open (modified) primary, offering an 
advantage to the candidate who has the greatest appeal across party lines. This means 
that candidates can draw on extra votes from other Party’s. Conversely, the 
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disadvantage is that opposing party affiliates can throw votes over to their opposing 
party’s worst candidate, bolstering anyone other than the front runner. The defining 
electorate in the New Hampshire primary, however, was neither Republican nor 
Democrat in its voters. Instead it was the independent voter, a constituent with 
“indifference to party” and who are open to suitable “identification”xiv at the 
appropriate time. It was this bloc that was crucial to McCain’s win. 
By looking at the figures for the voter registration totals in New Hampshire for 
January 2000, it was possible to construct a more detailed picture by turning the 
percentages into numbers. From this we are able to see what impact this particular 
bloc had. Firstly, it is worth noting the rise in the independent voter. Table 3 
illustrates this increase between 1998 and just prior to the New Hampshire primary in 
January 2000. This saw the independent vote increase by 2793 votes over this period. 
These figures also showed that independents were ahead of registered Republican 
Party voters by 3.8% with 9248 votes going into the primary.  
Almost 237,000 people voted in the Republican primary.xv John McCain won 
with 115,490 (49%) and Bush came second with 72,262 (30%). Now according to 
CNN exit polling 63%xvi of those who voted in the primary were registered 
Republicans. This would equate to 149,185 votes. Of this number Bush took 35% 
(53,214) and McCain took 44% (65,641). But of those who were able to cast their 
vote in the GOP primary were independents. According to CNN it was those whose 
Party identification was independent that accounted for 41% of the GOP vote. This 
means 97,088 votes came from this group. More importantly 61% (59,224) went for 
McCain and only 19% (18,431) went for Bush. This means that 51% of McCain’s 
winning vote in New Hampshire came from the independent voter. This was the 
swing vote for McCain.  
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Table 3. xvii 
 
VOTER REGISTRATION TOTALS 
 
   Republican  Democrat  Independent 
 
1998   272,217  203,257  272,134 
2000     (January) 265,679  197,816  274,927 
CHANGE  -6538   -5441   +2793 
 
 
 
 Although significant in establishing where McCain’s victory came from these 
figures do not account for the reasons for shift in the voting pattern. Registration 
totals actually show the increases for the independent to be slight when viewed 
against the drop in voter registration for Republicans. This shows a decrease of 6538 
voters for Republicans compared to 2793 of an increase for Independents in the same 
period. Voter apathy and/or disappointment in the Party may account for the growth 
of the independent voterxviii and a decline in those willing to register in the Party. But 
evidently the reasons ran deeper than this. Clearly there was some movement within 
the core Republican base that contributed to Bush’s loss.    
While notably diminished by the independent voting bloc, these other 
dimensions to the Republican vote are worthy of merit. Despite the view that New 
Hampshire is sometimes perceived as a “red” state; solidly Republican in its voting, it 
is actually configured more like a “purple” state. From this perspective it is seen as 
 14
more closely divided and arguably more moderate. Ideological voter identification 
amongst Republicans recorded in exit polling showed that New Hampshire was 
“liberal to moderate” in its Republican persuasion. Even so, there was enough data 
available both historically and from ground level sources, for instance from grass 
roots Republican activists and commentators, to at least have hinted at the idea that 
the state of New Hampshire had several shades, variations and political anomalies to 
warrant caution. The voter registration totals, illustrated above, would have been 
another source to have demonstrated this. As a consequence New Hampshire should 
not have been taken for granted as a Republican bastion from which Bush was assured 
Republican support. Although Bush did in fact attempt to approach the state as a 
moderate, it was obvious he was still perceived to be too conservative. In New 
Hampshire, the contrast between Bush and McCain was, on the surface, sharply 
distinctive. To position himself as a moderate, Bush asserted that he was a 
“compassionate conservative”. The phrase had a number of connotations and was 
open to interpretation. On the one hand it gave a softer tone to the image of being a 
conservative, while at the same time not diminishing his conservative credentials. 
The phrase was first presented in his 1994 race for the governorship of Texas 
and was the theme to be carried in to the campaign for the presidency. Based on the 
policies of limiting government, reducing taxes, and encouraging private companies 
and, more controversially, religious associations to support welfare and educational 
initiatives, the ideology of compassionate conservatism proved popular. According to 
Bush, this was the “the philosophy ingrained in his heart”.xix In 1998, Bush won the 
re-election campaign for governor with 69% of the vote,xx making him the first 
governor of Texas to be re-elected for two consecutive terms. It was a solid 
foundation, at least at state level. Winning by 53 to 46% (the largest margin in twenty 
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years),xxi Bush defeated the seemingly steadfast incumbent governor of Texas, Ann 
Richards.  
The environment preceding the run for the presidency had been both nurturing 
and successful for the ideas of compassionate conservatism. Not all Republicans, 
conservatives or the Religious Right favourably shared its notions or practices; 
nevertheless, it remained a strong element to the springboard for Bush’s presidential 
ambitions. Even so, the new campaign mantra still ran alongside a conventional 
Republican message of tax cuts, opposition to abortion, and gun control. These were 
seen as the way to success. The compassionate conservative slogan gave a new 
dimension to the Bush image; a representation that toned down what Bush saw as the 
“bullying image of conservatism”, which Bush thought of as “mean”.xxii This was not 
to suggest that this was a soft image, because promoted alongside the idea of the 
“Responsibility Era” it still endorsed strong conservative ideas of individualism. The 
question was could these images or more specifically the delivery of these images win 
over New Hampshire? 
Analysing strings of commentaries and post-election interviews through 
Nexus Lexus, it was apparent that delivery mixed with message was a key factor in 
McCain’s winning the Republican vote. This was also found to be the defining factor 
for the independent voter too. McCain’s delivery with his readiness to drop barriers 
and open himself up to both the media and voters won him their attention and then 
their support. “New Hampshire cherished – demanded – being won over one vote at a 
time”. There they wanted “face time; they wanted to be wooed”.xxiii The 
unprecedented levels of access, particularly by the media won McCain support. 
McCain’s idiosyncratic approach to the media, offered them the opportunity to 
accompany him on the “Straight Talk Express” campaign bus. This was access the 
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media and therefore the public were unaccustomed to. Bush on the other hand was 
often absent, missing debates due to family circumstances that took him back home to 
Texas. When he was present, the meetings and interviews were clearly choreographed 
and well staged. Questions from the press were not allowed to stray and there was a 
brusque succinctness to Bush’s responses. For more moderate, Republican voters this 
detached manner mixed with a routine message did not advance Bush’s campaign. 
Fundamentally, McCain worked the state of New Hampshire harder and on a more 
personal level than Bush was either willing or able to do. In short, there was a 
palpable distance between Bush, McCain and the New Hampshire voter. 
Apprehension about Bush arose because in New Hampshire the “Bush campaign was 
not about charming the folks of the state; it was about George W. Bush becoming 
president of the United States”. Erroneously the “make it look presidential”xxiv 
approach was not brought by the New Hampshire voter.  
In sharp contrast to Bush, McCain presented his personality as passionately as 
his issues. In addition to his political history in office, xxv McCain pushed the strength 
of his character and in particular his war record. McCain could strongly trade a 
distinguished military career. The recipient of the Purple Heart and a prisoner of war 
in Vietnam meant McCain could portray himself as an honourable man of experience 
who had served his country. These were highly valuable assets; things Bush could not 
buy.xxvi 
McCain also positioned himself as a far from average Republican, one who 
did not toe the Party line. Portraying himself as the “Washington Outsider” and as a 
“maverick” against “special interests”, McCain’s signature issue for the campaign 
was campaign finance reform.xxvii McCain attacked the soft money donations by large 
corporations and asserted that he would break the bond between special interests and 
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government. Frequently he referred to the “iron triangle” comprised of money, 
lobbyists and legislation; an attack that included both the Republican and Democrat 
Party’s. This was a clear challenge to the extremely well-financed Bush, who was 
seen firmly as an establishment insider.xxviii 
Ultimately, McCain was allowed to frame the issues in New Hampshire; 
present a more amiable character, tap independent voters and aided by Bush’s clumsy 
approach win the primary. McCain thus entered South Carolina self assured seeing 
comparable advantages similar to that of New Hampshire. Also a modified, open 
primary, McCain’s appeal across party lines could once more absorb non-party 
members. Growing financial support and the added dimension of the veteran and 
service personnel broadening the voting base for McCain even further proffered 
nothing but confidence and strength. So although a conservative state, South Carolina 
seemed ripe to be taken. What was clear from New Hampshire was nothing could be 
taken for granted. Entering as a moderate, compassionate conservative with a broad, 
fifty state approach suddenly hit a wall. The Bush campaign needed to redress the 
damage in New Hampshire.  
 
South Carolina: a turning point in strategy  
 
Leaving New Hampshire, it was essential that Bush re-establishes himself and 
the McCain insurgency brought to a halt. With McCain favourite to take Michigan 
and his own state of Arizona on 22, Februaryxxix, a triumph in South Carolina could 
turn into an unstoppable momentum. The new approach, if it recognised the specific 
dimensions of the electoral map, could benefit from a basic rule in primaries: no two 
states are the same; a point heavily lost on New Hampshire.  
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Fortunately for the Bush campaign there were advantages in the markedly 
different environment of South Carolina. As a result much of the revision needed by 
the campaign was already encoded into the political environment. The most important 
feature for Bush was that the make-up of the Republican Party was different. The base 
was socially conservative and although there was a very real threat from some 
quarters there were also some distinct groups on whom Bush could focus, namely the 
Religious Right. McCain on the other hand continued to focus upon courting the 
Independent, veteran and floating votes of the Democrat. To encourage these voters 
McCain continued to strongly promote his own image. However, in comparison Bush 
required a more noticeable shift in his position. Forced into moving closer to the 
Religious Right and more conservative elements Bush took a political gamble 
departing from his original, moderate pose. However, the priority had altered. My 
contention from this point onwards is that the political gain from securing South 
Carolina by appealing to a more religious audience simply outweighed the risks. What 
began as a broad church approach now saw Bush having to narrowly focus to help 
swing the state. The wider challenge was to find support with those necessary to help 
secure victory while at the same time not be seen abandoning the views of his 
moderate support. Quite often the rush by observers to place Bush in harmonious 
union with the Religious Right mistakenly omits political convenience as well as 
political necessity as an answer.  
As already noted, South Carolina was a different environment. In addition to 
the urgency required of the Bush campaign to stabilise itself here the conditions were 
a dissimilar proposition. Two areas are noteworthy: firstly, the historical importance 
that South Carolina had come to play in the GOP nomination process and secondly 
the necessary alignment, procured through that history, to religious forces needed to 
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secure the state.  In South Carolina the Bush campaign used religion because they had 
to.  
In contrast to the general election, when little time and effort is spent there, 
South Carolina has a special position in the Republican nomination process. 
Historically, the state had a record of blocking early momentum gained in New 
Hampshire by a Republican challenger to the establishment front runner. This was not 
accidental. Republican political consultant and strategist Lee Atwater gave 
considerable importance to South Carolina for Republicans by placing the primary 
between the New Hampshire primary and Super Tuesday. In 1988, Atwater moved 
the primary forward to help deliver the state for George H. W. Bush. Until then, it was 
Super Tuesday that held the attention. By frontloading the state, Atwater gave South 
Carolina Republicans the opening southern vote, placing the state at the foundation of 
the campaign. Leaning heavily towards the more traditional, establishment orientated 
character of the Republican Party; South Carolina presented a foundation for a 
comparable candidate. This gave the state the opportunity to bestow a form of its own 
approval on the establishment choice. This became increasingly relevant as candidates 
stumbled in New Hampshire giving South Carolina a burgeoning role in its capacity 
as king maker for Republican front runners.  
This boosted the credentials of the state. The term firewall is commonly used 
to express the preventative role South Carolina has come to play in this trend. 
Following New Hampshire, Bush’s political strategist Karl Rove used the term when 
speaking to the Washington Post saying that South Carolina, “will provide a firewall 
of protection for [Bush]”, as it had done in previous elections.xxx This endorsement 
has thus far never failed in seeing the front runner loose the nomination. In 1988, 
South Carolina saw George H. W. Bush stop the impetus gained in New Hampshire 
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by challenger Bob Dole and Pat Robertson. In 1992 President George H. W. Bush did 
the same in South Carolina, stopping Pat Buchanan and in 1996 Bob Dole blocked Pat 
Buchanan after Buchanan’s success in New Hampshire (See Appendices A).  
As a guide Bush had something of a historical precedence with which to enter 
South Carolina. But this was still no guarantee. However, with a proven record of 
delivery in these matters it was the Religious Right who were needed to add to the 
assurances. As a particular part of the Republican state machine they had shown the 
ability to marshal solid, grassroots organisational support. It had become an important 
feature of the South Carolina firewall. Arguably the Clinton years had seen an 
element of dormancy mixed with uncertainty but by the time of the 2000 presidential 
primary their presence was such that only a small amount of reinvigoration was 
needed to rouse them. The role and character of religion in New Hampshire was 
something in sharp contrast to South Carolina. According to polling by CNN, the 
religious right (as it was termed in the polling) only accounted for 8% of GOP 
primary voters in New Hampshire. This was a significant drop compared to what 
would conclude with 34%xxxi in South Carolina. These figures are post-election, but 
they do give a sense of variation between states and mark the value of making this 
body inclusive.  
What New Hampshire did offer was a potential pointer to this being a future 
condition. Of few notable exceptions amidst Bush’s loss, the religious right were 
strongly in favour of Bush with 36 to 26%,xxxii against McCain. As the primaries 
moved south, where the Religious Right are more commonly active and certainly pro-
Republican, they had built for themselves an indispensable function. Although fluid, 
their influence within the state Republican Party’s was analysed as being generally 
strong; witnessing “gains in 15 states and declines in 8”xxxiii with South Carolina, 
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Alabama, Oklahoma, Texas and Virginia seeing no change from 1994 to 2000.xxxiv 
These figures are contrary to the view some held that the Religious Right were in 
terminal decline. As South Carolina was about to show this certainly was not the case 
at state and local levels.  
The role of religion in modern, South Carolina politics accompanied the 
growing GOP of the 1950s and 1960s when the party was actively “dominated by 
religiously traditional upper and middle status mainline Protestants”.xxxv But this was a 
part of a broader trend. Following the gravitation of many Southern Democrat leaders 
towards the support of the Civil Rights movement, the solid south as it was termed, 
became increasingly unstable. As a result, the Republican Party witnessed 
dissatisfaction and more southerners willing to embrace the Party. But this transition 
towards the likes of Barry Goldwater, George Wallace, Richard Nixon and Ronald 
Reagan, as examples, added a strong, conservative essence to the southern evolution 
of the Republican Party. Gradually, the inclusion of white, more observant, 
evangelicals into their ranks began to change the Southern political dynamic even 
further. The picture is of course far more complex than this, but essentially the 
foundations were in place for the Religious Right to become more pro-active in 
southern party politics. This rapidly increasing influence would soon be referred to as 
the “southernization of U.S. politics” based upon the “re-organization of the 
Republican Party around religion”.xxxvi For South Carolina this was particularly so. 
Added to this was the growing civil rights movement. This helped alienate white 
South Carolinians and deliver the state to Barry Goldwater in 1964. From which point 
a continued Republican presence carried on to dominated the state.  
It was in the 1987 Republican precinct meetings before the 1988 presidential 
primary that the foundations for organized religious activity were laid. Pat Robertson, 
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the Charismatic Southern Baptist organized the Carolina Conservative Coalition 
(CCC) and almost succeeded in winning the state Republican convention against 
incumbent Vice President George H. W. Bush. In the 1988 presidential primaries 
Robertson was unsuccessful but reorganized in 1989 as a branch of the Christian 
Coalition would prove a political force. Ironically, the grass roots activism of its 
members would help George H. W. Bush in the 1992 presidential race when he won 
the state primary. As a vehicle of faith for assisting those who wished to shape 
government the Christian Coalition helped draw in Southern Baptists and other 
conservative protestant groups particularly those with a pro-life agenda. With 
Republicans like born again Southern Baptist David Beasley running in 1994 for the 
South Carolina governorship, the anti-abortion platform he ran on benefiting from the 
states religious support. Over the decades, sometimes with mixed results, there had 
been a systemic influence of Religious Right forces within the state. It was to this that 
George W. Bush looked to strengthen his own campaign.  
Advantageously, Bush was familiar with the special political circumstances in 
South Carolina having campaigned there in 1988 for his father’s own presidential 
campaign. One of Bush’s functions little noticed at the time or thereafter, was as the 
liaison to evangelical Christians within the state, again, most notably to the Religious 
Right. It was a valuable introduction. The task of aligning to and hopefully mobilising 
the Religious Right in favour of his father was against a man who was arguably one of 
the group’s main protagonists, Pat Robertson. In the main, the Religious Right were 
unsure about Bush Senior, the softly spoken candidate from the north-eastern states 
who offered only “uncertain rhetoric and [an] inability to articulate his faith”.xxxvii 
This geographical configuration, however, aided Bush junior. Although born in New 
Haven, Connecticut, Bush was viewed as an “authentic cultural Texan” and as 
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someone who had “absorbed the folk culture of Texas along with the worldview of 
members of the native white Protestant”.xxxviii As a result, Bush was far more at ease 
amongst the network of the Religious Right than his father. More importantly, he 
spoke their language. To the religious base there was genuineness about his 
communication, a sincerity that they could accept.  
This was the new Bush, the Bush who had redeemed himself and who no 
longer coveted the malevolent ways of an alcoholic, philandering past. To give this a 
seal of approval Bush had the endorsement of Billy Graham, the reverend who had 
“saved” Bush. This helped him reach out to those his father required. But this 
application of personal faith for the purpose of political achievement was precisely 
this and should be interpreted as nothing more than a politically motivated 
manoeuvre. Whatever the personal religious convictions George W. Bush may have 
had it was utilised for his father for political and not religious gain. Bush’s father was 
simply unable to align in the same way as his son. For these reasons Bush was placed 
in charge of coalitions, the coded language for evangelicals. Bush did two things to 
promote this. Firstly, he met with all the key Religious Right figures; secondly he 
learnt the correct way to align, pacify and mobilise them, often implicitly, away from 
the publics gaze.   
Nevertheless, forging these links to religious forces could not be done by 
George W. Bush alone. Despite his own religious advantages, Bush had to be driven 
further into evangelical circles by other Party’s. The assumption that these 
relationships were a given was not the case. Bush needed direction and connecting. 
To do this George H. W. Bush’s assistant Doug Wead was used. Wead, an ordained 
minister of the Assemblies of God Church, offered entry into the religious power 
base. A motivational speaker and a promoter of Amway products, Wead’s political 
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influence came largely through his publishing. In February 1988 and as a part of the 
broader strategy for the nomination, Bush senior released his campaign biography, co-
written with Doug Wead entitled “A Man of Integrity”. This was one of a number of 
attempts to bridge the gap and reach out to evangelicals and Conservatives. 
Nevertheless, it was the stealthy background work by George W. Bush and Doug 
Wead that would eventually rally evangelical support, most notably in the South, 
needed by his father. In addition to Wead was another actor vital for Bush’s 
introduction to the Religious Right. This was spiritual leader James Robinson. 
Robinson had been instrumental in making the connections for Ronald Reagan to the 
then burgeoning Religious Right and was adept at making the politician feel at ease 
with the religious constituency and vice versa. As late as 1999 Robinson was 
introducing Bush to key religious figures and soothing those on the Religious Right 
who thought Bush too moderate. James Dobson, of Focus on the Family was one of 
them. Dobson had “publicly chastised Bush for not supporting a pro-life amendment 
to the Constitution”. Intervening Robinson “called Dobson and pleaded with him not 
to be a political kingmaker”.xxxix   
It proved successful. Importantly for Bush, this journey through the 
powerhouses of the still rising constituency of the Religious Right would become the 
foundation for his own political aspirations twelve years later. There were strong 
lessons to be learnt from the 1988 campaign, lessons Bush could carry forward for his 
own political ambition.  
 
The political character of the South Carolina primary 
 
 By the time of the South Carolina primary only Allan Keyes remained in 
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contention for the religious vote. In Iowa and New Hampshire the 
Conservative/religious character of the Republican running field was of similar 
measure.xl The presence of figures like Gary Bauer, Allan Keyes and Steve Forbes 
meant that there were those in contention who may perceivably draw from the same 
valuable constituency. Advantageously this diminished early on in the campaign for 
Bush. In truth, each of these candidates had varying difficulties that would have made 
their appeal to religious forces in South Carolina problematic had they have 
proceeded.  
Steve Forbes position had residual baggage from his 1996 campaign when he 
was critical about social conservatives being in the Republican Party and had courted 
pro-choice groups, not to mention attacking Pat Robertson in the 1988 presidential 
campaign. Gary Bauer, having resigned his position with the Family Research 
Council to make his run, had done poorly in both Iowa and New Hampshire and his 
campaign never really got underway. This witnessed the race for the GOP nomination 
abridged to three: Bush, McCain and Allen Keyes.xli At a disadvantage Allan Keyes 
was Catholic and one could argue had the question of his race as a factor. Although he 
stayed the course, Keyes only polled 6% of the vote in New Hampshire behind Steve 
Forbes who carried 13%.  
  However, all these candidates, including Bush, could be considered something 
of a second choice for the Religious Right. The “preferred option”,xlii had been 
Senator John Ashcroft (R-Missouri). On January 5th 1999, Ashcroft, a member of the 
Assemblies of God, announced that he was declining to make a bid for the White 
House. Only then could Bush be moved into a prime position as first choice for the 
Religious Right. Despite his early, exploratory travels into the key states of Iowa and 
New Hampshire to gauge the feeling for a Presidential bid, Ashcroft eventually 
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proclaimed his desire to remain concentrated on securing his Senate seat due to 
concern that the seat could be lost to a Democrat. Even so, Ashcroft’s value is still 
noteworthy. 
Very early on Ashcroft had been seen as a force that could energise the 
Religious Right and as a figure behind which they could unite. How far Ashcroft 
could have gone in a Presidential Race is questionable. His acceptability to the 
religious base was one thing, but to the wider electorate was something else. There is 
little doubt, however, that the vocal, pro-active evangelical John Ashcroft had the 
broad support of the Religious Right.xliiiOnce Ashcroft decided not to run, the key for 
other candidates was to attempt to harness that support. When one considers that the 
links between Ashcroft and Bush were initially not that close and yet within a short 
period of time the president elect would place Ashcroft into the highest position ever 
attained by a Religious Right figure (attorney General), the initial value of his support 
cannot be ruled out. Support like Ashcroft’s was vital. It reinforced the idea for the 
Religious Right that Bush was “their man”. What remained was for this support to 
help spoil the McCain campaign. There were several ways of doing this. To begin 
with Bush had to make political manoeuvres suitable to the conservative base. 
 To begin with Bush drew attention away from McCain by revealing his new 
slogan, “a reformer with results”. It was the Presbyterian elder Karen Hughesxliv who 
coined the term and it signalled a significant shift in Bush’s position. Unlike New 
Hampshire, Bush was no longer willing to be defined as a “Washington insider”. 
Bush stated “those days are over”, and that he was “going to make it very clear to the 
voters of this state who Mr. Outsider is and who Mr. Insider is”. In one way McCain 
viewed this shift as not necessarily bad news because although it was an obvious 
attempt to detract from McCain’s own platform, it was bringing into the arena 
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McCain’s own issue of reform. Although Bush’s shift was viewed cynically, Bush 
really did have a record of reform on the issues of taxes, education and welfare.  
From then on the watchword of “Compassionate Conservatism” was absent. When 
asked what had happened to the campaign slogan, Bush replied that a “reformer with 
results is a conservative who’s had compassionate results in the state of Texas”.xlv The 
reply appeared weak and muddled; clearly there had been a change. In reality there 
was little room for moderation in South Carolina, particularly if, as we have seen, 
Bush was to marshal the more conservative elements that mattered in his favour. In 
the words of Robert Draper the “fifty-state campaign had come down to South 
Carolina”.xlvi  
 
Bob Jones University, a strategic necessity 
 
To commence the South Carolina primary, Bush undertook one of his most 
controversial steps on the campaign trail. On the morning of February 2, 2000, the 
day after the New Hampshire primary, Bush ventured to speak at the Conservative 
Christian xlvii Bob Jones University in Greenville, South Carolina.xlviii  
Almost immediately the visit developed into one of the most frequently 
referred events for those attempting to establish Bush’s right-wing, fundamentalist 
Christian qualifications. In an article for the Washington Post, Colbert I. King 
commented that in speaking there “Bush caters to the bigotry of Bob Jones”.xlix Even 
some Republicans were critical. “The message”, said Congressman Peter King of 
Long Island (Rep) “is he was willing to look the other way at a bigoted institution to 
get the votes of hard core fundamentalists in South Carolina who could be anti-black, 
anti-Catholic”.l Fellow conservatives were critical too. “It is one thing to lurch to the 
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right. It is another thing to lurch back 60 years,” said Bill Kristol, editor and publisher 
of the conservative Weekly Standard. “You could make the case that compassionate 
conservatism died February 2 when Bush appeared at Bob Jones University.”li For 
those critical of Bush, the willingness to attend the University demonstrated a clear 
solidarity with the most extremist elements of the faith. From their outlook, this was 
proof enough. But once more, the rush to attack Bush has not questioned what 
possible value there could be in aligning to this establishment, particularly at such a 
critical time.  
Viewed as a bastion of ultra-conservative views, the Universities notoriety 
came largely from its separatist policies, stringent adherence to scripture and an open 
denigration of other faiths. Not until 1971, for example, did Bob Jones University 
enrol black students and between 1971 and 1975 this was for married couples only. 
These policies have understandably led to fierce criticism and where possible various 
attempts at reproach have been made against the University. In 1983, following a 
Federal Justice Department legal challenge, the United States Supreme Court voted 8 
to 1lii in favour of the IRS to the Universities tax-exemption status,liii a ruling that 
simultaneously saw the removal of the same status from North Carolina’s Goldsboro 
Christian School.    
The potential disadvantages of an appearance at Bob Jones, begs the question: 
why did the Bush campaign take the risk? Firstly, and despite its notoriety for its 
emphasis on race we can confidently assume that Bush’s posturing was political and 
not racial.liv There was nothing to be gained from this, but there was gain to be made 
from appealing to the values of a university that had some political leverage with the 
state. Even so, controversy over Bush’s visit continued. Under scrutiny, however, the 
picture is more detailed.  
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There are three possible explanations. Firstly, this was a simple miss-
calculation an event that had no forethought or particular motivation. Secondly, this 
was indeed a blatant show of Bush’s true position in relation to the Religious Right, 
no matter how extreme. Or thirdly, this was a necessary, unavoidable political 
manoeuvre the negatives of which were outweighed by potential gains.  
It is inconceivable that Bush’s visit can be attributed solely to pure folly. Post 
New Hampshire there had to be keener vigilance, an air of caution to the campaign 
ahead. If complacency had ruled in New Hampshire, it did not in South Carolina. 
Even accrediting blame for the visit solely to Bush, we cannot dismiss the idea that 
those surrounding and guiding him were completely oblivious to the political dangers 
that such an appointment could afford. In any case, given Bush’s personal 
acquaintance with the state twelve years earlier it is difficult to imagine that he too 
would have been ignorant or reckless. On some level, Bush had to be conscious of the 
history, policies, and stance of the University. An absolute lack of unawareness is 
therefore unlikely. In defence of Bush, however, there was no prima facie of antipathy 
from which to take guidance for attending. Until that time, Ronald Reagan, Dan 
Quayle, Pat Buchanan and Robert J. Dole and John Ashcroft amongst others, had all 
made the University a stopover in the process of their campaigns. It follows then that 
there had to be a value in the action.  
Upon the second point, Bush’s alignment to the Religious Right was no secret, 
his openness at times politically questionable, but always unashamedly made known. 
The uniqueness of the Bob Jones visit, it is argued, lies not in Bush attending a 
religious establishment, but one deemed to be so fundamental. To suggest that as a 
result of his attendance he himself is a fundamentalist is stretching the argument. 
Bush may, as all politicians are, be apt to making miscalculations but an unconcealed 
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protestation to fundamentalism for the sake of doing so is nonsense, not to mention 
politically perilous. George W. Bush was not in the business of endangering his 
political aspirations. As we will discover later, Bush was all too aware following his 
religious rhetoric in Iowa how cautious he should be in publicly aligning to religion.   
Thirdly, we have the argument for an indispensable visit whose undertaking 
was calculatingly worthwhile. Rejecting the visit as a mistake or a form of religious 
swagger leaves a visit with purpose. This purpose soon becomes clear when we 
understand something of the influence the University had within the state and as a 
function of the Republican Party. The key is that Bob Jones University is not on the 
fringes, although some of its attitudes and policies maybe, but is an institution within 
a part of South Carolina society. 
From 1927 the Bob Jones University, or College as it was then known, had a 
Republican bias. Amidst a solidly Democrat affiliated South many of the schools 
faculty and students were initially from the North, hence their Republican persuasion. 
Even its founder Bob Jones Senior voted Republican at one time in the primacy of the 
school, campaigning for Republican Herbert Hoover against Democrat Al Smith in 
1928. With the increasing alienation of white southern Democrats from their Party 
establishment on the issue of race, especially over the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 
appeal of the Republican Party grew and so did the influence of the University. The 
foundation for this political interest came from all the leading Bob Jones figures, each 
one having keen political as well as religious interests.  
A turning point that bonded the University even further to the Republican 
Party and bolstered its pro-active role in state politics was the switch of South 
Carolina governor Strom Thurmond from the Democrat to the Republican Party. 
Thurmond, angry at what he saw as an attack on States Rights by his own party, but 
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more specifically by those in Washington, helped cement South Carolina Republican 
Party. As a feature of this the University increasingly took a more active role in local 
and State-wide Republican politics. This was accomplished by faculty members either 
entering or endorsing fellow alumni candidates for political office, these positions 
giving a deepening function and a growing political influence within the States party.  
It was then prudent to seek endorsement from Bob Jones. Despite the 
controversy that Bush’s visit attracted it did not prevent either Alan Keyes on 
February 14, or Steve Forbes on February 17, from speaking there. It could be argued 
that an attendance there was almost ritualistic, its purpose to help win over not only 
those elements within the state Republican Party but the core political constituency of 
the Religious Right. 
Although condemnation of Bush’s visit took many forms and came from many 
quarters, one in particular stands out. In an attempt at electoral impetus, McCain 
quickly picked up on the universities anti-Catholic sentiment and sanctioned a phone 
banking tactic aimed at Catholic voters in Michigan, whose primary was on 22, 
February. Given the strong position of the Catholic vote in key, battleground states 
like New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Illinois, it appeared a good line 
of attack. 
Initially Bush appeared to try to ride out the storm but the McCain camp kept 
up the pressure. Eventually Bush was forced to make a statement. For three weeks 
Bush evaded the issue and then on 25th February sought to resolve the matter. To help 
curb the negative attention the visit was gaining, Bush wrote a letter to Cardinal John 
O’Connor, Roman Catholic archbishop of New York. The letter expressed Bush’s 
regret, his disappointment at not having seized the opportunity at the time to detach 
himself from University policy. He also stressed yet again that he was “a uniter not a 
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divider”.lv Bush then pointed out in his defence the conversion to Catholicism of his 
sister-in-law and brother, Florida Governor Jeb Bush.  
Contrary to the impression that the McCain campaign tried to present 
regarding Bush’s willingness to align with those of an anti-Catholic nature, the Bush 
campaign had initially taken the Catholic vote quite seriously. In fact it is arguable 
that the approach to this voting bloc and the number of Catholics supporting and 
advising Bush was not only comparable but potentially greater than the presence or 
the wooing of protestant evangelicals.lvi But this was not new. The Bush focus on 
aligning to Conservative Catholicslvii was part of an ongoing and very concerted 
process. In various forms, the attempts at a trilateral bonding between Conservative 
Catholics, Republicans and the Religious Right had been an endeavour for several 
decades. There were tensions, particularly when it was perceived that Catholicism 
was maybe “seeking to impose Catholic teaching on those outside the faith”.lviii 
However, the role of Catholics on the rise and influence of Conservative religion in 
the United States and in influencing Bush is vastly underestimated. To define Bush’s 
position there are two particular areas to be noted.  
Firstly, in February 1999 the Republican National Committee created the 
Catholic Task Force with a view to attracting the Catholic vote and aiding the Bush 
campaign. Representing the largest Christian denomination in America with an 
estimated 24% of the population describing themselves as Catholic,lix it was 
reasonable to attempt to bring them into the fold. Politically, however, the Catholic 
vote had historically leaned Democrat with momentary swings towards the 
Republican Party, most notably for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and again in 1984. But it 
was not the mainstay for the Republican Party that evangelical Christians in general 
had come to represent. Even so, its power as a bloc had not gone un-heeded. As a 
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result it was certainly not to be put off-side. 
Secondly, Karl Rove was especially in tune with the prospective power of 
Catholic swing voters providing added force to Bush’s margins of victory. Following 
an article in June 1999 in the conservative Catholic magazine Crisis,lx Deal Hudson,lxi 
its publisher, distributed its findings to all presidential candidates. The article, by 
pollster and analyst Steve Wagner entitled “The Heart of the Catholic Voter”, 
proposed the identification of two distinct types of Catholic: the “Social Justice 
Catholic” and the “Social Renewal Catholic”. The latter, Wagner suggested, was more 
conservative, more observant and more likely to lean Republican. It seemed tenuous, 
but it was enough, according to conservative strategist Grover Norquist to detail that 
Rove invited Hudson to take part in meetings designed to forge additional and 
stronger Catholic alliances.lxii At the same time the Republican National Committee, 
citing the same research, followed suite, expanding its Catholic outreach programme. 
The Catholic dimension was only a part of the religious element which in turn is only 
a part of the political dimension. The apparently constricted approach to Bob Jones 
had several valuable layers worthy of its visit.  
It is clear then that Bush’s visit to the Bob Jones University was a necessary 
venture. Always a risk, the rational, guided partly by history, was political pragmatics 
and political motivation in action. Given the position of the University within the state 
Republican Party and the support by the Religious Right both within and beyond the 
University made it an unavoidable visit. What the Bob Jones visit was not, was an 
alignment to the Religious Right for a display of religious nepotism.  
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Beyond Bob Jones 
 
If we charge that Bush had misread New Hampshire, then McCain 
misunderstood South Carolina. In fact, the poor manner in which McCain approached 
South Carolina was a major feature in handing Bush his victory. While Bush adjusted 
accordingly to the political landscape McCain stuck with the strategy which had 
brought him success in New Hampshire. McCain’s hope of attracting the same 
constituency of voters was feasible and with the expectancy of a high turnout amongst 
the tens of thousands of independent, Democrat and veteran voters likely to take part 
in the primary it may not have seemed misguided. But McCain’s failure came from 
never attempting to attract the states core constituencies that Bush looked to. Instead 
McCain antagonised them. 
For example: a serious issue in South Carolina was the presence of the 
Confederate flag flying above the South Carolina statehouse. It had been since 1962. 
Whatever arguments may have been on the campaign table, health care, taxes et 
cetera it shows the narrow, idiosyncratic nature of the state. Some viewed it as a 
symbol of legacy, a memorial to Confederate forces during the Civil War. To others it 
was a clear symbol of states rights and slavery. The NAACP in particular undertook 
pro-active action on the issue, seeking its removal. This issue should not be 
underestimated. South Carolina’s prominence in the civil war was the lead in seceding 
from the Union; the home of Andrew Jackson and John C. Calhoun and where the 
first shots of the war were fired made this a highly contentious point.   
Both candidates attempted to avoid the issue but were unavoidably drawn in. 
Bush stated that it was for the people of South Carolina to decide, whilst McCain after 
originally stating that it was “offensive” and a “symbol of racism and slavery”, 
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changed to calling it a symbol of “heritage”.lxiii McCain’s original comments would 
not evaporate. From the candidate who spoke of “straight talking” his wavering over 
the issue was deeply damaging. This divisive issue called for a clear statement.   
To add to the uncertainty, McCain’s campaign strategist was the pro-flag, neo-
Confederate Richard Quinn of the Southern Partisan Quarterly Review. 
Embarrassingly, an article in the Wall Street Journal saw pointed out that Richard 
Hines, managing editor and contributor to the same magazine managed to add 
additional damage to the McCain Campaign upon this issue.lxiv Hines, a political 
consultant and neo-Confederate activist used his PAC Company to finance and 
distribute 250,000 letters to targeted conservatives criticising McCain and promoting 
Bush as the only candidate worthy of not denigrating the Confederate Flag. As a 
result Bush managed to undermine McCain. It is worth noting that in a poll taken later 
Bush won 61% of the vote over McCain’s 35%lxv on this very issue. 
On February 3, at a rally in Columbia, South Carolina, Bush, surrounded by 
veterans and soldiers witnessed one of the most controversial and savage attacks of 
the campaign. Taking the stand, Army Veteran Thomas Burch, Chairman of the 
National Vietnam & Gulf War Veterans Coalition, said of McCain: “Senator McCain 
has abandoned the veterans. He came home from Vietnam and forgot us”.lxvi The 
remarks were a reference to McCain opposing measures and legislation to help 
families of Agent Orange poisoning, one of the coalition’s central issues. 
Understandably these remarks were wounding to McCain who had traded so heavily 
on his military career.  
But the political damage as a result of these remarks was done by McCain. On 
Tuesday, February 8, air time was secured for an advertisement in which McCain 
commented that “I guess it was bound to happen. Governor Bush’s campaign is 
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getting desperate, with a negative ad about me…. His ad twists the truth like Bill 
Clinton. We’re all pretty tired of that”.lxvii For Bush the McCain advertisement was a 
blessing, a political Godsend. McCain’s ad completely alienated the Republican base. 
To make comparisons to Clinton by one Republican against another was indefensible. 
Bush seized the opportunity, running a counter-advertisement which said, “Politics is 
tough. But when John McCain compared me to Bill Clinton and said I was 
untrustworthy, that is over the line. Disagree with me fine. But do not challenge my 
integrity”. The use of the C - word was pivotal in turning voters against McCain. 
From then on the advertisement was run almost on a loop, pressing home the 
message not only to South Carolinians but to the broader Republican electorate too. 
The advertisement was aired in other states, without the spectator aware of what had 
led to it.lxviii From then on Bush was able to place McCain in a bad light for his 
negative campaigning while at the same time drawing attention away from his own 
negative campaign tactics. These crucial areas of the early campaign saw McCain 
falter in the publics view.  
 In a relatively short space of time McCain had succeeded in turning many of 
South Carolina’s core voters over to Bush. It was one thing to not target them it was 
another to alienate them. The returns were revealing. Compared to 1996 the overall 
state voter totals were significantly up, showing 276,741 in 1996 to 573,101 in 2000. 
Interest in the primary stimulated voter turn out. (See tables 4 & 5). Ideologically 
McCain faired well amongst those he was expected to. The veteran vote was won but 
narrowly. McCain took the vote 48% with Bush on 47%. McCain won the liberals and 
moderate vote with 63% and 59% compared to Bush with 34 % and 37% respectively. 
As expected, the Democrat vote swung significantly for McCain with 79% compared 
to 18% for Bush. Similarly the Independent vote was also captured by McCain 60% 
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to Bush’s 34%. 
Similarly Bush managed to capture those votes thought most likely to favour 
him. Those described as Conservative and very conservative voted 59% and 74% for 
Bush contrasted to McCain with 37% and 16%. Those described as the religious right 
voted for Bush with 68% while 24% went for McCain. Amongst the issues Bush drew 
67% of the anti-abortion vote compared to McCain’s 19%. On taxes and moral values 
Bush won 78% and 55% to McCain with 20% and 36% correspondingly. Party 
identification saw Bush take 69% compared to McCain’s 26%. Regarding their 
 
 
TABLE 4.lxix 
 
 SOUTH CAROLINA: Primary Election: March 2, 1996 
 
Republican Candidates   Votes  Percentage 
 
Dole, Bob     124,904    45.13  
Buchanan, Pat     80,824     29.20  
Forbes, Steve             35,039     12.66  
Alexander, Lamar    28,647     10.35 
Keyes, Alan        5,752     2.08 
Lugar, Richard       1,017       .37  
Gramm, Phil    467      .17  
Taylor, Morry                         91       .03  
 
 Total Party Votes:               276,741          
 Total State Votes:               276,741      
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TABLE 5. lxx 
SOUTH CAROLINA: Primary Election: February 19, 2000 
Republican Candidate  Votes   Percentages 
Bush, George W.   305.998  53.39 
McCain, John    239.964  41.87 
Keyes, Alan    25.996   4.54 
Bauer, Gary    618   0.11 
Forbes, Steve    449   0.08 
Hatch, Orrin G.   76   0.01 
 
    Total Party Votes:  573.101 
Total States Votes: 573.101 
 
 
campaign messages Bush came out on top as a “reformer with results” by 95% to 
McCain with only 3%. On McCain’s slogan of “campaign finance” McCain came out 
on top with 67% (see appendices B for all data regarding exit polling). lxxi                                                   
Political necessity required Bush to indulge in certain characteristics of the 
political map in South Carolina. Becoming more conservative and with some 
unexpected help from McCain, Bush was able to place his political ambitions back on 
track. But there was a cost. The damage inflicted on McCain was such that it did not 
just remain within the confines of South Carolina, it effectively dented his whole 
presidential ambition. But McCain was not the only one scathed from the encounter. 
Having moved from, “Bush the moderate” to Bush the Conservative, dropping the 
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“compassionate” and visiting establishments like the Bob Jones University helped 
Bush pick-up a number of his rightist labels. These tags remained and much of the 
thinking surrounding George W. Bush and his association with the Religious Right as 
well as the smear campaign raged against McCain emanates from this period. 
Conversely, the Religious Right having previously failed to rescue David Beasley 
(former South Carolina Governor) for his second term now felt empowered in having 
delivered for Bush. The South Carolina firewall had been re-kindled and there was the 
potential to see a religiously favourable candidate go all the way. Briefly the 
Religious Right machine had worked, but there was a price. As Robert Draper has 
pointed out after the “Machiavellian triumph on February 19 [Bush] found himself 
with a lot of explaining to do”. Shifts from the centre to the right, key religious 
associations and changes in slogans required Bush re-locate to the middle ground. 
This was not a pure-bred religiously orientated man moving forward regardless; this 
was a politician making political modifications. All of a sudden there was a reversion 
to Bush the “compassionate, all over again”. lxxii                                                                                          
 What Bush discovered in the early primaries was a formula. Whether it was 
prudent to stick with this method is contentious, but the decision to embrace religion 
in politics was nevertheless a means of achieving power. Religion could be a guide, 
an influence, and, most importantly as it would turn out, a valuable asset. The 
Religious Right had had years of developing involvement to know that the art of 
politics was negotiation; the relatively brief period of the South Carolina primary 
showed is that the convergence in this negotiation between religion and politics was 
about opportunities for and arbitration by both sides. Shaped by practical 
circumstance the Religious Right saw the opportunity to advance its many causes and 
actors in what may have appeared a pro-friendly presidential candidate. Conversely, 
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George W. Bush utilised his own faith, experience and contacts for his own 
development.  
 This union is not licence, however, to call religion and politics, Religious 
Right and Presidential campaign one and the same. There were many variables in the 
opportunities envisaged by each side, but it was arguably Bush who, through strategy 
and not scripture, was more proficient in achieving his goal.  
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Already conservative in its outlook the 1950s and 1960s saw the emerging GOP ruled by white 
evangelical Protestants.  
 
 
ii   Politics1. Iowa Caucus. 2000 presidential primaries. <http://www.politics1.com/vote-ia.htm>  
1/03/07 
 
 
iii   Politics1. Iowa Caucus. 2000 presidential primaries. <http://www.politics1.com/vote-ia.htm>  
1/03/07 
 
 
iv   Karl Rove, Bush’s political strategist acknowledges these dates for the contemplation of 
 41
                                                                                                                                            
Bush’s run.  
   Kevin Philips. American Dynasty. How the Bush Clan Became the Worlds Most Powerful 
and Dangerous Family. (2004) Penguin. p. 84 
 
 
v   Ibid. p. 85 
 
 
vi   John Micklethwait. & Adrian Wooldridge. The Right Nation. Why America is different. 
Penguin. (2005)  p.142. 
 
 
vii   Lou Dubose, Jan Reid & Carl M. Cannon. Boy Genius. Karl Rove, The Brains Behind The 
Remarkable Political Triumph Of George W. Bush. Public Affairs Reports.(2003)  p.135  
 
 
 
viii   Going into New Hampshire some polls placed Bush and McCain neck and neck, but as 
already stated, other forecasts were far more favourable towards McCain and several entrance and 
tracking polls placed McCain ahead by as much as 12% amongst likely GOP primary participants. An 
added possibility deflecting attention away from any possible threat coming from McCain was that the 
Iowa caucus results, at that time, only showed contention from millionaire publisher Steve Forbes. In 
actual voting terms Senator John McCain was still an unknown, if popular, entity. While polls may 
have given possible indicators, they were not of course compensatory for actual results. With Iowa 
having only registered McCain in fifth position with just 5% of the vote, comparable to that of Steve 
Forbes with 30%, this was not data from which the Bush campaign team could obtain solid information 
relating to McCain’s potential strength. 
 
 
ix   Victory in Iowa had only ever resulted in a following success in New Hampshire when, in 
1976, Jimmy Carter collected both states. Since then, only incumbent presidents have succeeded in 
achieving a dual gain in both Iowa and New Hampshire, although they ran as uncontested in each state.  
 
 
x   CNN. Election 2000.   
<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/primaries/NH/results.html >16/08/2006 
 
 
xi    Lou Dubose, Jan Reid & Carl M. Cannon. Boy Genius. Karl Rove, The Brains Behind The 
Remarkable Political Triumph Of George W. Bush. Public Affairs Reports. (2003) p.140 
 
 
xii   CNN. GOP Primaries: New Hampshire. 
<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/primaries/NH/results.html> 16/08/2006 
 
 
xiii   CNN. GOP Primary: New Hampshire 
<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/primaries/NH/poll.rep.html> 16/08/2006 
 
 
xiv   H. G. Nicholas. The Nature of American Politics. Oxford University Press. (1986) p.57 
 
 
xv   CNN Election 2000. GOP Primaries: New Hampshire. EXIT POLL Results. 
<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/primaries/NH/poll.rep.html> 16/08/06 
 
 
xvi   CNN. Election 2000. GOP primary: New Hampshire. 
<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/primaries/NH/poll.rep.html> 21/06/06 
 42
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
xvii   Independents Become Largest Voting Bloc In New Hampshire. 
<http://www.pbbs.org/newshour/bb/election/iowa-newhampshire/independent.html> 9/01/08 
 
 
xviii   A record 393, 245 people cast their vote in the New Hampshire primary. 2000: A Record 
Turnout Sends Message.  
< http://unionleader.com/article.aspx?articleId=1882db41-d340-49cb-ab0f-f1acac5f395f> 21/11/06    
 
 
xix   George W. Bush. A Charge To Keep. My Journey To The White House. Perrenial. (2001) 
P.234  
 
 
xx   John Micklethwaite and Adrian Wooldridge. The Right Nation. Why America is Different. 
Penguin Books. (2005) p.39 
 
 
xxi   John Micklethwaite and Adrian Wooldridge. The Right Nation. Why America is Different. 
Penguin Books. (2005) p.38 
 
 
xxii   Robert Draper. (2007) Dead Certain. The Presidency of George W. Bush. Free Press. (2007) 
p.6 
 
 
xxiii   Ibid. p.8 
 
 
xxiv   Ibid. p.8 
 
 
xxv   First elected to the United States House of Representatives in 1982 McCain then won election 
to the United States Senate in 1986 following the retirment of Barry Golwater. In 1996 he was National 
Security Adviser to the Dole/Kemp Presidential campaign.  
 
 
xxvi  To promote this, McCain’s autobiography Faith of My Fathers which was heavily centered 
around his incarceration in Vietnam was released to coincide with the campaign. Politically, this too 
presented a potentially difficult future for Bush, namely McCain’s appeal to the strong contingent of 
veterans that resided in the next primary in South Carolina. In fact, more veterans and active duty 
service personnel per-capita than any other state resided there. Veteran census data show 14.2% of the 
civilian population in South Carolina available as votes to the war hero candidate. Acknowledgement 
of the status of the veteran vote would have been known and targeted. On September 23rd, 1999 Bush 
attended the Citadel Military College in Charleston, to give a speech on renewing the bond of trust 
between the president and the military. Even so, this was in advance of the primaries and the urgency 
then would not have been the same. 
 
 
xxvii     Salon Politics 2000. How Dubyah got his groove back. 
<http://archive.salon.com/politics2000/feature/2000/02/10/bush.html> 01/09/06 
 
 
xxviii   For McCain, this was undoubtedly a risk because in truth McCain was arguably as much a 
Washington insider as Bush could have been perceived to be. A glance at McCain’s campaign sponsors 
demonstrates this; for instance: Motorola, Viacom, Bank of America, AT & T, Boeing and Phelps 
Dodge, did not completely detach McCain from the corporate interests he espoused to attack. Neither 
should it be forgotten that McCain was one of five Senators on whom the United States Department of 
 43
                                                                                                                                            
Justice and the Senate Ethics Committee focused their attention when looking into the Keating Five 
Scandal in the 1980’s. Centred on the collapse of a large number of Savings and Loans institutions, 
McCain, along with others were judged to be the beneficiaries of large sums in campaign contributions 
from Keating after having requested that there be an easing off of the investigation. It was from that 
point on that McCain began to promote campaign finace reform. Curiously, even when the campaign 
become far more vicious in its exchanges, this issue was never raised, at least not by Bush. 
Incidentally, the platform of campaign finance reform was a significant obstacle between 
McCain and the Religious Right to whom Bush would soon turn. If successful, campaign finance 
reform would impact upon their political leverage, just as it would upon any other interest group. For 
Conservative Christians it was one of the indicators that McCain was not their man. But McCain was 
no stranger to going against the grain of the Republican Party establishment a feature that often set the 
establishment against him and was an undoubted factor in the establishment’s support of Bush and not 
McCain. Even so, the opposition one may have expected from the more rigid, Republican 
establishment in New Hampshire was at a ground level, absent. Instead, the states moderate, 
Republican tone finally aided McCain, not Bush. To reinforce all of this, McCain’s victory in New 
Hampshire had seen an upsurge in his campaign contributions. Within 48 hours McCain’s web site: 
McCain2000.com, saw pledges and donations increase, rising to $1,275,000 in online contributions. 
This gave an overall air that popular support and not big donators were at the heart of his campaign.  
 
 
xxix   McCain did indeed win these states, taking Michigan with 51% and Arizona with 60%. 
 
 
xxx   Election 2000. On Line News hour. South Carolina. After Strong Win McCain Faces Tough 
Challenge in South Carolina. 
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/election2000/states/south_carolina/update_2-4.html>  
 
 
xxxi   CNN. Election 2000. GOP Primary: South Carolina. Exit Poll. 
<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/primaries/SC/poll.re.html> 21/06/06  
 
 
xxxii   CNN. GOP Primary: New Hampshire 
<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/primaries/NH/poll.rep.html> 16/08/2006 
 
 
xxxiii   Kimberly H. Conger. & John Green. (Feb. 2002). ‘Spreading out and Digging in’. Campaigns 
and Elections, Inc. Campaigns & Elections Feb. 2002 
<http://www.theocracywatch.org/campaigns_elections_study.htm> 23/06/2006 
 
 
xxxiv    The influence within each state was based upon the percentage of Conservative Christians in 
each state Party committee.  
 Conger. Kimberly H., & Green. John,. (Feb. 2002). ‘Spreading out and Digging in’. 
Campaigns and Elections, Inc. Campaigns & Elections 
<http://www.theocracywatch.org/campaigns_elections_study.htm> 23/06/2006 
 
 
xxxv   James L. Guth. Political Science and Politics, Vol 28, No. 1. 1995. pp. 8-11. South Carolina: 
The Christian Right Wins One. 1/10/06. 
   
 
xxxvi   Kevin Phillips. American theocracy. The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and 
Borrowed Money in the 21st Century. Viking. (2006) p.172 
 
 
xxxvii   Stephen Mansfield. The Faith Of George W. Bush. Charisma House. (2004) p.82-83 
 
 
 44
                                                                                                                                            
xxxviii   Michael Lind. Made In Texas. George W. Bush and the Southern Takeover of American 
Politics. New American Books. (2004) p.2 
 
 
xxxix   Stephen Mansfield. The Faith Of George W. Bush. Charisma House. (2004) p.112 
 
 
xl   Religious Affiliation of Candidates: 
  Baptist: Gary Bauer & Al Gore 
  Episcopalian: Steve Forbes & John McCain 
 Methodist: George W. Bush 
 Roman Catholic: Alan Keyes 
 Presbyterian: Bill Bradley 
 
 
xli   Gary Bauer dropped out of contention on February 4th, Bauer only scoring 1% in New 
Hampshire. Steve Forbes stepped down from the running on the 10th February, scoring only 13%. Allan 
Keyes despite scoring only 6% in New Hampshire remained in opposition. 
  CNN. GOP Primary: New Hampshire 
<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/primaries/NH/poll.rep.html> 16/08/2006 
 
 
xlii   Martin Durham. The Christian Right, the Far Right and the Boundaries of American 
Conservatism. Manchester University Press.  (2000) p. 18  
 
 
xliii   Never shy from weaving his faith into his politics, Ashcroft received a 100% rating on all 
issues like abortion and education on the Christian Coalition score card. Putting forward his proposal to 
run, Ashcroft’s financial backing had come from individuals like Pat Robertson; in fact, Ashcroft 
received more money from religious sources than any other candidate. 
 
 
xliv   Karen Hughes, Bush’s former secretary in Texas and before long presidential council who, 
like Karl Rove was once one of Bush’s most influential guiding lights. 
 
 
xlv   Jack Tapper. Salon.Com. How Dubyah got his groove back. 
<http://archive.salon.com/politics2000/feature/2000/02/10/bush/> 31/05/07 
 
xlvi   Robert Draper. (2007) Dead Certain. The Presidency of George W. Bush. Free Press. (2007) 
p.62 
 
 
xlvii   The University is not regionally accredited as a Christian establishment. 
 
 
xlviii   The University did not locate in Greenville, South Carolina until 1947. Before then the Bob 
Jones College was near Panama City, on the Florida panhandle. From there it was relocated to 
Cleveland, Tennessee in 1933. 
 
 
xlix   Colbert I. King. ‘Bush caters to the bigotry of Bob Jones University’. The Washington Post. 
February 28, 2000  
 
 
l    CBSNews.com. Bush Regrets Bob Jones University Visit. NEW YORK, Feb. 27, 2000 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2000/02/27/politics/main165529.shtml> 12/08/07 
 
 
 45
                                                                                                                                            
li   Jake Tapper. Salon.Com. Politics2000. Jonesing for votes.  
<http://archive.salon.com/politics2000/feature/2000/02/03/bob_jones/> 17/09/07 
 
 
lii    Bob Jones University v. United States, 1983. 
<http://www.phschool.com/atschool/supreme_court_cases/bob_jones_university.html> 17/9/06 
   
 
liii   Bob Jones University v. U. S. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).  
<http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/case/39/> 15/09/06 
 
 
liv  Clearly, the engagement was at odds with the actions of a compassionate conservative and a 
candidate whose political refrain had been one of inclusion. At variance with photo ops of Bush with 
black school children and his numerous addresses in Spanish concerning anti-immigration policy to 
Hispanic and Catholic audiences, the appointment looked contrite. At a cursory glance this was not the 
actions of a centrist Republican who claimed to be expanding the Party’s appeal.  
   
 
lv   Bush’s letter of apology to Cardinal John O’Connor. February 25th 2000.  
<http://www.vdare.com/letters/w_letter.html> 11/04/07 
 
 
lvi   It is strongly recommended that further investigation be undertaken in this area. Just beyond 
our period of consideration with Bush in office, it has become clear that the alignment to conservative 
Catholics, their assignment to key posts and their implementation into prime advisory roles are worthy 
of significant concentration. It would appear that unlike the relationship with Bush’s relationship to the 
Religious Right, this was a relationship not held at arms length.  
 
 
lvii   We define Conservative Catholics here as being those who strictly uphold traditional, 
historical Catholic teachings. These concern: the sanctity of marriage, prohibition of divorce and 
homosexuality, the importance of male-only clergy and the restriction of birth control. They are also 
found to be more observant in church attendance.  
 
 
lviii   Martin Durham. The Christian Right, the Far Right and the Boundaries of American 
Conservatism. Manchester University press.  (2000) p. 48  
 
 
lix   Grover Norquist. “The Catholic Vote”.  The American Spectator. October 2000. 
 
 
lx   Crisis: founded in 1982 by Catholic neoconservative intellectuals Michael Novak of the 
American Enterprise Institute and Ralph McInerny, professor of philosophy and director of the Jacques 
Maritain Center at the University of Notre Dame. 
 
 
lxi   Deal Hudson was hired by Michael Novak and Ralph McInerny and made senior editor of 
Crisis. In 1995 Hudson was made editor and publisher of the magazine. 
 
 
lxii   Results obtained from the Barna survey, conducted from January 2000 through June 2001. 
Largest Religious Groups in the United States of America.  
<http://www.adherents.com/rel_USA.html#families> 3/05.07 
 
 
lxiii   Todd S. Purdum. Vanity Fair. February 2007. 
<http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/02/mccain200702?currentPage=1> 10/05/07 
 46
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
lxiv   David Rogers, ‘Lobbyist Funded Mailing That Hurt McCain Campaign’. Wall Street Journal. 
Tuesday, July, 11th. 2000. 
<http://www.confederate.org/publish/legal/missing/dh17cma.jpg> 8/05/07 
 
 
lxv   Federal Election Committee. 
<http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe1996/presprim.htm#sc> 3/10/07 
 
 
lxvi  http://forum.signonsandiego.com/archive/index.php/t-46091.html   5/29/2005 
 
 
lxvii   Lou Dubos, Jan Reid.& Carl M. Cannon. Boy Genius. Karl Rove, The Brains Behind The 
Remarkable Political Triumph Of George W. Bush. Public Affairs Reports. (2003) p.141. 
 
 
lxviii   Robert Draper. Dead Certain. The Presidency of George W. Bush. Free Press. (2007) p.70 
 
 
lxix   Federal Election Committee. 
<http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe1996/presprim.htm#sc> 3/10/07 
 
 
lxx    Federal Election Committee.                               
<http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/2000presprim.htm#SC> 3/10/07 
lxxi   GOP Primary: South Carolina 2000. Results. CNN.Com 
<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/primaries/SC/poll.rep.html> 3/04/08 
 
 
lxxii   Robert Draper. (2007) Dead Certain. The Presidency of George W. Bush. Free Press. (2007) 
p.80 
 
 
 47
 CHAPTER TWO 
 
RALPH REED: The pragmatic addition to the campaign 
 
 
For those asserting that George W. Bush and the Religious Right shared a 
theocratic agenda the role of Ralph Reed, former head of the Christian Coalition, has 
been a valuable part of the argument. Reed, one of the leading lights within the 
Religious Right movement and his involvement with the Bush campaign supported 
their idea that there was a natural and likeminded religious alliance. But contrary to 
this opinion this was a relationship firmly embedded in the secular. Analysis of this 
union clearly indicates this went beyond a simple religious affiliation. Indeed, this 
association is indicative of a bond forged for political and not religious interests.  
Following the devastating results in New Hampshire, Bush’s ambition was 
simply to win. In South Carolina’s the Religious Right were seen as both willing and 
capable of negating John McCain’s advantages. But despite the proclivity for 
referring to Bush as the “new leader” and a “moral center”1 for the Religious Right, 
the candidate’s qualities were not enough to mobilise the bloc. South Carolina had 
provided warnings that contrary to popular consensus, the Religious Right and 
Conservative Christians in general might not be assumed to be solely pro-Bush.2 Just 
as Doug Wead helped to reach out and navigate for George W. Bush in support of his 
father’s presidential bid, there was a similar need in this campaign.  
To marshal the faith base and their support, Ralph Reed was considered ideal. 
He was not just a religious figure but one who could move between the religious, 
political, and the corporate worlds. He did so with such ease that observers questioned 
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 whether he was a preacher, politician, or businessman. In short, he was all of these: a 
“committed Christian and a committed politician”.3 Reed’s attributes are best 
described, however, as those of an activist, a campaigner who could transform his 
image and guide his energies when and where required.  
The inclusion of Ralph Reed was a pragmatic choice by Bush’s senior political 
advisor Karl Rove who had been “thinking about the campaign for five years and 
planning for three”.4 Until defeat in New Hampshire religious aspects were features 
of the political landscape. After that defeat, Ralph Reed and religion became a 
necessity for the campaign. It was a subtle but nevertheless important shift. So why
employ Ralph Reed and what factors contributed to his importance? More specifical
how does this shape our understanding of religion and politics in the 2000 campaig
 
ly 
n?  
   
The ascendancy of the Christian Coalition,5 formed in 1989 out of the political 
apparatus of Pat Robertson’s failed 1988 presidential bid, can be ascribed to the 
talents of Ralph Reed’s energies. Reed’s breakaway in 1997 from the Coalition into 
the world of political and corporate consultancy offer the potential for further success. 
Reed himself was keen to point out that he was a “seasoned political veteran” who 
had already worked “on Capital Hill and numerous state wide and congressional 
campaigns”.6 Once again the political activist was on display. 
In 1979 whilst a freshman at the University of Georgia, Reed set his sights on 
the Universities College Republican chapter. Only 18, Reed was politically astute and 
conscientious enough to be dismayed by the chapters lacklustre image and the self 
imposed isolation of elitist fraternity. Ideologically Reed “saw a vacuum, an 
opportunity to promote hard-core conservatives like himself”.7 Reed’s creed at this 
early stage was uncomplicated: “to play to win”.8 So encompassing was his political 
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 activism that it took Reed six years to earn his undergraduate degree in 1985, during 
which time Reed elevated himself to national level leadership. Described as 
“relentless and determined”, the young activist was a “Godsend”9 to the Universities 
youthful Republicans Assisted by the arrival of the Reagan years and the 
transformation of the Republican Party in the South, Reed established his first 
political base.  
In 1981 Reed moved to Washington D.C. to intern for Jack Abramoff, the then 
Chairmen of the College Republican National Committee (CNRC). Under the tutelage 
of Abramoff and conservative strategist Grover Norquist, Reed’s political character 
was moulded.10 In 1983 Abramoff promoted Reed to Executive Director of the 
CNRC, succeeding the incumbent Norquist. The Abramoff-Norquist-Reed triumvirate 
consolidated their control by whatever means they could. During the 1980s it was the 
College Republicans who “had a plan to train a new generation of conservative 
activists by sending field teams to campuses to teach grass roots organising”. 
Eventually, this transpired into the “organisation and running of Republican 
campaigns, the building of activist groups and the lobbying of Congress”. Working on 
the principle that “personnel is policy”,11 it was a straightforward political philosophy 
that worked on the acquisition of numbers. The College Republicans, although 
established outside the Republican National Committee (RNC) had become its 
systemic supply for mobilisation. 
But in the same year as his promotion in Washington, Reed was accused of 
rigging the election for his successor as President for the College Republicans at the 
University of Georgia. Reed’s ally, unpopular amongst many in the College 
Republicans, was Sam Harben who triumphed when significant number of new 
recruits signed up for membership on the eve of the election. Eventually Harben 
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 admitted that a “dirty election”12 had been run. One of Reed's political allies later 
commented that “he is completely Machiavellian” and “will do anything to win”.13 
Reed himself once bragged that his “goal was to be the next Lee Atwater”, a political 
consultant and strategist and a “bare-knuckled, brass tacks practitioner of hard-ball 
politics”.14 
As Reed was defining his inclination for adverse or underhand political 
manoeuvrings, the young activist was proclaiming another conversion. In 1983 Reed 
had a religious experience. Until 1983, the only trace of religion in Reed was his 
Methodist upbringing. Reed admitted that despite having been raised in a “devout 
Methodist home”, by an “active mother and father in church affairs”, he had “lost 
touch with his spiritual roots”.15 However, in the same year that Reed rose to 
Executive Director of the CNRC, Reed proclaimed that “the holy spirit simply 
demanded me to come to Jesus”. In September, in a bar in Washington, Ralph Reed 
“decided to make a change” 16 after a “gentle tugging in [his] conscience”.17 This 
episode seemed at odds with Reed the “hard-ball politico”. Biblical instruction states 
that “no one can serve two masters. You cannot serve God and Mammon”, (Mathew: 
6-24). This religious conversion, however, was not so much of a transformation as an 
amalgamation. Reed’s embrace of the spiritual was not a move away from the secular 
world of politics but a welding of the two. It is a vitally important nexus in Reed’s 
political narrative. 
Faith was soon turned into political action. In 1984 a political organisation for 
evangelicals called Students For America (SFA) emerged. This was Reed’s first 
venture for incorporating religion and politics. The SFA was a diluted version of the 
soon-to-be-formed Christian Coalition; a grassroots organisation designed to support 
religious conservatives in congressional and gubernatorial contests. It proved 
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 successful. For the SFA’s first national convention in Washington D.C. in 1985, Reed 
managed to attract a number of high-profile conservatives, including Newt Gingrich, 
Jack Kemp and Jesse Helms. Along with the College Republicans, the SFA made its 
mark, “shifting campus sentiment to the right during the Reagan years”18 and 
stimulating grassroots activism at the base of the Republican Party. However, in 
comparison to other leading figures like Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell, Reed is 
given little credit for his role in mobilising Religious Right forces.  
In 1989 Reed’s career altered significantly. As part of the festivities at the 
inaugural of George W. H. Bush, Pat Robertson was to receive the SFA’s Man of the 
Year award. Reed found himself seated next to Robertson who recognized – if he was 
not already aware of - the potential in the young Ralph Reed. Reed “spoke to 
Robertson about how to maximise the defection of socially conservative Democrats to 
the Republican ranks”. Impressed the evangelist asked Reed to develop his vision for 
a grassroots political organisation. He told the former Presidential candidate “if the 
Roman Catholics and the evangelicals could get together and agree on a shared 
agenda, they would be the most effective political force that the country [had] ever 
seen”.19 Impressed, Robertson offered Reed the lead in the construction. Even though 
he was working on his doctorate at Emory University Reed accepted.   
Reed’s proclivity for political expediency and practical opportunism can also 
be found at this meeting. It was thought that Reed “never intended to run for 
Robertson’s group. He planed to become a college professor, not a Christian activist”. 
According to Reed’s wife, Jo Anne, “Robertson simply got to the finish line first, 
offering a pay check before the University had”. Moreover, Reed “did not subscribe 
to Robertson’s theology, nor was he a political supporter, Reed volunteering for Jack 
Kemp, not Robertson in the 1988 presidential race”.20 Reed’s version of events is less 
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 prosaic but neither is it opposing. What this tells us about Ralph Reed is that despite 
his own commitment to Christianity, he was willing to adjust and augment his own 
career.  
The assembly of the political machine required labour and initiative. To do 
this Reed projected a different image for the Coalition, one at odds with the 
expectations of a Religious Right organisation. The single issues of abortion, 
homosexuality, and school prayer more commonly associated with the religious right 
were subsumed in what Reed preferred to term “pro-family” policy. It was a 
perceptive strategy. Referring to its policies as “pro-family” toned down the 
Coalition’s image. It proved effective. This way, Reed managed to diffuse what was 
often interpreted as an aggressive, narrow approach, more familiar to the Moral 
Majority of the 1980s. But this was not to dismiss them. On the contrary, Reed openly 
paid homage to Jerry Falwell and the Moral Majority for the “blazing trail” that “pro-
family operatives walked”.21  
Reed’s strategy was simple: “spread the net”,22 configuring the Coalition to 
appeal to the broadest possible audience. In his political biography Reed quoted the   
apostle Paul to explain his approach: “I have become all things to all men that I may 
by all means save some”.23 In an article for the Weekly Standard he stated that, “What 
we have in mind is not a Christian agenda or even a Republican agenda. It is not a 
special interest agenda of any kind. It is a pro-family agenda which restores autonomy 
to the two parent family”.24  
For the wider audience this was a more acceptable platform; more importantly, 
it made the Christian Coalition central to grassroots American politics.25 Posing 
himself the initial question, “what do religious conservatives really want”? Reed now 
answered: “They want a place at the table we call democracy”.26 People of faith 
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 should no longer be on the sidelines of political participation but an integral part of 
the process. This process, Reed believed, needed to find and speak a “similar 
language” of a “secular culture”, and the purpose was not to “dominate” but to 
“participate”. The “pro-family” Christian Coalition did not wish to “elect Billy 
Graham to the presidency” but wanted to “give our values a voice in the process”.27 
Devoid of the fire-and-brimstone evangelism that one would have expected from a 
religious conservative group came something different. Businesslike Reed presented a 
new face as well as a new style. His “media appearances” contributed significantly to 
“build and sustain the Christian Coalition”.28 His presence and presentation proved a 
winning combination.   
Tactically Reed understood that it was not Washington that directly needed the 
focus of the Christian community but the state. It was in the counties, 
neighbourhoods, school boards, and state legislatures that Reed correctly surmised 
were the battle grounds. From the ground up, not the top down change could be made. 
If the Coalitions mission of “reversing the moral decline and encroaching 
secularism”29 were to be carried out then this was the method. Reed stated that “the 
Lord is going to give us this nation back one precinct at a time, one neighbourhood at 
a time, and one state at a time”.30 Stealthily, the Coalition made steady progress into a 
“number of elections for city and county office” by “affiliated candidates running for 
a variety of posts”. The “customary campaign venues were sidestepped”, and by 
“cross-referencing membership lists of conservative churches with registered voters” 
the bloc was targeted more precisely. More importantly Reed sought to get the 
religious observant in general and not necessarily those who leaned Republican. For 
Reed it was a meticulous task.31   
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 Similar to Karl Rove, the drive for Reed was in the detail. To many this type 
of political organisation and activism was hum-drum, removed from the exciting end 
of the political spectrum. For Reed it was essential; the organisation of state chapters 
was “the enfranchisement of one of the largest and most under-represented 
constituencies in the United States”; a body that would be a “national political 
organisation dedicated to mobilising, educating and activating Evangelicals and their 
Roman Catholic allies”.32 Reed turned the Coalition into “more of an electoral 
machine than a lobby”, giving “spectacular success in turning out voters”, particularly 
in “closely run races”.33 If the Coalition’s aims were to be fully realised, however, 
they had to make inroads into party politics at a higher level. The state-based strategy 
was its strength but it was in Congress that it needed to be effective. 
Reed’s contributions to Newt Gingrich’s (R-Georgia) legislative programme 
in the mid-1990s, “The Contract with America”, went some way to achieving this. It 
was around the policies of the Contract with America that Republican candidates 
could hopefully campaign in the 1994 congressional elections. Reed was initially 
petitioned for his input by the chairman of the House Republican Conference Dick 
Armey.34 The Contract with America, partly pushed, promoted and financed by the 
Coalition, offered an involvement that the grassroots voter could see as a tangible 
inroad into the political process. As Reed indicated, “political involvement is a 
dynamic process” that neither religion nor politics were exempt from changing each 
other.35   
Reed’s approach, always leaning more towards the political strategist than the 
spiritual advisor, did not go unrecognised. Describing him as “a born again Christian 
with a fine sense of the secular mechanics of American politics”,36 Time highlighted 
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 an individual who appeared to be more infused with politics than religion. The 
question was how to utilise his flexibility, his attitude, presentation and tactics.  
By 1996 the coalition claimed to have 1.7 million members.37 This was a huge 
jump, compared to Reed and Robertson’s proclamation that the Coalition had 
“twenty-five thousand members and twelve state chapters”38 within its first year. 
Reed referred to this simply as “building up political capital”.39 Under Reed the 
Coalition was enthused, moving forward into the modern political arena. Over the 
course of the next eight years Robertson’s initial assessment of Reed proved ac
as he cultivated a flourishing and influential organisation and a dominant force within
the Republican Party. To those within the Coalition and the Religious Right grouping 
as a whole Reed appeared the figure of a triumpha
curate 
 
nt.  
 
It was with mixed emotions then that on April 23, 1997 Ralph Reed 
announced his departure from the Christian Coalition to pursue the role of a political 
consultant. The political consultancy firm Century Strategies based in Atlanta, 
Georgia was formed. Century Strategies was described as a consulting service for 
campaigns with “pro-life, pro-family and pro-free enterprise candidates at every level 
of government”.40 Although Reed did not rule out Century Strategies working for a 
Democrat, it was apparent that whilst a door had been left open to the Coalition the 
newly formed company was more suitably arranged for Republicans and in particular 
the Religious Right. The departure looked to be a complete transformation, a re-
invention appearing to show Reed firmly embedded in the secular world of politics. 
However, the move from the Christian Coalition to Century Strategies was not a clean 
break.  
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 Despite his projected departure from the Coalition on September 1, 1997, 
Reed remained on the board of the Coalition until December 1998.41 In his farewell 
press conference, Reed stated that the reason for remaining connected to the Coalition 
was to help the organisation find a successor. In spite of Reed’s proclivity as a 
political strategist it was not a renouncement of his religious ties. There were other 
practical reasons for remaining. In addition to “helping find a successor” Reed had 
residual interests such as the Samaritan Project, the Coalition outreach programme 
designed to help inner-city poor and he pledged ongoing support for other faith-based 
initiatives, ministries and organisations, in particular the American Compass.42  
Reed’s departure appeared timely, however. In fact, there was a strong 
argument that Reed had reason to court a degree of estrangement from the Coalition. 
It remains to be ascertained definitively but Reed’s departure from the Coalition has 
been closely linked to the Coalition’s demise. While it is possible to plot a rise in 
Reed’s fortunes it was also possible to plot varying degrees of failure in the Coalition. 
 As early as 1996, Judy Liebert, the Coalitions chief financial officer, raised 
concerns about financial discrepancies for over-billing with Federal prosecutors. 
Liebert maintained Reed was implicated, as he had handed over the Coalition’s 
mailing list free of charge to Ben Hart of Hart Conover, a direct mail vendor who had 
allegedly over-billed. No charges were ever brought but the wrangling and 
accusations were damaging. During 1996 the Federal Election Committee (FEC), 
(civil action No. 96-1781) “sued the Coalition for alleged violations of elections laws 
going back to 1992, including in-kind contributions for Republican candidates. The 
tax status of the Coalition allowed for funds to be channelled to political education 
projects but not directly to particular candidates”.43 The supplied voter guides were 
supposed to be non-partisan.  
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 In 1998 the religious advocacy group Americans United, which promotes the 
separation of church and state, advised that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
examine the Coalition. The following year the IRS revoked the Coalition’s 
provisional tax-exemption status, in view of the Coalitions distribution of “voter 
guides” which they deemed had been partisan. Losing up to $300,000 in back taxes 
and penalties the Coalition reorganized as the Christian Coalition of America, in both 
an effort to regain tax-exempt status and as a form of reinvigouration.44  
Free from tax exempt status, however, the Coalition was able to focus fully 
upon politics in a more openly partisan manner. Financially there were short falls. 
Between 1996 and 1997 there had been a deficit of $8 million, public tax forms 
showing that the Coalitions income in 1996 had been $26 million but only $18 
million in 1997.45 Several Churches linked to the Christian Coalition began to 
disassociated themselves, primarily for fear of losing their own tax-exempt status.46 
This exacerbated a decline in membership and resources that was now affecting the 
Coalitions image making the Coalition looking beleaguered. Critics maintained the 
membership numbers had been inflated all along, and had occasion to refer to the 
Coalition as a paper tiger.  
It is still a matter of debate how much responsibility Reed carries for the 
Coalition’s downfall. Some members of the Coalition maintained that the problems 
were post-Reed, others that it occurred on his watch. Whether or not he deserved 
blame, Reed’s departure into political consultancy was judicious enabling him to 
move more freely amongst political circles without fear of been labelled as someone 
simply from the religious right. Reed’s value was twofold. On the one hand he was 
useful as a political consultant whilst maintaining valuable ties with the religious 
grouping.  
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 This dual positioning was the most understandable of reasons for including 
Reed into the Bush campaign. It was a double-edged sword that the Republican Party 
faced in its relationship to the religious right was no exception for Bush. The 
necessity to align at state level where the power base of the Religious Right lay was 
something that at a national level had to be mitigated. The perception of Bush as 
someone firmly tied with the Religious Right and as a promoter of their cause rarely 
acknowledges that politically the relationship had to have a sense of balance, at least 
publicly. If Religious Right kingpins like Robertson, Dobson and Falwell offered their 
endorsement and were willing to rally their troops in support of Bush, then so be it, so 
long as it appeared to be of their own volition. This arms length affiliation politically 
suited Bush. It was also the perfect role for Reed. 
The timeline for asserting Reed’s joining the Bush campaign is usually cited  
post-New Hampshire, specifically to help after the defeat there; this is incorrect. 
Reed’s connection with the campaign was from as early as 1997.  Reed claimed that, 
three years earlier, he met with Bush and said that if he ran for the presidency he 
would like to be a part of the team and would “help in what ever capacity”47 he could. 
This timeframe corresponds to the one in which Karl Rove began his planning and 
assembly of personnel for Bush’s presidential run. But the Bush campaigns use of 
Ralph Reed at that time raises several issues. Firstly, Ralph Reed was an untried 
political consultant. Secondly, Bush already possessed a very good, tried and tested 
consultant and strategist in the shape of Karl Rove. So what was the criterion for his 
addition?  
In the first instance, the little that was known of Reed as a political consultant 
had been unproductive. In 1997, Reed joined the campaign of the Fulton County 
Commission Chairman, Mitch Skandalakis, becoming his campaigns general 
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 consultant. Skandalakis, a moderate Republican had previously and openly courted 
gay votes when running in the 1998 mid-term election cycle for Governor of Georgia. 
Skandalakis’s closest opponent, Clint Day, a staunch conservative and devout 
Christian understandably looked to the faith-base for support. But to demonstrate 
Reed’s unerring position for his client, Reed remained unmoved by his own 
affiliation, giving Skandalakis the conservative and religious support he needed. The 
Christian activist vote was perplexed. Ralph Reed, it was assumed, would show 
loyalty to his faith. Not so. Reed showed devotion to his client.48 Skandalakis won the 
primary but the negative campaigning tarnished his run for the general election.   
Skandalakis was not alone. In addition Reed’s other clients fared badly too; 
for example: Pennsylvania Congressional candidate Bob Kilbanks, South Carolina 
state senator Mike Fair, former Republican Frank Cremeans, Republican Bob Zemel, 
Governor Fob James, Jr, Gary Hofmeister and Gex “Jay” Williams all lost. Reed was 
deemed complicit not only in the campaign tactics, but in their individual failures. 
Reed denied any involvement in any aspects of negative campaigning.49 In all, an 
estimated 50% of Reed’s clients were successful, however, according to some 
observers; these figures were arrived at by “counting the number of clients Reed was 
willing to identify”.50 The actual numbers are uncertain. Despite Reeds protestations 
of innocence Reed altered his representation from “campaign consultant” to a stronger 
emphasis on “advocacy and lobbying”. Reed had changed, albeit subtly. Delicately 
this alteration gave advantages to Bush. Rather than being seen as someone with 
strong religious ties as a campaign consultant, Reed would be better thought of and 
thus presentable as advocating the campaign. This also meant that any lobbying of the 
faith base was moderated and moved into the background.  
 61
 The second point that the Bush campaign was already in possession of a gifted 
and proven political strategist is a far more complex proposition. But not only does 
this allow us to see where Reed fitted into the campaign’s plans, it also gives us a 
better idea of what mechanisms were at work within the campaign. This apparatus 
was politically, not religiously expedient.   
Karl Rove and his company Karl Rove & Co.51 formed in 1981 brought 
together a comprehensive and most sought after index of direct mailing lists. Over the 
following two decades the “response rates” from those targeted were seen as 
“spectacular”.52 This had been the financial making of Rove and was a highly 
valuable asset that Rove guarded carefully.  
It was a surprise then that in March 1999, Bush told Rove to sell the company. 
According to Bush he “wanted 120% of his attention, he wanted him full-time, day 
and night”.53 The theory was that with his company out of the way there would be no 
distraction from the campaign. Those close to Rove found this a curious request 
especially given the effort Rove had invested in the company and the fruits it had 
provided. Plus, its existence aided, not hindered the campaign.  
To a degree, Bush’s request seemed reasonable and if accepted the vacuum 
left by the companies withdrawal had to be occupied. This could explain the 
reasoning behind employing Reed and Century Strategies. The question, was could 
Ralph Reed and Century Strategies fill this void? On the strength of early results and 
experience the answer was no. Therefore there has to be additional reasoning behind 
the employment of Reed. 
This state of affairs becomes clearer once we understand that the divestiture of 
Karl Rove & Co was not, as Bush had requested, completely wholesale. In fact, there 
was a residual working presence of Karl Rove & Co. Rove was still listed as the 
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 president of the company and remained part-owner until September 2000, a fact Rove 
omitted to disclose in his financial disclosure form.54 In March, two former 
employees of Rove’s, Ted Delisi (then press spokesman for Attorney General John 
Cornyn of Texas) and Tod Olsen (a registered lobbyist) bought, incrementally, th
political consulting portion of the company
e 
 the 
 to 
ed 
55 along with another auxiliary of Karl 
Rove & Co called Praxis List. Over the course of the campaign Robert Bryce of
Austin Chronicle, wrote on August 2, 1999 that the Bush campaign paid $51,573
the Praxis List Company, in addition to the Olsen & Delisi Company who receiv
$155,000 for direct mail work.56 Clearly Rove was still closely tied to the companies 
and to some degree still in control. 
But there were broader dimensions to this situation. Any monies involved 
remained it would appear in a form of loop, never moving too far away from the 
campaign. With the view that Rove’s firm was no longer in play it gave a sense of 
legitimacy to Reed’s inclusion while at the same time having no detremental effect on 
the actual machinery of the campaign. What is remarkable about the establishment of 
the Bush/Reed alliance was that Reed’s acquisition and presence was undertaken and 
carried out quite implicitly. This was not surprising given the reality of Karl Rove’s 
lingering presence. 
As an almost hidden feature, Ralph Reed and Century Strategies downplayed 
the potential for a harmful affiliation between Bush and religious forces. Having 
Reed’s advocacy and lobbying was a bonus – any campaign was allowed more than 
one consultant - but the clearest link to success for Reed remained the narrow cast of 
the religious base. This would have provided an oblique link to the mobilisation of the 
evangelical vote under the guise of political consultancy. Tactically Reed was an 
inactive, but primed, link between Bush and the Religious Right. Should Reed’s 
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 services and/or loyalty be needed it was better to have him on the inside and standing 
by, rather than on the outside.  
On 25, January 2000, a New York Times article by Richard L. Berke suggested 
that Reed's delivery into the Bush campaign was indeed to secure Reed’s services so 
that no other candidate could.57 The argument ran that Rove introduced Reed into the 
campaign by presenting Century Strategies with a lucrative consultancy contract with 
the Texas based energy corporation Enron. Enron, now firmly established as having 
had a deep reach into the Bush political machine was ideally placed to offer such a 
luring and anchoring role. As political analyst Kevin Philips wrote “it is unclear 
whether the Bush family built Enron or vice versa.” In fact, Enron was, according to 
the Centre for Responsive Politics, the most generous contributor to the Bush 
campaign with $2.3 million between 1999 and 2000.58 Karl Rove was one of a 
number of soon to be White House officials who were listed as share holders in 
Enron. Along with Dick Cheney, Lewis “Scooter” Libby and Nicholas E. Calio 
amongst others, Rove had a particularly large portfolio valued at between $100,000 
and $200,000.59 There was certainly scope for such a deal. 
What is certain is that in September 1997 Century Strategies accepted 60 and 
the association continued until October 2001, when, according to Tim Phillips, 
Century Strategies Vice president, it ended “in mutual agreement”.61 During this time 
Ralph Reed was in receipt of between $10.000 and $20.000 a month.62 In all, Enron 
paid $300.000 in fees to Century Strategies.63 
Prompted by the New York Times article the conservative watchdog, Judicial 
Watch, Inc.64 called for a federal investigation. This was to examine whether the 
contract between Reed and Enron was to avoid Reed’s fee coming from Bush 
campaign funds. Had Reed have been paid by Enron on behalf of the Bush campaign 
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 in a form of “in-kind” payment, it would have violated the Federal Election Campaign 
Act [U.S.C. 441B] which Judicial Watch was adjudged it had. The suggestion was 
that Ralph Reed was brought into the fold via the contract with Enron. This was 
considered an “in kind” way of securing his services. It was speculated that it was 
Karl Rove in particular who made the offer to Reed. Reed denied that Rove had “put 
in a good word for him”65 with Enron, advocating that the contract with Enron was 
completely separate.  
In an interview on January 26, 2002 with CNN’s Judy Woodruff, Reed faced 
questions on the New York Times article. Reed denied the accusations but confirmed 
various points. Reed also confirmed that he did indeed join the Bush team and more 
specifically from “early 1999”66 his firm was paid for its services by the Bush team 
and the Republican National Committee. Federal Election Commission filings do 
confirm this. Reed stated that the notion that sources telling the New York Times that 
“Enron took care of Reed”, were “untrue”.  
However, Woodruff raised a problem. Century Strategies initial brief from 
Enron was to organise grassroots support for the de-regulation of electricity in the 
state of Pennsylvania. Enron’s overall aim was to win a central role in that particular 
states market. Nationally Enron aspired to the deregulation of the United States 
energy markets with a view to freeing up the market for its own manoeuvres. But 
“Pennsylvania politicians found it curious that Mr Reed would be enlisted in a state 
where he had little experience”.67 Woodruff said that “CNN had done some 
checking” and had discovered that Enron “has no electricity customers in th
Pennsylvania, so what exactly were you doing for them back in 97”? Reed’s answer 
was philanthropic and elusive. “We were organising customers; encouraging support 
for deregulation that would allow for more competition and more choice. It was a 
e state of 
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 great success. Implemented by the public service commission it became a model for 
the nation”.68 Woodruff then pointed out that it had indeed been implemented; and, 
signed into law in “December 96”,69 some ten months before Reed joined Enron.  
In February 2003 the Federal Election Committee (FEC), promted by the New 
York Times report, found that the decision by Enron to hire Reed was not an “in-
kind” way of securing his services on behlaf of the Bush-Cheney presidential 
campaign. The FEC did find, however, more money involved than had originally been 
estimated and did conclude that there was a lack of work for these sums. Whilst the 
FEC could only deal in hard facts it remained clear that whether through an “in-kind” 
payment or not Reed’s services were not in the employment of other candidates and 
as a channel to the Religious Right the Bush campaign could remain aloof. Karl Rove, 
however, whose continued involvement was deflected by the involvement of Reed 
and Century Strategies. Furthermore, substantial amounts of campign money 
remained within the confines of the campaign.  
What emerged from this period was the lack of clarity to the Bush/Reed 
relationship. Overall there was a feeling of detachment, a disconnected and aloofness 
that harboured distrust. While this allowed for a separation to any negative aspects of 
the campaign that would follow, it also came at a price. In the fall of 1998 Ralph Reed 
signed on with Microsoft a contract not revealed to the Bush campaign. The 
undertaking of the contract was understandable, Microsoft paying $20,000 a month 
for Reed’s services;70 nevertheless it appeared to be a conflict of interest. In April 
2000 the New York Times reported that  it was alleged that due to pressure from the 
Clinton Justice Department for supposed monopoly and anti-competitive practice, 
Microsoft needed to lobby for its own support to counter balance the accusations and 
any impending penalties that may ensue. The argument ran that through Reed 
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 Microsoft hoped to find more targeted support with Republicans and Conservatives. It 
was thought that through those opposed to Clinton they would find more ideological 
favour for their laissez-faire and anti-regulatory approach.  
In addition to this, the potential to lobby the candidate seen as most likely to 
win not only the nomination but the presidency suited Microsoft to winning future 
goodwill from the Bush campaign. But significantly there was no disclosure of the 
Microsoft contract to Bush. When an apology from both Reed and Century Strategies 
was eventually forthcoming it became apparent that Governor Bush was indeed 
unaware that “one of its senior consultants was lobbying the campaign behind the 
scenes”.71 Scott McClelland, a spokesman for the Bush campaign stated that “Reed’s 
Microsoft contract was an unpleasant surprise for us”.72  
Despite the negative press and the obvious embarrassment handed to the Bush 
Campaign, Reed denied any accusation of stealth lobbying on behalf of Microsoft 
towards the Bush campaign. Nevertheless, Reed remained a client to both Bush and 
Microsoft. Evidently, Reed had his own agenda and its guiding principles were far 
removed from the religious. But the failure to dismiss Reed demonstrated that he had 
potential value in other quarters. Although the story broke post-South Carolina the 
value of maintaining Reed’s services as a possible conduit to the Religious Right vote 
had already been demonstrated. Favourably, South Carolina also held any possible 
rewards for having placed the Bush campaign back on track. South Carolina was once 
more the focal point.  
It is worth noting that similar to Bush, Reed did not go into South Carolina 
unaware of its character or political machinery, due to his work for Bob Dole’s 1996 
presidential campaign four years earlier. When Bob Dole saw a heavy defeat to Pat 
Buchanan in New Hampshire and a late rally in the Republican primaries from Steve 
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 Forbes, the South Carolina “firewall” came once more into life, partly through the 
involvement of the Christian Coalition who mobilised the states Religious Right base 
against Forbes and Buchanan. Reed, along with South Carolina Governor David 
Beasley was instrumental in uniting the faith base behind Dole.  
The 1996 Republican primary was comparable to the contest in February 
2000. Similarly, the religious right was not in agreement and whilst Reed supported 
Dole, Gary Bauer opted for Pat Buchanan. Whilst Gary Bauer was, like Reed, 
arguably as political as he was religious, his approach was far less pragmatic. Reed’s 
big tent strategy enabled him to take a more conciliatory approach to the running 
field. Bob Dole although viewed as the expected winner “needed the Coalition’s 
support and would thus be amenable to its demands”. Buchanan, although possessing 
a “base amongst Christian activists had the potential to threaten the Christian 
Coalition’s position as the dominant force for social Conservatism”. In short, the 
Christian Coalition was unhappy about some of Buchanan’s stances, namely his 
“attitudes towards Israel and protectionism”.73 This matter-of-fact manner in which 
the religious right, or certainly Reed and Bauer were willing to take demonstrates 
their practical approach. Reed would not have been remiss about any lessons learnt 
from 1996. He certainly had more knowledge than Bush of South Carolina.  
As a result Reed would have been acutely aware of several warning signs.  
Despite successes in 1996 there were also recent failures. In 1998 the incumbent 
Republican governor of South Carolina, David Beasley, himself helpful in the 
Religious Right’s mobilisation in 1996, was ousted by Democrat Jim Hodges, the 
former minority leader of the state House of Representatives. The so-called solid 
Republican South was hit hard that year with losses in both Alabama and Georgia. 
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 The firewall, temporarily, had faltered for one of its main protagonists. The Religious 
Right base so strong in 1996 was deficient in its turn out that year.  
But by 2000 the mood was mixed. As the nineties came to a close the 
Religious Right were in one of their many periods of apparent breakdown. Following 
the acquittal of President Clinton in 1999 social conservative and president of the free 
Congress Foundation and co-founder of the Heritage Foundation Paul Weyrich’s tried 
to sum up the mood. In an open letter to fellow conservative leaders Weyrich’s 
February 16, declaration called for “quarantine”, for Conservative Christians to “drop 
out of this culture, and find places where we can live godly, righteous and sober 
lives”. There was, according to Weyrich “no longer a Moral Majority”.74 Had the 
concept that the religious right was one, monolithic element been true then it may 
well have expired through this period, but it was not and it did not.   
Ironically, the apparent balkanisation of the Religious Right grouping 
following the Clinton years was given unity, particularly as the running field of 
potential suitors for to support in 2000 looked promising. As Clinton’s final term in 
office came to a close and by using the anti-Clinton feeling as fuel, there now 
appeared a real chance for a pro-Christian candidate to succeed and promote their 
causes. Weyrich’s letter may have highlighted the mood amongst some evangelical 
Christians but generally it was not heeded. The apparent fragmentation of the 
grouping allowed for evolution in some whilst others waned. Reed’s step down from 
the Coalition seemed to add to the notion of a meltdown amongst the Religious Right, 
but Reed was one of those who managed to develop. Amidst the uncertainty, 
however, Reed’s ensuing progress would add in some sense to a feeling of cohesion 
as he worked to unite the faith base behind Bush.  
 69
 Reed’s brief, we can assume, was uncomplicated: to convince the Religious 
Right that George W. Bush was preferable to the maverick McCain. Whereas there 
was little enthusiasm for Bob Dole in 1996 there was a very different feel to the 
candidates in 2000, particularly towards George W. Bush. To assist him Reed had 
several advantages. In addition to using his vast Rolodex, McCain could not or would 
not morph into anything else and was, as we have seen, largely complicit in his own 
demise. It was therefore best to let McCain be himself. Furthermore, the Religious 
Right were already tepid towards McCain. This came largely on the point of abortion 
where McCain was seen as inconsistent. But it was the actual mobilisation of the 
grass roots voter, the accumulation of numbers on the ground that were needed to 
swamp anything McCain could muster. To achieve this, the voter had to be turned 
away from McCain, put-off as completely as possible. Ralph Reed certainly seemed 
the best equipped to do this.   
The Christian Coalition that Reed had appeared to move away from was now 
the link needed to help smooth the progress of his client Bush. It was Pat Robertson 
then whose assistance was needed. The Robertson endorsement came early on and 
was arguably a figure already in position. When Bush spoke to the Associated Press 
in March 1999 stating that “America is not ready to overturn Roe v. Wade because 
America’s hearts are not right”, it naturally caused a sense of unease amongst the 
social conservative pro-life base, so much so that Robertson came quickly to Bush’s 
aid, proclaiming that Bush was “profoundly pro-life”.75 Later on into the campaign 
Robertson made his and the Religious Right’s position that he believed he 
represented, very clear. Speaking in February with Wolf Blitzer on CNN’s Late 
Edition Robertson said: “if he [McCain] becomes the Party’s nominee the Coalition 
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 would sit this vote out. We would not support him and you would see a lot of 
Christian support for the Republican Party go out of the door”.76  
Politically and religiously Bush and Robertson had history. We should recall 
that Bush garnered support amongst the Religious Right base for his father against 
Robertson in 1988 and that he spiritually, as well as very publicly, rallied against 
Robertson during his Texas Governorship in the Karl Faye Tucker trial. Sentenced to 
death for the murder of two people Karla Faye Tucker “found Jesus and salvation”77 
and even went on to marry a prison chaplain. In looking to diminish her sentence she 
came to the attention of the Religious Right who rallied to help appeal against her 
sentence. Pat Robertson was one of those who led the charge. But whatever Bush’s 
own faith he was first and foremost the Governor of Texas with, as Bush termed it, “a 
charge to keep”. For Bush there was “no room for religion in public policy.”78 
Whatever protestations were made to Bush by Robertson about Karla Faye Tucker 
Bush remained steadfast. To possibly explain no residual acrimony between them it is 
worth noting that Bush, as outlined in his political biography, saw Robertson a 
friend.79 Viewed this way the alignment by Robertson to the establishment choice and 
as a channel for Reed gives us a personal as well as a political angle. It also 
emphasises that these men were guided by more than religion. This aspect of going 
beyond the religious was an important, if not overlooked element to the relationship.  
Strategically, Bush was advantageously positioned to challenge McCain in 
South Carolina. What remained was for tactics to be implemented. One of the most 
important traits to emerge from the South Carolina primary, for all the infusion of 
religion, was its lack of religious virtue. In fact, the attempt to persuade the Religious 
Right and the broader electorate that Bush was “their man” witnessed the most un-
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 Christian of campaigns. Aimed directly at McCain was a savage, vituperative set of 
tactics. The question was, was their source religious?  
Throughout South Carolina floods of e-mails, telephone calls, radio adverts 
and flyers circulated the pews of the states churches negatively targeting McCain. 
McCain was accused of “fathering illegitimate children to a North Vietnamese 
woman, which, it was said was why during his captivity he had received special 
treatment from the Viet Cong”. There were also references to their “adoption of a 
dark skinned daughter from Bangladesh”. Bob Jones University professor Richard 
Hand sent an e-mail to “fellow South Carolinians” stating that McCain had “chosen to 
sire children without marriage”.80 They developed further. “McCain was gay, McCain 
voted for the largest tax increase ever, his wife stole prescription drugs from a charity 
and McCain was pro-abortion and he had left his first crippled wife”. 81 The personal 
turned political. Carol A. Campbell Jr., for example, former Governor of South 
Carolina was one of many to attack McCain’s appeal to the Democrat vote, Carol 
stating in one advert that “McCain was a tool of a Democratic plot”.82 Michael 
Graham, conservative writer and a radio host in Charleston said, “I have worked on 
hundreds of campaigns in South Carolina and I’ve never seen anything as ugly as that 
campaign. It was 100% McCain sucks”.83  
This form of vigorous, negative campaigning was promoted through pro-Bush 
hit and run political organisations that suddenly appeared and then disappeared in 
South Carolina. With an expenditure of millions of dollars they saturated the 
campaign with malign, almost unaccountable accusations; the more derogatory the 
better. But whereas McCain was the acknowledged recipient of the orchestrated 
negative campaign, Ralph Reed is often the acknowledged contributor. In fact, Ralph 
Reed has been almost completely credited for the uncomplimentary nature and tactics 
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 that the campaign took. But despite the continued proclivity for naming him, it is 
difficult to pin down any action attributed directly to him. The difficulty, then and 
now was attempting to locate sources to censure for these activities.  
In attempting to do so it became clear that although Reed may well have been 
a chief protagonist it was others who stood out more clearly. McCain’s political 
director, John Weaver remarked post-election that it was the combined effort. “Ralph 
Reed, Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell are to be congratulated,84 stated Weaver. We 
lost to the religious right proudly – they overwhelmingly turned out for Bush”.85  
Post-South Carolina McCain himself was highly critical of the same religious 
elements that he believed had seriously damaged his must win campaign there. On the 
day before the Virginian state primary on February 28, nine days after the South 
Carolina primary, McCain, still stinging from the manner of the defeat made a 
campaign address at Cox high School, Virginia Beach. McCain took the same line as 
Weaver and singled out evangelists Robertson and Falwell for the attacks. “They 
distort my pro-life message and smeared the reputations of my supporters because I 
don’t pander to them”.86 Reed was not mentioned. 
 McCain’s reference to the smearing of his supporters alluded to former 
Senator for New Hampshire Warren Rudman, the National Co-Chairman for the 
McCain campaign who was referred to as a “bigot”.87 This followed remarks Rudman 
made in his autobiography criticising the Religious Right’s role in politics in which he 
said they were “anti-abortion zealots, homophobes and would-be censors”.88 
Robertson, however, could not distance himself from the calls that McCain was 
referring to, it was his recorded voice, but he did detach his comments from the Bush 
campaign which they equally reciprocated.  
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 But McCain did not stop there. As allies of Bush’s McCain described the 
Christian right as “agents of intolerance” and denounced what he said were the tactics 
of “division and slander”.89 McCain’s assertions were also in response not only to 
what took place in South Carolina but to Robertson’s sponsored phone calls to voters 
in advance of the Michigan Republican primary on February 22. As a continuation of 
the smear campaign McCain’s abortion record was in particular challenged. 
Robertson urged voters to “protect unborn babies and restore religious freedom by 
opposing Senator McCain”.90   
Once more, McCain seemed to miscalculate his attack, even if a response was 
warranted. Despite having Gary Bauer91 by his side at the time McCain still had not 
learnt from his previous miscalculations. For one thing it was still early in the 
primaries to completely assail the Religious Right, and in particular key figures. But 
to do this on solid territory like the state of Virginia added hugely to the risk. The 
home of Pat Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Network, based in Virginia Beach 
and the base of Falwell’s Moral Majority and Liberty University which he founded 
was a curious and dangerous choice for McCain. The proximity of these attacks may 
also account for Robertson’s more high profile attacks on McCain. But it was in 
South Carolina the smear campaign’s anatomy had its genesis and it is Pat Robertson 
and not Ralph Reed who is more conspicuous in the activities against John McCain. 
Acredited with actively and effectively contributing to what John Dickerson of Slate 
Magazine referred to as “a scorched-earth”92 campaign against McCain in South 
Carolina, Robertson is certainly more in evidence.  
Unlike Reed, Robertson was the one figure who was publicly open about his 
position and dislike of McCain as well as his open endorsement for Bush. Interviewed 
on February 13, on the Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, Pat Robertson clearly spelled 
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 out his, reaffirming as he perceived it, the Religious Right position on McCain. “I do 
believe that if he [McCain] became the nominee of the Republican Party, that the 
Christian Coalition, would not put out 75 million voter guides, would not urge its 
membership to vote for anybody in the general election, and I think there'll be a 
defection of Christian Conservatives in major waves. I’m talking about a large portion 
of the Republican base would walk away”.93  
This was a powerful message. Given that the Christian Coalition had “proxies 
in all forty-six counties”94 in South Carolina it had to be taken seriously. Mobilising 
Religious Right support was not, however, the same as going negative. Crucially 
Washington correspondent Adele Stan suggested that the role of Robertson who was 
indeed perceived to be a political tool, an instrument belonging to a broader 
mechanism. Stan cited Reed, saying that Pat Robertson was in 1999 “in reserve”, 
primed to go “negative on McCain”95 should McCain prosper in those early rounds. 
This should be treated with caution, but if true, then Robertson was less autonomous 
than believed and controlled or prompted in some measure by Reed. This moves Reed 
into a completely different position in which Reed would appear to be orchestrating 
some elements of the negative campaign. What it does show is that Reed too had 
someone, a proxy in the forefront.  
This inconspicuousness is important. Along with the propensity to mention 
Reed and Robertson, Jerry Falwell was even more unremarkable. Whereas Pat 
Robertson was the most visible Religious Right figure to support Bush and the most 
vocal against McCain, Jerry Falwell was the opposite. There is no available evidence 
to link Falwell with any smear campaign against McCain in South Carolina; in fact, 
other than the continued citing of Falwell’s name no specifics, other than his general 
endorsement for Bush are visible. It can only be concluded that the collective 
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 assumption that they were all involved simply broadened the argument that the 
Religious Right were responsible for attacking McCain. This is unfounded.   
Similarly, this was the case for Ralph Reed. Critics of the negative campaign 
against McCain, including McCain himself, regularly blame him but always fall short 
of naming detail. It was understandable why Reed should be a prime suspect. The 
orchestration for such deeds had to come from somewhere and it was logical to 
assume based upon his reputation he was a source; the smothering of the states voters 
with derogatory phone calls and mailings were thought to be characteristic of him. 
The covert manner in which he was brought into the campaign did not help. But there 
is no evidence to corroborate anything levelled against him. 
Reed distanced himself from the negative telemarketing along with the other 
tactics used. Reed stated that his work in South Carolina “did not encompass attacks 
on McCain but rather dealt with mainstream issues that were central to the campaign”. 
96 The exact nature of these “mainstream issues” were not made clear, although there 
is evidence that Reed was involved in working in other areas. For example, he was 
part of the Bush Pioneer Group, one of Bush’s Rangers. Devised by Karl Rove, the 
groups aim was to raise money from friendly sources to put into the Bush-Cheney 
campaign coffers. The monies raised were substantial. Reed’s tie to the Bush 
campaign as one of Bush’s campaign strategists was in an official capacity. Beyond 
this Reed’s role remains elusive.  
What is certain is that Century Strategies received in excess of “$350,000 
from the Bush Campaign during the 2000 primaries. Included in this was $28,831 for 
telemarketing for South Carolina”. In the lead up to the Iowa primary monies totalling 
$186,10797 were paid for the October, November and December of 1999 to Reed. 
Examination of campaign fillings for Bush for President Inc. with the Federal 
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 Election Commissions index also shows that monies involved for “telemarketing” 
were far in excess of other individuals or organisations throughout that same period. 
Logically the fees involved required results and we now know that these were 
acquired in the main through negative campaigning. Either way, Reed was at the 
forefront of the campaigns advocacy and lobbying plans and pivotal in putting into 
practice suitable strategies.  
Regardless with whom he was dealing, Reed made clear his philosophy. 
Originally appearing in the Washington Post and later reported by the Weekly 
Standard, a memo sent by Reed in October 2000 to Enron executives stated, “in 
public policy it matters less who has the best argument and more who gets heard and 
by whom”.98 This snap-shot of Ralph Reed’s operating creed lets us understand that 
whether he is appealing to the Religious Right, Enron or Microsoft executives, Reed’s 
rationale was simply to gain accordingly. Put succinctly these were clients, nothing 
else.  
In the end it was a “matter of numbers”. To achieve those numbers Reed was 
paid handsomely to deliver. If the “cost of victory was high, so were its rewards”.99  
Whilst many believe Reed’s tactical fingerprints were all over the negative 
campaigning, there is no evidence to corroborate this. Invisible to the media and 
public scrutiny Reed’s get-out-the-evangelical-vote machine worked; the Religious 
Right bloc opting for Bush.   
 The best assessment is that Reed was part of a collective political machine. He 
certainly was not alone. The Party organisation erected by former Governor Carol A. 
Campbell that once aided Bush’s father and individual efforts from people like Pat 
Robertson and the alumni of the Bob Jones University were all key. Reed’s skill for 
targeting the narrow cast vote as well as his perceived political and not religious 
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 standing allowed for a broad approach that arguably few others could offer. Contrary 
to common belief, Bush’s religiosity was not enough to achieve this. Ultimately it was 
a constellation of individuals and apparatus that could build bridges, stimulate 
support, and deliver results.  
To all appearances Bush remained aloof to the tactics involved and was able to 
remain non-apologetic for the character of the campaign and the damage McCain 
received. In fact, Bush’s attitude was even-tempered. He neither condemned nor 
condoned his Religious Right support. Bush stated that they were “supporters of 
[his]”, and that he had “all kinds of supporters. The Republican Party”, he went on, 
“needs somebody who can unite our party, somebody who can bring people 
together”.100 Bush’s inference that figures like Reed, Robertson and Falwell were part 
of an all inclusive Republican Party allowed him simultaneously to both align and 
distance himself from the main protagonists. Some were less guarded and cavalier. 
Karl Rove stated that in the “aftermath of the ugly South Carolina primary” came one 
of his “proudest moments”101 when he was invited to answer to Warren Rudman 
(McCain’s campaign chairman), who felt personally maligned by the Bush-Rove 
tactics.  
102The pragmatic addition to the campaign of Ralph Reed paid dividends,  but 
more importantly it was a clear expression of what the Bush strategy represented and 
like any other political campaign the aim was to win. The acquisition of the values 
voter was the objective, a means to an end. More needs to be said on Reed’s actual 
activities within the campaign but clearly the strategy to use him worked. In South 
Carolina Bush regained his core voters.  
 Beyond South Carolina Reed’s activities for the Bush-Cheney campaign 
become even scarcer. If Reed’s activities were difficult to pin-down beforehand they 
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 were imperceptible post-South Carolina. Reed continued to work for the Bush ticket, 
expounding the virtues of supporting Bush not only for the Religious Right but also 
economic conservatives, social conservatives, moderates, pro-life and pro-choice 
Republicans. Reed continued to spread the net. Eventually, Reed became chairman of 
his native Georgia Republican Party from 2001-2002. During this time he assisted in 
the election of U.S. Senator Saxby Chambliss and the election of Sonny Perdue. More 
importantly Reed would go onto become southeast regional campaign chairman for 
the Bush-Cheney 2004 campaign. The region included for Georgia, Alabama, Florida, 
Louisiana and Mississippi. Plainly, his inclusion had been deemed valuable and 
arguably successful enough to give him such a position.    
 
Historically the decision of the Religious Right to join with “secular 
conservatives to oppose liberal policies” in the battle over “moral and family 
values”,103 was just as pragmatic as the Republican Party’s embracing of the 
Religious Right to expand its voter base. The utilisation of this space where the two 
intercede was reeds speciality. As a major force in bringing this union together Reed’s 
inclusion into the Bush campaign was both understandable and as it would turn out; 
necessary. Few other individuals could alchemize religion and politics like Ralph 
Reed. The need to reach out to the religious base following Bush’s defeat in New 
Hampshire made Reed’s inclusion even timelier. What is clear is that Reed’s addition 
in the 2000 campaign was one of political expediency. Their positions were clear. 
George W. Bush the politician and Ralph Reed the political consultant reached into a 
constituency needed to further their aims. In South Carolina this worked, but not 
without coming at a cost. Despite the advantage of letting individuals like Reed enter 
into conflict at a distance, as far from the campaign as possible, the stigma of 
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 association to the Religious Right and dirty tricks remained. In addition, the Religious 
Right may well have been effectively mobilised in Bush’s favour but as we have seen  
John McCain was largely responsible for his own demise. Another factor was the 
ferocity in which the Bush campaign waged its ground war against McCain, 
demonstrating that even in theoretically “safe states” where Bush’s core voters were 
believed to be, was not a complete certainty. The dynamics that informed Bush’s 
victory were complex, going beyond a simple entreaty to the Religious Right for 
support. Ultimately Ralph Reed’s insertion into the Bush campaign of 2000 can be 
called a success. Helping the Bush campaign to recover following its early faltering 
Reed’s navigation of the religious and political tensions both in South Carolina and 
beyond demonstrated that pragmatics had prevailed.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
STRATEGY NOT SCRIPTURE  
 
 
If Esther Kaplan, Kevin Philips and others are to be believed it is religion that 
drives George W. Bush and his politics and political ambitions are shaped by this 
drive. This perception of Bush was deemed strong enough for him to be seen not only 
as a “sympathize”1 but as the “new leader” and “moral center”2 of the Religious 
Right. Clearly, George W. Bush had a strong personal faith, placing strong emphasis 
on the role of religion within politics. This faith undoubtedly shaped his principles 
which in some cases shaped his policies. “A government that truly wants to help 
people should welcome the active involvement of people of faith”,3 wrote Bush.        
  However, to state that this is the unconditional premise to his political being 
and political actions is wrong. If, in 2000 religious advocacy became important, Bush 
did not instigate the process, he exploited it. As we saw in chapter one, greater 
religious involvement was ordered by political necessity. Indeed, the suggestion that 
religion propelled Bush’s aspirations misplaces cause and effect; it was Bush’s 
political aspirations that helped frame religion.   
This is not to say that Bush was regarded by the religious community as a 
secular leader separated from their beliefs and interests. On the contrary, some saw 
Bush quite clearly in religious terms. When on December 24, 2001 Pat Robertson 
resigned his position as President of the Christian Coalition, Gary Bauer was quick to 
assert that the new de facto head was George W. Bush, stating: “Bush is [our] leader 
now” adding he was “one of [our] own”.4 In the eyes of those willing to censure Bush 
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this kind of rhetoric could only strengthen his credentials as a religious leader whose 
approach was a potential threat to the plurality of America.  
This interpretation is suspect, however. Firstly, the religious grouping is not 
monolithic, but a confederacy. The Religious Right, like Conservative Christians in 
general are far too fragmented to have one figurehead. As Woodberry and Smith note, 
“Defining Conservative [Christians] is difficult because they belong to such a jumble 
of different denominations and movements”.5 Sara Diamond described the movement 
as a “diverse demography of all regions, all walks of life” which is cemented by the 
“homogeneity of its race (predominantly white), religious affiliation (Christian) and 
political viewpoint (Conservative and Republican)”. 6 Divisions over biblical, social 
and political objectives and stances make it even more difficult to pin down the 
movement. Terms like the Religious Right help, but we must remember that the 
spectrum of Christian political, social movements and organizations characterized by 
their strong support of conservative social and political values is an umbrella term. 
Even when viewed through individual leaders like Pat Robertson, James Dobson and 
Jerry Falwell the challenges of diversity remain. Each figure looks to prop-up his own 
position of power and each has his own religious character and social and political 
outlook.  
Added to this was the problem of impermanence. No matter how successful or 
amenable he may be, the president’s time in office is limited. This temporal difficulty 
is expanded into the often limiting power of the presidency itself. As president it was 
understandable to see why he may be able to promote their causes but in practice it 
was not entirely viable for the modern presidency to deliver. Professor James Q. 
Wilson reminds us that the modern president is a “titular head of a huge federal 
administration”.7 The complex political machine to which the President is ultimately 
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answerable checks many of his expectations, even assuming they were religiously 
driven.  
With the shift to leadership via a political figure Bauer widened the symbolic 
space for religion, within which a number of concepts could be articulated. These 
concepts were valuable to both sides. To some grass-roots supporters Bauer’s words 
may have indicated that Bush was literally “their leader”. More generally, however, it 
represented a focal point for all sides to come together. From Bush’s perspective such 
rhetoric helped maintain the appearance of a union from which he could pull support. 
As long as such rhetoric did not emanate from him, it was open to utilization. 
Conversely the Religious Right had a figure upon which to focus, to at least believe 
that Bush was, if not one of their own, then sympathetic to their causes.  
Bauer’s “symbolic” representation was an emblematic approach that furnished 
much of the structure to the Bush/Religious Right paradigm. In 2000 timing was a 
crucial factor. The end of the decade had proved a turbulent time for religious forces. 
The Religious Right in particular had seen a number of high-profile step-downs of 
key organizational figures as well as several investigations into financial irregularities 
within some of its flag-ship organizations. Added to this the acquittal of President 
Clinton disconcerted and divided the grouping even further. Conservative Christians 
in general questioned the nation’s morality but for the Religious Right, having placed 
great store in rallying against Clinton, there was the murmur of a withdrawal from the 
political arena. Paul Weyrich’s open letter was a good example of this attitude. 
Weyrich, disillusioned with politics, thought politics “had failed”. The “reason is 
because of the collapse of the culture. The culture we are living in becomes an ever-
wider sewer. In truth, I think we are caught up in a cultural collapse of historic 
proportions, a collapse so great that it simply overwhelms politics”. Believing that 
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conservatives and Conservative Christians had “lost the cultural war” he called for a 
“strategy of separation”.8 
There was then an added imperative as 2000 approached to find a focal point 
for religious stimulation and revitalization. The Religious Right needed to restore a 
sense of morality, faith and political leverage whilst Bush required political support to 
shore up his candidacy. With several overlapping and favorable religious features the 
alignment between them looked suitable for both their purposes.  
The subsequent problem of interpretation was that Bush’s critics saw these 
purposes in a purely religious context. Described by Kevin Philips as a “born-again 
favorite of conservative Christian evangelical and fundamentalist voters”, Bush, in his  
policies and rhetoric, “confirmed that bond”.9 Phillips wrote, “To understand George 
W. Bush, it is crucial to understand how the president of the United State could 
simultaneously be the leader of the nation’s Christian Right”.10 To set out the 
“symbolic space” in this manner, Bush’s critics found it necessary to make jumps in 
narrative and analysis, omit pragmatic reasoning, and marginalize political functions 
as well as political necessities to move directly to the controversial, sensationalist 
portrayal. The notion that Bush and the Religious Right had become allies for secular 
reasons was readily dismissed.  
Textual analysis of those who took this view revealed three areas that they 
most commonly employed for promoting this argument. The first feature that fuelled 
the criticism of religion behind Bush’s politics was the candidate’s use of religious 
rhetoric. The second was Bush’s outwardly-professed religious persuasion and the 
third the electoral power of the religious grouping, interpreted as a display of Bush’s 
strength and support. Collectively these elements served as the bedrock of the 
argument for a Bush/Religious Right alliance and program. 
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Bush’s Religious Rhetoric 
 
Bush’s religious rhetoric was interpreted as overtly favourable with the 
Religious Right. Esther Kaplan wrote that “Bush’s language closely reflects 
evangelical ways of speaking and habits of mind”.11 It was a clear indication of 
Bush’s unashamed faith and a blatant outreach to the religious base not only for 
support but also to reassure them that he was one of them. It was also considered to be 
language that moved beyond the civil religion expected of most leaders or dignitaries. 
However, this is problematic. Many examples used by those critical of Bush focus 
upon a post-9/11 environment. This is a wholly different setting for Bush’s 
religiously-framed language. Before 9/11, when one might have expected urgency in 
the rhetoric of candidate Bush, there was a lack of such language. Furthermore, 
Bush’s religious language and religious lobbying was usually expressed confidentially 
and in private. Even Kaplan admits that it was in “private”12 that for example Karl 
Rove met with key Religious Right figures to garner their support. This was a key 
point. Insider accounts and biographical woks on Bush show this to be a common 
theme. As Stephen Mansfield has pointed out, it was through specific audiences with 
key religious figures that Bush met with a view to “win” the Religious Right.13  
Religious oratory was uncommon. Where Bush used religious language 
publicly it was applied either quite specifically at religious gatherings or amongst 
religious representatives. It was natural to entreat specific audiences and/or 
individuals at specific locations with relevant and endearing language. Neither was 
Bush alone. Bush’s religiously affiliated contenders like Alan Keys, Gary Bauer and 
John Ashcroft used similar language at similar venues. It was Bush, however, who 
 92 
 
 
 
 
was criticised for his rhetoric.  
The most notable pre-9/11 example of Bush’s use of religious language 
occurred on December 13, 1999 before the Iowa Republican caucus in the civic centre 
in Des Moines, Iowa. Bush took part in an open debate with fellow Republican 
presidential candidates before a small but partisan Republican crowd. Taking part 
along with Governor Bush were Steve Forbes, Senator Orrin Hatch, Alan Keyes and 
despite his absence from the later caucus, Senator John McCain. What followed 
would be one of the most controversial and repeated pieces of rhetoric that Bush 
would ever utter. When Bush was asked what political thinker he most identified with 
and why, he replied: “Christ; because he changed my heart”.14  
This, to anyone critical of Bush was unambiguous.15 his words signalling two 
things; firstly, a blatant reach to Conservative Christian forces for the up and coming 
election, both in Iowa and beyond; and secondly, the insensitive involvement of 
personal faith, openly brought into the political arena. It was seen as an overtly 
sectarian response. On this occasion, like others, Bush’s words were taken to be a 
fearful prospect that a born-again Evangelical Christian was running for office, the 
implications of which were unthinkable. To Democrats, pro-choice, liberals and some 
moderates the display was simply astounding.  
Despite the furore, Bush’s opponents did not fully utilise the event to their 
advantage. One line of attack was that these were the words of a man who had just 
committed political suicide. Instead, those present took Bush’s lead. Only later was 
greater attention given to his remarks. No one went aggressively on the offensive and 
tried to turn this against Bush. The theme remained religious. Importantly the follow 
up on the podium, less cited than Bush’s response came from those sitting next to 
him. His fellow running mates opted for congratulating not criticising Bush, 
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conceding that he had stolen the debate. Senator Orrin Hatch, a Mormon from Utah, 
cited Lincoln and Reagan as his political role models but equally added that he too 
gave “witness to Christ”. He went on to say that he knew him “to be the saviour of the 
world”, and that it meant “more to him than anything else”. Gary Bauer, a Baptist also 
quoted scripture and named Christ. Steve Forbes, an Episcopalian added, “We’ve seen 
in this century the bloody consequences of not realising there is a higher authority, 
that there is a God and that life emanates from God and God only”.16  
It was reasonable for such rhetoric to be found. After all, of the estimated 
“100,000 to 120,000 Iowa Republicans expected to attend the caucuses saw a 
November poll estimate that 40% of likely Republican participants considered 
themselves to be evangelical”. The poll showed that “30% were Protestant and 17% 
Catholic”.17 Even so, Bush was dismissive of the remark and attending a town 
meeting in South Carolina on February 12, 2000 said: “I didn’t spend much time 
thinking about the answer. It just came out”.18 
Only now, with the advantage of time can we see that an open forum was not 
– nor arguably remains – a wise environment for Bush to have operated. Heavily 
maligned for his lack of articulation and clearly unsure of himself when off message, 
Bush’s remarks, under these conditions, were understandable. 
If we accept the criticism that Bush has to some degree to be tutored to 
succeed, then we have to accept that his remarks were indeed personal, unscripted and 
that his answer was therefore genuine. If Bush was honest, he was also naïve. True, 
his remarks did register with Christians as one would expect; this show of faith 
undoubtedly influencing their opinion and thus their vote; but if this were part of a 
blatant strategy to do so, it was highly risky. It was also highly improbable.  
What is clear is that Bush was not frightened to express his faith or his belief 
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that that faith could help others. Again, Bush’s only empirical knowledge based on his 
tenure as Governor of Texas showed this form of rhetorical approach not only 
possible, but acceptable. If there was a mistake, a misreading of the audience then it 
was a failure to tone it down as Bush stepped up to run for the presidency. Even some 
religious leaders joined a chorus of discontent to declare that Bush sounded more like 
a priest than a potential president of a secular country.  
One insider account proclaimed that Bush was conscientious and he “always 
took exquisite pains to avoid sectarianism when he talked about God” and that it “was 
no accident that he spoke of his faith rather than his Christianity”.19 Bush himself 
proclaimed in his biography to recognise that “faith can be misinterpreted in the 
political process”. He went on to say that it was an important part of his life”, giving 
him “focus and perspective” and that it should not be “flaunted”.20  
Even so, critics hung on to any religious expression Bush made, rarely giving 
credibility to the idea that there may be nuances to Bush’s religious language. There is 
evidence to show that some care was given to the application of religious language. 
We should note that in early 1999 Karl Rove made the addition of Michael Gerson to 
the campaign as speech writer.21 Referred to as Bush’s spiritual; scribe and listed in 
February 7, 2005 edition of Time as one of the twenty five most influential 
Evangelicals, it was Gerson who deliberately wove the religious tone into Bush’s 
scripted speeches.  
Some years later, during the second term of Bush’s presidency, Gerson 
defended himself against the use of religious language in Bush’s speeches. At a two 
day conference on religion and politics, Gerson said: “such language was not new in 
presidential rhetoric and that former President Bill Clinton referred more often to 
Jesus Christ than Mr. Bush” and that “presidents like Abraham Lincoln and John F. 
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Kennedy without difficulty invoked God in their speeches, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
announcing D-Day to the nation in the form of a prayer”. Gerson added that there 
were reasons to use religious language in presidential speeches. “I think the reality 
here is that scrubbing public discourse of religion or religious ideas would remove 
one of the main sources of social justice in our history. Without an appeal to justice 
rooted in faith, there would have been no abolition movement, no civil rights 
movement and no pro-life movement”.22 Gerson acknowledged some rhetorical 
“missteps, such as Bush’s remarks five days after the events of September 11, 2001, 
that the United States had begun a crusade”. This said Gerson was “unscripted”. 
Otherwise Bush’s words were “carefully calibrated and fully within the tradition of 
American civic religion”.23  
Sources close to Bush, like Gerson, although partisan, should be given some 
credence. Bush, not un-typically, was using religious rhetoric to political effect. At no 
point did Bush use religious rhetoric for religion’s sake. What Gerson had managed to 
highlight was the fact that “unscripted” Bush was unsound and could, as indeed he 
had in Iowa, make errors.   
Professor David Domke disagreed. He argued that Bush was not a “petitioning 
supplicant” for God’s word, as for example Roosevelt and Eisenhower had been in 
their addresses or speeches, but that Bush was a “prophetic spokesperson”. The 
former, according to Domke, is when “a blessing, favour or guidance” is sought. The 
latter is “prophetic, issuing declarations of divine desires for the nation and the 
world”. Because the president has the “unique ability to act upon these beliefs”,24 
Domke saw this as a threat and read that a “fundamentalist leadership is implementing 
its policy goals”.25 As we have already alluded, it is erroneous to believe that the 
presidential platform can ever be used to overtly promote and up-hold religious 
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practice. It is a useful distinction, but only a retrospective of Bush’s tenure will 
sufficiently answer these claims. Up until now, Bush has not “acted upon his religious 
beliefs”, neither has he “implemented” any religious based “policy”. 
Domke was not alone in his criticism. It is worth pointing out that some 
quarters of the religious community were critical too; although again, the bulk of 
disapproval came later, post-election. About 20 theologian professors of the Fuller 
Theological Seminary, the largest evangelical seminary in the country, signed a 
statement opposing what they called his “theology of war”. An example of this was 
Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address when Bush labelled Iraq, Iran and Korea the 
“the axis of evil”. Although the term was penned by David Frum (Special Assistant to 
Bush for Economic Speechwriting from January 2001 to February 2002 and an 
orthodox Jew), the Fuller statement thought it a “dichotomy between a righteous 
United States and [the] unrighteous axis of evil”. It leads, according to the statement 
“to a crusade in which Christians think the Christian thing to do is support war 
making against an allegedly unrighteous enemy”. Over the course of Bush’s 
presidency it was one of several statements delivered by the seminary. Bush’s speech 
about a “unilateral pre-emptive war in Iraq” with, as they interpreted it, inappropriate 
use of “Christian language”,26 another example.   
On closer inspection Bush’s religious rhetoric was actually representative of a 
more careful, strategic use of terminology. Also detectable was a subtlety within the 
wording. Infrequently, if at all, are words like born-again, Jesus, saved, repent, heaven 
or hell used. Instead we find religiously generic words like faith, God, spirit, service 
and charge. This refinement had its function. To non-religious ears it appeared 
complementary and in keeping for the president to use. For the religious it simply 
served to reinforce his religiosity. This feature was consistent. Either way this was not 
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the language of an unconcealed religious zealot. It has become the language of the 
critic, not Bush.27 
In reality trying to ascertain Bush’s purpose through his religious rhetoric is 
difficult. Its scarcity puts pay to this. Understandably, however, this is because Bush 
is not a preacher ministering religion for religion’s sake but a politician. Bush’s 
primary concern is first and foremost to win votes. To assist this, Bush had a 
particular, though not unique, religious advantage to reach out and garner that 
support. In fact, the non-exclusive nature of Bush’s position meant that much of the 
development for an alliance with the Religious Right was left to others. The 
constellation of individuals that surrounded Bush, like Rove, Reed, Robertson and 
Gerson had the task of tapping into and utilising the religious base. Bush’s religious 
language could assist this effort, but the motive was always political expediency.  
 
Religious Identity 
 
If Bush’s religious language was found to be limited then it can also be shown 
that other aspects of his religiosity are wanting. It had been taken for granted that 
along with the rhetoric Bush’s own religious identity was also overtly and 
purposefully expressed, particularly his evangelical identity. Core questions were 
never asked, however, about this identity.  
Take for example the use of the word evangelical. This was a label readily 
applied to Bush; but under scrutiny it holds some descriptive difficulty. The first 
challenge is that the term has a “wide reaching definitional canopy”.28 So wide in fact 
that it was possible to make a correspondence with an individual on a number of 
points, each one arguably valid. It is impossible to find one, coherent term and to 
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apply it broadly to the political case.  
In a modern context the term has come to hold pejorative connotations, a 
position favoured by Bush’s critics. Culturally as well as politically the emergence 
within American Protestantism of the evangelical and that evangelical’s deeper 
migration into the Republican Party and politics in general has been viewed with 
distaste. This has aided the interpretation of the evangelical as someone over-
enthusiastic or zealous in pursuit of their cause. In the same vein the impression we 
get from the modern application of the term implies that the evangelical is only of a 
certain type of Christian. This is not true. In fact a more conventional understanding 
of the term, though less used, sees the evangelical as “relating or belonging to any 
Protestant Christian church whose members believe in the authority of the Bible and 
salvation through the personal acceptance of Jesus Christ”.29 It has been the activism 
of a certain type that has helped to diminish this though. When asked about its 
classification, even Bush was hesitant upon the point. “I’m not even sure what the 
characteristics of an evangelical are in common parlance”, he said. One may have 
expected Bush to have been clearer; after all, according to his critics he was supposed 
to be the unconcealed evangelical (in the pejorative sense) proffering a religious 
cause.   
There were other problems. For those who deemed him to be an evangelical, 
Bush’s use of religious rhetoric held no surprises; after all, it is the task of an 
evangelical to evangelise or proselytise, to spread the gospel, and to preach the good 
news. Ordinarily this particular feature should hold control over all other actions and 
become the leading imperative for the religious individual. For Bush, however, 
evangelical outreach was subordinate to his primary position and function: politician. 
We cannot, in an unconditional sense, call Bush a preacher.  
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As the president of the United States, Bush cannot evangelise. He cannot use 
the presidential platform to espouse Christian doctrine and advocate the Christian 
faith with a view to conversion of others. The point itself was noted by Bush. When 
asked about a “moral obligation to try to urge people to follow the same path”, Bush 
replied: “Not in my line of work, I don’t. My line of work is political. My line of 
work is to walk the walk and respect others and respect their religions”.30  
To help clarify this notion of Bush the evangelical further, we can apply a 
model based upon one of the most common forms of classification for the term. This 
allows us to view Bush even more as a secular, pragmatic politician than a religiously 
orientated man with a religious cause. It also helps to highlight the tensions between 
the public and the private where much of the misunderstanding arises.  
According to historian David Bebbington there are four “specific hallmarks” 
that characterise the evangelical. These hallmarks see the evangelical Christian as 
someone who “affirm[s] to a few key doctrines and practical emphasis”. Firstly, there 
is conversionism, the belief that lives need to be changed or that there is an emphasis 
on new birth as a life changing experience of God. Secondly, there is crucicentrism; 
that is: a stress on the sacrifice of Christ on the cross. Thirdly there is Biblicism, a 
particular regard for the Bible or reliance upon it as an ultimate authority. And lastly, 
there is activism, the expression of the gospel in effort; namely: spread the faith.31  
 
Conversionism 
 
This would seem an easy proposition to apply to Bush. One of the most 
commonly applied expressions to Bush in relation to his Christian conversion and his 
stance as a Christian is the term “born-again”. But once more the term should be 
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treated cautiously. To begin with, Bush himself has never used the term, saying he 
was uncomfortable with it. When asked during the campaign  by the Baptist Press, 
(the national news service of the Southern Baptist Convention), if he would describe 
himself as “born-again” Bush evasively replied, “I would describe my self as 
someone raised Christian, who sought redemption and who found Jesus Christ”. In an 
interview with Steven Waldman, the editor of Belief Net, in October 2000, Bush 
stated that “the way I like to put it is I redirected my life to Christ”. When pressed if 
his “experience had been born-again”, Bush responded: “I call it a renewal of faith”.32 
In short, Bush has never used the term and refuses to be drawn explicitly upon the 
point.  
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Bush’s own take on how he became “born-again” is well documented, giving 
us a clear impression of how his conversion came about and what we should infer 
from it. Recounted in “A Charge To Keep” Bush states that it was in 1985 that his life 
changing conversion took place. While on vacation at the family home in 
Kennebunkport, Maine Bush encountered the family friend Billy Graham. “Over the 
course of that weekend”, Bush wrote, the “Reverend Graham planted a mustard seed 
in my soul, a seed that grew over the next year. It was the beginning of a new walk 
where I would recommit my heart to Jesus Christ”.33 Bush’s words alluded to 
Mathew 13:31-32, a biblical description of the slow growth of faith, a reading 
removed from the lightening bolt awakening that is so often associated with being 
“born-again”. The key point here is that in Bush’s own words “it grew ov
Theologically it would be correct to refer to Bush’s experiences as “born 
again” as described in John 3:3. However, there are some interpretations that hold that 
in an “instantaneous sense” this was not the case. The majority of Protestant church
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do give less emphasis on the conversion or “experience” and focus rather upon the 
individual’s pers
e frame.  
Conversely some evangelical, fundamentalist and charismatic Christian’s 
associate being born again with a greater emphasis on the conversion itself. This 
involves an intense almost lightening strike encounter with the power of God. It is t
this interpretation that Bush is commonly thought to belong. Historically the Bu
family is Episcopalian and Anglican both of which falls under the umbrella of 
Mainline Protestants. George W. Bush is no exception and is officially a Methodist. 
phasis for the Methodist is on the statement of faith and not the conver
What this serves to do is moderate our impression of Bush. The slow, 
progressive born-again Methodist appears somewhat removed from the aggressive, 
negative tag of a Southern Conservative Christian speaking in tongues and lab
themselves born again. Unlike Ralph Reed who walked out of a Washington 
restaurant and was instantaneously “born-again” Bush’s was a more measured 
approach. This, more considered classification
h
 
C
Crucicentrism refers to the emphasis in evangelical theology on the atoning 
death of Jesus and is often presented as the only way to salvation. According to 
Bebbington it is “the conviction that Christ’s death on the Cross provided the means 
of reconciliation between a holy God and sinful human beings”.34 In short, seeing 
what God gave as his sacrifice we, the sinful, can believe in him.                                                                 
 
 
 
 
 It is true that Crucicentrism can be applied to all evangelicals, with the 
crucifixion of Jesus Christ remaining the predominant symbol of redemption and a 
pivotal feature of the Christian faith, but Bush’s individual feelings or approach to this 
are little-known. In outlining his faith Bush said, “I’m a Methodist. I’m an active 
church member, I attend church, I like church, I've heard great preachers and I’ve 
heard not-so-great preachers. I love the hymns, I read the Bible daily and I pray on a 
daily basis. I’ve got a structure to my life where religion plays a role. I understand 
religion is a walk, it’s a journey. I fully recognize that I’m a sinner, just like you. 
That’s why Christ died. He died for my sins and your sins”.35 With this statement, 
Bush offers a thoughtful description of this particular hallmark; but all this does is 
highlight the sincerity of his faith through a belief in one of its central themes. It does 
not accentuate an alignment to the Religious Right in any additional sense other than 
sharing a broader, common point of view. This cohesion, even in the eyes of Bush’s 
sternest critics, is not disputed; what is contentious is the belief that this faith tips 
blindly over into Bush’s politics. Bush’s ability to convince the Religious Right that 
they were equal and were doctrinally in tune, helped him trade on their support. As 
Steven Waldman, president and editor-in-chief of BeliefNet.Com has pointed out, 
“Political consultants don’t sit around assessing whether voters in certain precincts 
follow crucicentric theology. They see a large group of voters who call themselves 
evangelical or attend certain churches and have developed certain political 
tendencies”.36 Nothing aided this better than the inclination amongst the Religious 
Right to feel comfortable in a shared faith. Still, the inclination was to gain the vote.  
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Biblicism is defined as the adherence to the letter of biblical text. But as is s
often the case, trying to place exact degrees on this adherence is difficult. To help 
interpret this we can attempt to clarify the term in two ways. On the one hand the 
moderate interpretation of Biblicism speaks of “reliance” or a “confidence” upon 
biblical text as a guiding authority. This version of Biblicism is inclined to see the
bible as allegory. Most Americans would confess to this kind of observance, the 
symbolism of religion touching most through weddings
ristmas. Bush arguably falls into this category. 
Then there is the more exacting understanding, often described as the 
fundamentalist, approach. This sees biblical text as something that is an absolute, 
unequivocal authority. For the fundamentalist this inerrant, literal approach is enti
pervasive. The term fundamentalist, meaning the belief that religious or politi
doctrine should be implemented literally does not recognise interpretation or 
ion. To this mindset the Bible is simply without error.  
Whatever the denomination, the fundamentalist is perceived to be an 
ideological threat to the liberal, pluralist consensus within the United States. This 
approach melds the religious and the secular. As a result there is no clear divid
the fundamentalist between religion and politics, or, as it is sometimes stated: 
“religion is politics”. It is from this union that the notion of a theocracy arises, an 
interpretation, particularly at a populist level, that is often attr
 simply no evidence to support this. 
Allying Bush with fundamentalism or fundamentalists makes the error o
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again of defining Bush in absolute terms. It is of course possible to discuss and 
criticise Bush in the context of extreme, unprecedented events or actions but it is far 
different to argue that these are permanent states of affairs. Bush the openly confessed 
Christian, the daily Bible reader, the user of some religious rhetoric, and the promoter 
of faith in action is not necessarily Bush the fundamentalist in every aspect of hi
political activity. If we take the central statement of Biblicism, that the bible is 
“without error” and examine two themes, the death penalty and homosexuali
e to expose Bush’s political and not necessarily religious posturing.   
As Governor of Texas between 1995 and 2000, Bush was the signatory for the
execution orders of a record 152 convicted felons. Biblically there was an allowance 
for ambiguity in these cases. Biblical text states “an eye for an eye” but also “though 
shall not kill”. These inconsistencies allow for legitimisation on the one hand and an 
argument for exemption on the other. The key point, however, is Bush carried o
law of the state rather than the law of the Bible. If Texas had not had the death 
penalty, it is arguable that Bush would have been politically subject to that stat
 Even at the peak of his own religiosity, Bush followed the status quo.  
In particular, Bush was not swayed in his steadfast duty as Governor by th
Karla Faye Tucker trial, subordinating the role of religion to his charge as Texas 
governor. In his autobiography “A Charge To Keep” Bush made it clear that he wa
ng the letter of the state’s law, as he was satisfied that Tucker was guilty.  
When later questioned on the death penalty in relation to his faith, Bush’s 
responses lent this way. In an interview with Charisma Magazine in 2000 Bush wa
asked: “many Christians believe the death penalty is supported by scripture, while 
others believe it isn’t. How have you applied your faith to the issue? Bush an
“my job is to up-hold the laws of the land. When I swore on the bible at my 
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inauguration as governor of Texas, I swore to uphold the laws”.37 In a previous 
interview with the Catholic Digest Bush also stated the same. “I’m sworn to up-hold
the laws of my state. I review every case. I take it seriously. I believe every perso
that we have put to death in the state of Texas has been guilty and I know every 
person has had full access to the courts of law”.38 Bush went on to say:  “I support the 
death penalty because I believe, if administered swiftly and justly, capital puni
is a deterrent against future violence and will save other innocent lives. Some 
advocates of life will challenge why I oppose abortion yet 
t’s the difference between innocence and guilt”.39  
Bush has also maintained this subordination of religious to political view
homosexuality. Unlike biblical scripture regarding the giving and taking of life, 
biblical text concerning homosexuality has no ambiguity. It is clearly stated that u
no circumstances should there be same-sex activity. Leviticus 20:13 reads: “And 
when a man lies down with a male the same as one lies down with a woman, both of
them have done a detestable thing. They should be put to death without fail”.  As a 
result of such language it is clear to see why Christian Conservatives in general a
the religious right and fundamentalists in particular see it as one of their central 
platforms. Like the single issue of abortion, homosexuality is in clear opposition to 
their mor
   
As the governor of Texas, Bush’s stance appeared firmly anti-gay. He “sp
out against gay adoption, supported the states sodomy law and opposed the hate 
crimes bill that would have included gay and lesbian victims”.40 There was ambig
in this position, however. Bush was also in favour of gay employment rights and 
political appointments. In an interview with the New York Times in April 1999, Bush 
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said he would appoint openly gay people to his administration. He articulated that a
far as he was concerned “if someone can do a job, and a job he’s qualified for, that 
person ought to be allowed to do his job”.41 Bush went on to state that as long as the 
political agenda was the same, he was not interested in exclusion. The fundamentalist 
approach which prohibits certain lifestyles emphatically rallies against such inclusion 
and does not all
groups. 
Removed from the confines of Texas, Bush’s remarks made their mark, 
sending out a strong message on gay rights to gay Republicans and their vote. R
Tafel, executive director of the Log Cabin Republicans, America’s largest gay 
Republican organisation, said, “Many gay people will be very glad to hear hi
Even so, Tafel was aware of Bush’s inconsistencies. Tafel added: “it is a bit 
Clintonesque in trying to please all sides rather than laying out a clear and consistent 
set of principles. That is cause for concern at this point”.42 In a 1999, New York Times
article, Richard Berke accurately drew a line under Bush’s position and what he saw 
as Bush’s strategy. Entitled: “Bush Navigates the Centre Line”, it highlighted not on
his ambivalence on gay rights but abortion too. Critically it picked-up on Bush the 
politician manoeuvring politically and not the fundamentalist espousing religion. As
Berke pointed out, Bush was the “ultimate Rorschach politician”, in whom “
can see what they want to see”. Understandably Bu
able to the broad Republican electorate”.43  
In the lead-up to and including the primaries Bush continued to alternate on 
his position. A year after the article in April 1999 Bush opened up a more direct and 
open dialogue with gay Republicans. Following months of uncertainty in April 2000 
Bush met with a group of gay supporters at his campaign head quarters, known as th
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Austin 12. The group included former and incumbent elected officials. “I we
gay Americans into my campaign”, Bush said. “I want the Republicans and 
conservatives Republicans to understand we jud
at’s what the campaign is all about”.44   
Bush’s meeting with gay Republicans pulled down to the controversy that had
followed Bush in the early primaries, when, unlike Senator John McCain he initially 
refused to meet with Log Cabin Republicans. In fact, at the time of the South Carolina
primary, pro-Bush radio commercials, sponsored by the Christian Coalition, focused 
specifically upon the subject of his abstention. This led to accusations of Bu
anti-gay, intolerant and divisive. To illustrate differently Bush crossed the 
religious/political divide and eventually made appeasements to gay Republicans and 
their supporters. Soon after, Bush would make a number of appointments of openly 
gay pe
This was pure tactics on Bush’s behalf. Numerically there was little value in 
the actual gay vote although it may have attracted the moderate or liberal voter gi
its inclusive appeal. It may also have reinforced his compassionate conservative 
attraction. Its dangers were also clear to see, however. Bush was clearly not adhering 
to scripture and in doing so risked alienating those who did. Few si
 to the Religious Right’s family values as homosexuality.   
Yet, having steered the campaign back on course in South Carolina in the 
February Bush had room to manoeuvre. In this context, his actions were not those of 
an unyielding religious fundamentalist or a collaborator for the religious right bu
an astute politician se
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  The focal point of Bush’s social policy facilitated the idea to his critics that 
there was an “expression of the gospel in effort”, or interpreted another way, a for
of Faith in action. This was the faith-based initiative and has provided one of the 
fiercest points of criticism of the Bush’s tenure, whether at state or national leve
notion of Bush actually pursuing or actively implementing religion or relig
s was interpreted as proof of religious intention and interference.   
Bush first unveiled faith-based initiatives in his “Duty of Hope” speech in
Indianapolis on July 22, 1999. At the core of his social policy and an important 
feature of Bush’s compassionate conservatism, these programmes would help t
less-fortunate through various religious organisations, community groups and 
charities. Building on the “Charitable Choice” provisions that came out of the 1996 
welfare reform law, under the Clinton administration Bush suggested that fa
bodies compete for government contrac
ering their religious character.  
Politically the faith-based initiative was meant to give a softer edge to the 
conservative Republican machine. But from its inception it courted controversy as 
critics, both secular and religious, voiced concerns. The argument was that this w
clear example of a theocratic infusion into American life through policy. Esther 
Kaplan for instance wrote that “nowhere has the Bush administration experimented
more directly with theocracy than [with] the faith-based initiative”.45 Some saw
clear violation of the chur
encies for votes.  
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 some ninety years later were arguably less open to a 
religiou
und 
Religious institutions receiving public funds with the possibility of regulation 
by the government broke with the very notion of religious liberty, crossing the church 
– state partition and attacking the first amendment. It was unpalatable that a religious 
body could enter into a contract with government. The issue was compoun
possibility of proselytization. It was not unusual for religiously affiliated 
organisations to receive tax or private money for their social services, but these 
groups did not provide a religious message – or proselytise - within the service that 
they provided. With the faith-based approach, the recipient 
 religious practice. This was a form of conversion.  
This initiative was not new, however. The wave of reforms that sw
United States at the turn of the century (1900), that came to be known as 
Progressivism, a movement that had  a “moralistic” mentality and a “strain of moral
fervour was “largely derived from evangelical Protestantism”. In fact, in the 1890s 
Protestant churches “organised a variety of philanthropic enterprises and commu
services” as well as the establishment of “industrial commissions to study such 
questions as trade unionism, child labour, and immigration”. Furthermore, these 
churches “coalesced in 1908 to for the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in 
America, a body that placed itself firmly on the side of social-welfare legislation”
For the Progressives, biblical scripture was never too far away. Nevertheless, the 
social mores of the United States
s-based type of reform.  
Despite Bush’s advertisement as a moderate; disquiet about some of his 
rightist associations that added to the unease. This was also true of the faith-based 
initiative itself. After all, this was not Bush’s idea. Initially a legislative success for 
Missouri Republican Senator John Ashcroft it always had an inauspicious backgro
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and one that, tenuously enabled critics to link the programme through him to the 
Christian Right in origin. But neither was the idea religious in origin, it was academic
Annie Billings White, one of Ashcroft’s aides, presented Ashcroft with a draft
containing the formulation of faith-based initiative ideas was made available. 
Originally the property of Professor Carl Esbeck of Missouri University of Law, 
(under whom White studied) the paper contained the core ideas for the involvement 
religious groups in welfare programmes. 47 It was not until Bush embra
ook hold, leaving the world of conjecture and becoming deed.  
David Aikman wrote “it wasn’t a matrix of social theory that stirred Bush to
action on his faith-based initiatives. It was, rather, a very real practical problem”.48 
Bush himself referrers to this in his political auto-biography “A Charge To Keep”. 
The catalyst came in 1995 when state regulators “tried to shut down a successful d
and alcohol treatment programme called Teen Challenge, because its faith-based 
approach didn’t conform to the agencies bureaucratic rules”. To Bush it was noth
more than a “religious imperative to help neighbours in need”. As a result Bu
assembled a taskforce “throughout 1996 to recommend ways that churches, 
synagogues and mosques and other faith-based or private institutions could wor
government to help people in need without violating the important principle of 
separation of church and state, compromising
hackled by government intrusion”.49  
Interestingly, Bush talks in terms of a multi-faith initiative with no referen
to this being a solely white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant affair. This could have been 
sophistry on Bush’s part, but his exploration into the ideas suggest not. To begi
the advisory task force set up by Bush on May 2, 1996 to survey the legal and 
regulatory landscape for its implementation was not completely WASP in character. 
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Consisting of 16 clergy there were Catholics as well as Jews on the boar
evangelical Protestant state of Texas this was not a requirement. Texas, 
predominantly white and Christian had 12,875,01850 church members and adhe
out of a general population of some 20,851,820.51 In fact, it was Pennsylvania 
academic and self confessed b
e faith-based office.   
This appointment had implications that ran contrary to the assumption of a 
Bush/Christian Right alliance. After naming Dilulio to run Bush’s faith-based office 
there began an almost instantaneous conflict with the religious right. Sidelining and 
berating individuals like Pat Robertson and his allies for being “self serving” Dilul
championed instead the “black and Hispanic churches”. It was to these, protested 
Dilulio, the “faith-based dollars” should go. Dilulio argued that it was they wh
the “more benevolent traditions and histories that make them generally more 
dedicated to community-serving missions – more dedicated, that is, than you-kno
who – and who are generally more confident about engaging public and
s in achieving their mission”.52 This was a scathing attack.53     
What this shows was that the faith-based initiative was not in principle a 
religious instrument designed for the Religious Right. On the contrary, it soon becam
clear that the faith-based initiative could prove to be problematic for those elem
considered to be the core of Bush’s support. The fact that this was not a closed 
proposal to a few sectarian groups but open to all, added a new dimension to the 
program. A key argument for the religious right was that fringe or less appealing 
groups like the Church of Scientology or the Hare Krishna’s could collect fund
too. The idea of new or non-Western belief systems entering into government 
contracts was not appealing. As a result Pat Robertson was initially critical of the 
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initiative. On a televised episode on February 20, 2001 of Pat Robertson’s 700 
program, Robertson condemned the initiative stating that this could be a “rea
Pandora’s box”.54 This was not a policy designed with them in mind. More 
specifically it wa
s right.  
Despite their concerns the faith-based initiative it was actually stifled from the 
inside. Once Bush had assumed the presidency no new money was to be allocated fo
the faith-based initiative making it a constrained program. This restrained approach 
was exasperated by its contractual arrangements. Association with the government 
usually meant government inspection. As a result many were cautious of contractually
joining up. The notion of religious groups becoming active in politics was one thi
but government becoming active within them was something else. Transparency 
within certain religious bodies was not an attractive proposition. With most critics not
qualifying there remarks, it is difficult to ascertain what gains the Religious Right or 
could hope to accomplish. In the short term there may have been monies involved but
arguably the Religious Right and even th
s were not short in their funds.  
It remains open to question how strongly we apply this part of the doctrinal 
hallmark to Bush. The purpose of allowing religion to play a role in society seemed in
part genuine; but gauging Bush’s actual sincerity is unknowable. As the governor o
Texas it provided political success and a formula with which to go forward. 
Faith based Initiative was, as David Frum called it a “brilliant ploy to unite 
conservative evangelicals, urban Catholics, minority pastors and traditional noblesse 
oblige Republicans in a grand religiously inspired approach to social problems”,55 it 
failed. Overall it was too divisive, isolating those core elements from taking par
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f 
who Bush was supposed to be so incontrovertibly aligned. David Kuo, special 
assistant to Bush 2001-2003 stated in his book Tempting Faith: an Inside Story o
Political Seduction that the faith-based initiative was “little more than a cynical 
facade designed to win votes”.56 Once this had been achieved, interest waned. The 
conservative think tank The Heritage Foundation for example called it a success whil
the advoc
  
Stephen Bates best summed it up when he said: “the faith-based programme
serves both sides: President Bush to demonstrate that he cared about the Christian 
community and its role in society; and his critics who say it demonstrated [that there 
was a] theocratic nature of his administration”.57 Bush’s religious convictions may be 
“perfectly sincere and available for use in pursuit of po
r, “deployed if they are going to cost votes”.58 
This was the key: would it gain or lose votes? Arguably Bush’s navigation of 
the political/religious terrain in 2000 won votes, though not by indulging solely to his
core support amongst the Religious Right. In reality the links to the Religious
are fairly tenuous and Bush’s approach to the religious base far broader that 
c
 
T
 
 The summit to all arguments for a George W. Bush and Religious Right 
alliance was that they aspired to the implementation of a theocracy within the Unite
States. Although implausible this is the actual charge levelled against them. Esther 
Kaplan for example warned that the “governing Republican Party [was] in the grips o
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[a] theocratic base”, warning of its corrosive effects on democracy”.59 Kevin Philips 
spoke in his book “American Theocracy” of the peril of politics and radical religion 
and the rise and threat from radical and sectarian religion under Bush. These were t
most excessive of claims; nevertheless, the arguments th
ad a combined purpose had to rest somewhere.   
By definition a theocracy is “a form of government in which God or a deity is 
recognized as the supreme civil ruler, his laws being interpreted by the ecclesiastical 
authorities”.60 This form of rule is clearly distinguishable from other secular forms of 
government that have a state religion, or who are influenced by theological concep
For example: the use of the Bible in sworn testimony, blessings given to
o enter conflict and the invocation of God in political speeches.  
These instances are representative of “civil religion”; which, according to 
American sociologist Robert Bellah are, “an institutionalised collection of sacred 
beliefs about the America nation”. Bellah saw these as “symbolically expressed in 
America’s founding documents and presidential inaugural addresses. It includes a 
belief in the existence of a transcendent being called God and idea that the American
nation is subject to Gods laws and an assurance that God will guide and protect th
United States”. 61 According to Bellah these can be seen in the values of liberty,
justice, charity and virtue. Bellah argued that the majority of Americans shared 
common religious characteristics that were expressed through their symbols and 
rituals. But Bush’s critics have suggested that he goes beyond this, threatening to 
surpass acceptable symbolism and absorb the Union in Christian mores and practice.
At the very least it was perceived that Bush would allow elements like
 become more active and attempt to carry out such practices.  
But to whom are we implying that this theocracy belongs? As we are awar
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the Religious Right grouping is not monolithic and the positioning of Bush as its 
figure head is not as we have seen, viable. Conversely the fragmented grouping
the Religious Right has no centre from which to operate. Almost instantly the 
argument dissolves. If such a rule were to come into fruition its sheer diversity means 
it could not co-exist. After all, there has to be a bridge between the civil ruler, and the
ecclesiastical authorities. To who these “authorities” may be is not clear. Unlike 
Church of England, for example, there is no one point within American society, 
history or culture that may be a representative. Certainly, within the Christian Righ
there was no open
by Bush.  
This does not mean that within the constellation of the Religious Right there 
are not those who would wish to see such a rule. A body of some influence that h
pointedly suggested the notion of a Federal Government replaced by a Christian 
theocracy was the Reconstructionists. This particular belief system is worth noting
because it demonstrates the extremes to which it is possible to take the theocratic 
argument. “Created initially by the Presbyterian thinker (and John Birch Society 
activist) R.J. Rushdoony at the end of the 1950s [they] had become an increasing
visible presence among conservative Protestants”.62 But this body should not be 
confused as been a part of the Christian Right but a separate entity that even they ha
occasion to deem excessive. Reconstructionalism and its supporters were clear, the 
avocation of “a total reorganization of contemporary Western society to 
the laws of the Old Testament”.63 For the Reconstructionist there was a 
“compromised Christian agenda in which America is called back to morality but no
necessarily to Christ”.64 Such a view was at odds with Bush’s beliefs. Whereas 
Religious Right and the broader body of Conservative Christians and mainline 
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churches were seemingly content to operate in a secular world, Reconstructionist
took the view that “Pluralism is a myth” and that “God and his law must rule all 
nations” with “no tolerance for other faiths and the restoration of biblical punishments
for malefactors”.
secular.  
More specifically, the Reconstructionist believes that Christ will return, on
after “an extended period of Christian government”. In other words: “the second 
coming follows not precedes the creation of a Godly order”. It is therefore their d
to take dominion over the earth. This, however, is in contrast to the “widespread 
belief amongst the Christian Right and indeed amongst evangelicals more generally in 
what is known as premillennialism”. This view holds that Christ will return lifting the
faithful up into the heavens. This is termed as the “Rapture”. From then onward with 
the new millennium begins. While this does appear to have “secured a sound basis f
political action” on the part of the Reconstructionist, it should exclude the 
premillennialist from political action because they “expect at any time to be rescued 
from a world that is in its last days”.66 Even so, as Martin Durham has pointed
llennialists have proved perfectly able to pursue a political agenda”.67  
This did not mean that there were not areas where the Christian Right and 
Reconstructionists did not converge, particularly on certain areas of doctrine, but 
generally the Reconstructionist frowned upon the authoritarian institution of secula
power that the Christian Right was wedded to. Conversely Christian Right leaders 
have been “cautious about showing any interest in this radical movement”, due to th
intense nature of its ideas. But as Professor Richard Dawkins has said, this has not
stopped Jerry Falwell and Dr D. James Kennedy of the Coral Ridge Ministries in 
Florida “endorsing Reconstructionist books”.68 In fact, William Martin noted in his 
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work on the Christian Right that one member once said: “though we hide their bo
under our bed, we read them just the same”.69 What this says about the Christian 
Right is that like Bush, they may well idealistically agree on a Biblical blue pri
certain have the same opinion on certain script
tic about their present environment.    
Despite there being absolutely no link between them it has been suggested tha
this “last days”, or end times outlook accounts for certain aspects of Bush’s attitude; 
for example, environmentalism. With an eagerness for what is known as “end time
there is in the words of Stephen Bates no “point in saving things”.70 This
view” means there is “less incentive to save the world or to work for its 
improvement”. As a result there is little or no appetite to “embark on irreleva
schemes to improve society, ameliorate injustice or even save the planet by 
husbanding its resources”.71 However, trying to locate an “end times” philosophy i
relation to Bush was not possible. What did continuingly surface was a worldlier, 
material and practical attitude. Whilst it was feasible to try to understa
recklessness of some of Bush’s attitudes and policy decisions from a 
“premillennialist” perspective, it was more realistic to see things rooted in the sec
For instance: Bush’s record on the environment speaks heavily of a pro-industry 
leaning of which even some Christians have been critical. Bush’s approach, especia
to the area of clean air, the drilling for oil in Alaska and the allowance for a rise in 
mercury in the water, has not soothed all religious observers. More importantly the 
Bush administrations appointments to over see and regulate environmental questions 
were in most cases the lobbyists for the industries involved. They were not religiou
affiliated appointees. Whilst it has been common to discuss the strong presence of 
evangelicals or even Catholics in the White House, it is equally possible to discuss
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 doctrine or pandering to corporate desire?   
To dismiss the notion of a Bush led theocracy even further and recognize the 
political and not religious strategy that surrounded and steered Bush, we should turn 
our attention to those who intimately kept Bush’s court. A study of this grouping
is: Bush’s family, friends and advisors shows that a realistic conclusion of the
purpose was a blend of the paternal and the political mixed robustly with the 
corporate. Religion, though high on the agenda and deeply important in its perso
role for Bush, w
 office.  
Despite accusations of Bush been told by God to run for office, an analysis o
insider accounts tells of a different story and once more Bush’s purpose takes on a 
different perspective. Having witnessed a comfortable and successful governorship in 
Texas a coalition of those closest to him subtly but consistently spurred Bush on for a 
run for the presidency. Initially Bush was cautious. According to Robert Draper it was 
what Bush had witnessed his father and family go through that gave him concern. I
conversation around 1998 with Karen Hughes, Bush’s press secretary, Bush said: 
“I’m just not gonna do this. I want my girls to have a normal life”.72 Was this the 
attitude or vision of a determined theocrat?  According to David Aikman’s account 
the various reverends and pastors that Bush listened to o
nd influence, not manipulate him at that time.73  
Bush’s paternal ties should not be discounted either. The Bush “dynasty” as it 
is now referred is well documented as having its interests firmly imbedded within th
secular that is the political and big business arena. There is also a complex blend of 
intelligence and military networks that do not sit easily with the faith factor. Al
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George W. Bush was different in his religiosity from the rest of the family his 
religious devotion is something that should be measured carefully against his family’s 
sphere of influence. It is highly unlikely that the Bush family would acknowledge the 
single intention of a theocracy or indeed a theocrat. Even a tenuous approach to
rule would b
stic.  
Overall it is political not religious authority that holds authority.  In advance of
the presidency the hub of this influence was known as the “iron triangle”. It consisted
of karl Rove (chief campaign strategist), Joe Allbaugh (gubernatorial Chief of
soon to be campaign manger) and Karen Hughes (press secretary, soon to be 
communications director). This was Bush’s inner political circle and had been ever 
since 1994 when Bush first ran for governor. Beforehand these names had little or no 
distinction outside of the state of Texas; nevertheless, this was the group underpinnin
his political progression. What ever religious overtones were occurring around that 
time, it was Joe Allbaugh and Karl Rove who were pushing buttons and planning
an expansion of Bush’s gubernatorial success. It was at its heart both politically 
motivated and guided. These figures keenly saw the role of religion as a strengtheni
l factor to aid in their cause. Political power not religion was their doctrine
Karen Hughes was possibly the one exception due to her own religiosity
Describing her self as a “Committed Christian, and a follower of Christ”74 the 
Presbyterian elder and Sunday school teacher would have indeed been well place to 
help in the orchestration of any theocratic tendencies but for several factors. Her real 
concerns lay in family and finance. Her “family-friendly” decision, as it was term
in 2002 to resign from the Bush administration, was also laced with an “income-
friendly” decision”.75 Even so, her role before this was to project to the nation 
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olvement of religion in the political arena was for Rove nothing 
short o
of 
image of “warmth, compassion and multiculturalism of the Republicans 20
convention”. It was Rove who was responsible for narrowly targeting the 
“indispensable base of religious extremists”.76 Robert D
he had no agenda other than the presidents”.77  
In relation to Karl Rove, arguably the single most important individual in 
Bush’s political ascendancy, it is possible to obtain a clearer picture of the pragm
approach. Described by Republican strategist David Weeks as “Bush’s whirling 
dervish”, Weeks said “Rove was a man in perpetual motion. No part of the campaign 
escapes his eye – strategy, organization, message, polling, media, issues or money. He 
dominates a campaign. Nothing ever happens that he’s not aware of”.78 This 
centrality of Rove’s political dominance is something that most commentators would
find indisputable. Therefore, how do we discount him from Bush the theocrat or 
Bush led theocracy? Arguably we don’t. Karl Rove’s function in all its dynamics was 
undoubtedly that of secular politics, not religion. Where religion does feature we ca
be assured it had intrinsic, political value. Unlike Bush, Rove had no real personal 
religious attributes. There are no religious ties, favouritisms or spiritual affiliations
only political connections. Consistently Rove’s motivating force can only ever be 
identified as that of a thoroughbred political strategist. Even historically analyses of 
Rove’s political career shows that a connection between Rove and religion was
visible when religion mattered for political gain. In fact, there are a number of 
instances when the inv
f a hindrance.   
For example: when George H. W. Bush charged Karl Rove with the task of 
counter balancing the dominance of the Democrat Party in Texas with the building 
a worthy Republican Party, religious forces became highly significant. During this 
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Christian Conservative agenda”. 80 His 
greates
time Rove learnt the value of not underestimating the power of the religious activist. 
More importantly Rove learnt the importance of their inclusion. Rove could not f
recognise the strong, unifying and at times aggress
ted faith-base, whatever its denomination.  
With a view to controlling the Texas Republican Party Rove needed to first 
secure the party chairmanship. If this could be done it would assist in the progressio
of his then new candidate for the job George W. Bush. But in 1994 the Republican 
state convention was “Filled with Christian Right delegates” who wished to oust F
Meyer as Party candidate and put into service Tom Pauken. Fred Meyer, a Dallas 
CEO and friend of George H. W. Bush had been six years in the Republican Party 
Chair but was put under sustained pressure by Christian Right activists taking ove
county and district conventions not to run. After having been accused of, “never 
having gone to a pro-life rally, their litmus test for party officers, [Meyer] announc
his resignation”. The Christian-right candidate had succeeded and former Reag
White House functionary Tom Pauken, a Catholic was then up against Texas 
Congressman Joe Barton. Barton, supported by gubernatorial candidate Bush and 
endorsed by Senator Phil Gramm and Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois would 
ordinarily have been given a green light. However, the Christian right had “70%
the delegates in Fort Worth” and as a result the Christian right “just rolled over 
Barton”.79  In the end, Pauken was selected by the state convention delegates to lead 
the Texas delegation to the GOP national convention. In the words of Dubose, R
and Cannon it was an “uncompromising backing Rove couldn’t control”. What 
followed was an “accommodation of the 
t asset in this was Bush himself.  
There can be no doubt that these lessons were taken on board. Here was a 
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power base that if aligned to correctly could aid in political progression. The key then 
was to re-align this base with Bush. The value of the motivated Christian activist and
voter was clear to see. In Texas, the test bed for the Bush presidency, Rove targeted 
the states religious support in favour of Bush’s gubernatorial races. This then moved 
to incorporate the presidential run for office. For the individual Christian activist wh
thought they were making inroads into politics the notion of a theocracy may have 
been appealing, but this was not the case for Rove and Bush. Taken as a whole, the 
very notion of a theocracy is pure folly. At their core these were political individuals 
with political agendas. Religion was a functioning and expedien
ven here, at a personal level the position is not clear.   
Textual analysis both biographicaly and auto-biographicaly gave the
impression that contrary to common belief Bush was, in the words of Alan 
Cooperman, someone who leaves the specifics of his faith to speculation. Several 
books written about Bush’s faith demonstrate that we cannot unconditionally locate 
his religious position. David Aikman, who was given wide access to Bush’s frien
and senior officials said he “could not get from anybody a sort of credo of what 
[Bush] believes”. Aikman went on to say that he was forced to “intuit” many elements
of the president’s faith. Indeed, in his final analysis Aikman concluded that Bush is a 
mainstream evangelical. It may be best to state, however, that Bush was a mainstream
Methodist. Stephen Mansfield, the author of “The Faith of George W. Bush”, a text 
highly favourable of Bush, wrote that he was indeed a “conservative Christian but on 
many issues is less doctrinaire than his faith would make him appear, and this is p
of the mystery of George W. Bush”.81 It is not so m
 or fundamentalist as we are led to believe.  
What is clear is that by dissembling certain terms it is possible to take a
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suggested. This was particularly the case where it counted most: at the ballot box.     
 
The Electoral Grouping 
e 
ary 
n 
different viewpoint of Bush. This allows us to see a more mainline, moderate 
character with conservative tendencies in both definition and approach than his critics 
hypothesize. Identifying Bush as a fundamentalist or as a born-again Christian or even
an evangelical is potentially misleading. Bush’s religious position is basically that of 
an observant Methodist whose politics (Republicanism and Conservatism), combine
with his Southern adopted patronage and Southern characteristics move him, often 
symbolically, to the right of the socio/religious and political spectrum. In actuality 
George W. Bush is difficult to pin down; we therefore have to be cautiou
tations. Bush does not wholly fit the criteria his critics present.  
As a result of the above it became understandable why, under scrutiny, the 
relationship between Bush and the religious constituency held some other revelations,
exposure that demonstrated that this was not the harmonious collective that had been 
 
Contrary to the assumption that George W. Bush had a hold of the religious 
voter Bush lost the religious vote in 2000/1. This is a crucial statement. As one of th
main features underpinning his critic’s arguments, there was never an endeavor to 
apply actual numbers or denominational specifics to the percentages that they argued 
were in his support. Although our concern is with the Religious Right it is necess
to grasp something of the broader religious umbrella under which Bush is ofte
placed. This was found to be a general weakness amongst all literature. More 
significantly it demonstrates how imprecise the alliance was. If Bush’s support 
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Esther Kaplan, for example, was typical of those who stressed the significance 
of the religious vote. In her book: “With God on Their Side”, a highly critical analysis
of Bush’s relationship to the religious right, emphasis was immediately placed on the 
strength of the religious vote Bush received in 2000. Kaplan cited research carried out 
by the University of Akron Survey Research Center. From this it was estimated that i
2000 “about 25% of the national population were white evangelicals” and that “this 
bloc accounted for 40% of Bush’s electorate”. This figure was ra
usly observant Catholics”82 were added to the equation.  
Using Kaplan’s reference as our model the first difficulty was trying to assess 
what was meant by “national population”. Three sets of figures were practical to w
from. Firstly, there was the total population of the United States. Secondly, those 
eligible and/or registered to vote and lastly: the fin
d the most secure base to attempt a result. 
The general election demographics for 2000 were as follows: The population 
in 2000 stood at 281,421,000 of this number 202,263,000 were eligible to vote (72%
and from this number, those registered to vote stood at 158,000,000 (78%). Those
eligible but not registered stood at 44,000,000 (22%). The 2000 general electi
turnout was recorded at 105,365, 000 (67%).83 T
ively were: 50,461,000 and 50,994,081. 
If accurate, the figure of 25% Kaplan uses of the National population 
(281,421,000) would equate to 70,355,250 white evangelicals. Of this bloc, Kap
states, 40% (28,142,100) went for Bush. Kaplan then adds another 12% for the 
Catholic vote raising the overall percentage to 52%. This would give a figure of 
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,730. What happened to the remaining 33,806,520 Christians is not clear.   
The figure of 28,142,100 as a total of the turnout for evangelicals who
for Bush is not given as a breakdown. Without a breakdown of the complex 
amalgamation of denominations involved this makes it extremely difficult to colla
the vote. This bloc falls then under the umbrella of white evangelical Protestants, 
which, as we have seen is a very loose interpretat
detailed picture of Bush’s religious electorate.    
 There are further discrepancies. Kaplan, as do others, appears to confuse t
Religious Right with Evangelicals.84 This is also the case for others too. Kaplan, 
having presented the above figures, stated that the Christian Right is “Bush’s base”.85 
This too is erroneous. Those who identified themselves as belonging to the Religiou
Right in 2000 accounted for only 14%86 of the religious vote. We can only a
that this was 14% of the total religious voter turnou
ion purported to be “white evangelicals”.   
If so, then 14% of 70,355,250 are 9,849,735. It was estimated 79% of this 
“Christian Right” bloc voted for Bush while Al Gore received 19%.87 This means th
only 7,781,286 of the self described Religious Right votes were captured by Bu
Interestingly the figure of 14% for the Religious Right was a decline from the 
electorate who described themselves in this way in 1996. Then the figure was given 
17%.88 If true then the focus of attention surrounding the religious rights activity in 
2000 was actually a decline. Compared to the 50,461,000 who cast their vote for Bush 
this is only 15
 base. 
A further consideration when viewing the voting is that the 2000/1 election 
became known as a 50/50 election. This was because not only were the results v
 
 
 
 
 127 
 
s votes. Either way 
Bush’s
 
89 
targete
r 
0 Bush 
hat we can say is that this was not a single, harmonious mass for Bush’s 
support
e 
f 
of 2000 the broader 
religiou
 
close but voter turnout was extremely low. In other words only 50% took part.  
Combining Bush and Gore’s totals saw 101,455,160 votes, only half of those eligible
to vote at 202,263,000. Divide Bush and Gore’s totals once more and in reality you 
end up with only a quarter of the vote. This meant that amidst the 50% unaccounted 
for were unidentified religious numbers. If, however, we start to subtract the above 
percentages from these numbers we end up with considerably les
 command of the religious vote requires serious scrutiny. 
But if there is some difficulty in the voting for the general election then this is
also the case for the primaries. Take the vital South Carolina primary in 2000 where 
the religious right exhibited a particularly strong mobilization for Bush. Here 32%
of those described as the religious right did not vote for Bush. In one of the most 
conservative, religiously orientated states in the union that had been specifically 
d for mobilization, this was a high percentage.  
Similarly in the preceding primary in New Hampshire where the catalyst fo
Bush’s alignment to the Religious Right occurred, there was collectively a greater 
majority of 62% who gave their vote to other candidates against Bush’s 36%.9
won their vote but lost the majority. This pattern is consistent through out the 
election. W
.  
A realistic account should have focused more generally on the religious vot
and not tried to promote one of its composite parts, that is: the religious right. But 
here too, difficulties arose. According to data taken for the Third National Survey o
Religion and Politics by the University of Akron in the spring 
s vote did not favor Bush either. (See Appendices C). 
Of those who voted in the presidential election, 84% of white, more observant,
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evangelicals cast their ballots for Bush, while 16% voted for Gore. Conversely, black 
protestants went 96% Gore, 4% Bush. Bush also lost the Hispanic vote 76% to 24% a 
vote Karl Rove along with evangelicals had been specifically targeted and was seen
ostensibly pro-Bush. In addition Bush also lost the Jewish vote 77% to 23%.  The 
only other substantial g
 Gore’s 43%.   
The one consistent factor amongst the polling data for Bush was from th
who were identified as “more observant”, that is: those who attended religious 
services once a week were constant in their support. This group overwhelmingly 
voted for Bush, regardless of the denomination. This particular group’s support also
transcended into the results from the primaries, regardless of the state. But the key 
information to be drawn from the data is that one may very well argue that Morm
or even Catholics, for example, and not white evangelical Protestants swung the
election for Bush. The Catholic, Black Protestant and Jewish vote collectively 
diminished the White Evangelical Protestant vote. More importantly, if all the totals
are added up then albeit by 0.4%, Bush did not command or win the faith base, but 
over all lost. See Appendic
e religious vote.91  
It is an invalid proposition then, to state overwhelmingly that Christian forces 
gravitated entirely to Bush. Amidst those votes that did not take part in the election o
that chose instead to vote for one of his rivals witnessed a greater percentage of the 
religious vote. In fact, without a full turn out and a more detailed assessment of the
religious vote in general the figures a spurious. Karl Rove himself questioned the 
numbers. Speaking in 2001 at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, Rove 
gave recognition for the need for future engagement of the religious and in particular 
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the evangelical vote. Looking towards the 2004 election, Rove pointed to there been
“crucial weakness in the Republican’s 2000 campaign” on account of a “failure of 
evangelicals to turnout in significant numbers”.92 This “fall of in the white 
evangelical vote” was something that according to Rove “wouldn’t happen aga
Indeed, Karl Rove thought the popular vo
 evangelicals not casting their ballots”.94  
This was an intriguing point and details a number of things concerning the 
supposed alliance. The figure of four million has proved to be a contentious point 
with some observers questioning Rove’s source and numbers. It was possible for 
something approaching this number to be found amongst the two sets of figures we 
alluded to earlier: the abstaining vote and the vote lost. But even if the figures were 
inflated or completely erroneous it was curious rhetoric from someone who arguably 
understood this voting bloc. Perhaps few had better knowledge of such groupings and 
how best to reach out and utilise them for his candidate than Karl Rove. The question 
was, were R
h?  
If a rebuke it was curious. Grass roots support for local elections still m
as did the need to keep the religious base on side for a re-election campaign. 
Antagonising a still required constituency was not wise. If taken for granted by
then Rove was justifiable in attempting to rally more support, revitalising any 
complacency. What Rove’s comments do show is that the Religious Right was not the 
union it had been argued to be. Clearly there was a 
t the faith base that needed re-addressing.  
The fact that this became an election underpinned by religion is not in doubt; 
Bush sufficiently mobilizing core religious constituencies. But as these figures sho
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these were narrow margins and diminished numbers. It was only at times like the 
South Carolina primary when activity and support appeared to spike. Overall 
general pattern that emerged is less pronounced. In fact, had Rove and Bush 
succeeded in boosting the Hispanic or the black vote, as well as other religious 
denominations, the popular vote 
into proper perspective.  
What can be established is Bush did not wholly command this group, only 
sections of it and at choice moments. Conversely this wide denominational grouping
did not herald him to be their choice. The assertion of a strong union between Bush 
and the Religious Right, often built around perception needs to be reevaluated. The 
relationship between George W. Bush and both the Religious Right and Conservativ
Christians in general at the ballot box remains highly questionable. This is also the 
case for Bush’s own religiosity. The mistake often made is to treat these elements in 
absolute terms. Because this cannot be done notions such as Bush the fundamental
attempting theocr
y sense.  
In sum, George W. Bush has to be approached and understood in more p
terms. He is a career politician who in the end achieved his political aspiration. 
Religion, its place and function was a vital ingredient but it remained married to the 
greater drive and goal of secular politics. George W. Bush may well have “woven
faith into his presidency more enthusiastically than any recent president”, but as 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge have suggested Bush was “more of a pillar in the 
nave”.95 Fittingly Micklethwait and Wooldridge sum up Bush’s position by pointing 
out that “belief in God is a political advantage in a country where 85% of the people 
profess some sort of religious belief”. A narrow focus on Bush’s links to the Religious 
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ers it is always a matter of political strategy and once more not religious 
endeavor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Right misses the fact that Bush is far more “ecumenical”. While Bush may have been 
eager to “mobilize the Christian Right he is usually careful not to be captured by i
In fact Bush is surrounded by and far more influence by Catholics and Jews than 
Religious Right figures. What emanates from these influences whether as advisors or
speech writ
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 CONCLUSION 
 
  
“Above all” wrote Richard Hofstadter, “professional politicians want to win 
and their conduct is shaped by this pragmatic goal”. He added that “both their ideas 
and their partisan passions are modified by the harsh corrective of reality”.i Early in 
the 2000 campaign, Bush’s conduct was shaped by his loss in New Hampshire. With 
an ability to modify his position and utilise Religious Right forces, Bush was able to 
regain political momentum and navigate a difficult period. The central premise for 
Bush always remained the same: “professional politicians want to win”. Aspirations 
of a political and not religious nature always lay at the heart of Bush’s objectives and 
strategy.  
The 2000 campaign demonstrated that whilst religion had a serious and 
defining role for Bush, it was not the rationale behind the candidate. The religious 
tone of the period, Bush’s openness about his faith, his apparent public stand with 
social conservatives and his belief that religion should and could make social changes 
detracted from his real purpose: politics.  
By narrowly focusing on religion, those critical of Bush lost sight of the 
complexity involved in his politics, excluding Bush’s overriding ambition as a 
politician and ignored the complex interplay of the two spheres. This failure meant 
that Bush, religion, and politics were not set in their proper context.  
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Those who observed the candidate at the time were under no such illusions. 
“Pat Buchanan and his hard-core followers never believed Bush could be their 
champion in America’s religious war”.ii To them Bush’s religious commitment 
wasn’t strong enough. John McCloskey, director of the Catholic Information Off
 
 
 Washington D.C., described Bush as “a totally uninformed Christian”, whose faith 
was “shallow”.iii Deal Hudson, editor of Crisis Magazine best summed up Bush’s 
position when he said, “Bush occupies a niche between the mainstream and the 
evangelical right”.iv  
The value of these interpretations is that they do not portray Bush in absolute 
terms, fixing him in a rigid union with extreme forms of religion, but depict the 
candidate as someone able to navigate around the religious terrain. These analyses 
avoid the positioning of Bush through religious labels and/or definitions and illustrate 
that there are no unconditional classifications. 
At best, Bush offered a higher level of religious involvement, possibly through 
policy changes, religious programmes and political positions bestowed upon 
religiously orientated people. With this involvement, religion may have played a more 
active role, for example through faith-based programmes, but this was not the 
religious takeover of social policy or American democracy that some proposed. 
Similarly the appointment of certain individuals, such as John Ashcroft, to key 
positions in the Administration did not amount to religious intrusion. Whilst it is still 
possible to cherry-pick examples to fit incomplete and inaccurate arguments, a 
retrospective look at Bush’s presidency does not show any overt form of religious 
implementation or change, either socially or politically.  
If anything, Bush presented a focal point, a renewed interest in religion and its 
causes. As the Religious Right emerged from a difficult period in 2000, it sought a 
point upon which to focus and reinvigorate itself. However, if the designs of these 
individuals and/or groups who favoured Bush were purely religious, we cannot state 
the same for Bush. The decisive factor for the candidate was to revive his campaign, 
halt the momentum gained by McCain, and win nomination. To do this religion 
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 served a purpose.  
In a first-term retrospective Time Magazine ran an article asking, “What does 
Bush owe the Religious Right?” The movement had been busy reminding Bush how 
hard they had worked for him and was still pressing for policy changes. However, the 
President was non-compliant because of “political realities”, angering religious 
groups on issues such as gay marriage. Overall the feeling was “mixed”, and 
questions were still open. Bush’s religious supporters were asking “What now? And 
when, if not now?”v  
This thesis has attempted to show that it was pragmatics that guided George 
W. Bush. His religiosity, his own political knowledge (having worked on his father’s 
campaign), and his familiarity with the mores, practices and political structure of the 
Religious Right helped him draw on their support in 2000. It was, however, chiefly 
down to others to cement the bonds, and where possible the Religious Right was held 
at a distance. This allowed the symbolic space to be filled with notions of unity that 
aided the Bush campaign; in political reality, much was left to speculation over 
whether Bush was “one of them”. Nowhere was it found that this was a campaign of 
religion for religion’s sake. It was political pragmatism that emerged: this battle was 
about political strategy and not scriptural endeavour. 
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APPENDICES A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New Hampshire Presidential Primary, February 16, 1988 
 
Republican Resultsi  
 
 
 
Candidate    Votes    percentage 
 
 
George H. W. Bush   59,290    37.8% 
 
Bob Dole     44,797    28.6% 
 
Jack kemp    20,114    12.7% 
 
Pierre S. DuPont   15,885    10.7% 
 
Pat Robertson    14,775    9.4% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South Carolina Presidential Primary, 1988. 
 
Republican Resultsii 
 
 
Candidate    Vote    percentage 
 
 
George H. W. Bush   94,738    48.5% 
 
Bob Dole    40,265    20.6% 
 
Pat Robertson    37,261    19.1% 
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New Hampshire Presidential Primary, February 18, 1992 
 
Republican Resultsiii 
 
 
 
Candidate    Votes    Percentage 
 
 
George H. W. Bush   92,274    53.2 
 
Pat Buchanan    65,109    36.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South Carolina Presidential Primary Results, 1992 
 
Republican Resultsiv 
 
 
 
Candidate    Votes    Percentage 
 
 
 
George H. W. Bush   99,558    66.89% 
 
Pat Buchanan    38,247    25.70% 
 
David Duke    10,553    7.09% 
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New Hampshire Presidential Primary Results, February 20, 1996 
 
Republican Resultsv 
 
 
 
Candidates    Votes    Percentage 
 
 
Pat Buchanan    56,921    27.20 
 
Bob Dole     54,840    26.20 
 
Lamar Alexander   47,216    22.56 
 
Steve Forbes    25,535    12.20 
 
 
 
South Carolina Presidential Primary, March 2, 1996 
 
Republican Resultsvi 
 
 
 
Candidates    Votes    Percentage 
 
 
Bob Dole     124,904   45.13 
 
Pat Buchanan    80,824    29.20 
 
Steve Forbes    35,039    12.66 
 
Lamar Alexander   28,647    10.33 
 
Alan Keyes    5,752    2.08  
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i  Source: <http://www.politicallibrary.org/TallState?.1998rep.html> 
 
 
ii  Source: Telephone conversation: Jason Bucelato. Public Information Specialist. Public 
Records office. FEC.001/800424-9530. 11/10/06 2.15 pm. 
 
 
iii  Source: <http://www.politicallibrary.org/TallState/1992rep.html> 
 
 
iv  Source: Telephone conversation: Jason Bucelato. Public Information Specialist. Public 
Records office. FEC.001/800424-9530. 11/10/06 2.15 pm. 
 
 
 
v  Source: <http://www.fec.gov/96fed/newhamp.htm>  
 
 
vi  <http://www.fec.gov/96fed.southcar.htm>  
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APPENDICES B 
 
 
SOUTH CAROLINA: GOP Primary Election: February 19, 2000i 
 
Category Republican Candidate & percentage 
All    Bush    Keyes    McCain 
 
Gender       
      Men      50  51  6  43  
      Women      50  55  4  41  
 
Race by Sex  
      White Males     49   52  5  43  
      White Females    51        55  4  41  
 
Race  
      White      97  54  4  42  
      African American    2  0  0  0  
      Hispanic      0  0  0  0  
      Asian      0  0  0  0  
      Other      0  0  0  0  
 
Age  
      18-29      10  54  11  35  
      30-44      25  59  6  35  
      45-59      30  50  7  44  
      60 or Older     35  51  1  47  
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Age  
      18-64      75  54  6  40  
      65 and Older     25  50  1  49  
 
Age  
      Under 75      92  53  5  41  
      75 and Older     8  48  1  50  
 
Income  
      Under $15,000      4  42  4  54  
      $1530,000     11 60  5  35  
      $3050,000     25  55  6  39  
      $5075,000     31  51  4  45  
      $75100,000     15  55  5  40  
      Over $100,000     14  56  7  38  
 
Education  
      No H.S. Degree     4  51  3  46  
      High School Graduate    19  57  5  38  
      Some College     31  52  5  43  
      College Graduate     26  59  5  35  
      Post Graduate     21  46  6  48  
 
College Graduate?  
      Yes      46  54  6  41  
      No      54  54  5  41  
 
Are You a Veteran?  
      Yes      27  47  5  48  
      No      73  56  5  38  
 
Ever Voted in GOP Primary?  
      Yes      68  59  5  36  
      No      31  42  5  53  
  149
  
Party Identification  
      Democrat      9  18  3  79  
      Republican    61  69  5  26  
      Independent     30  34  6  60  
 
Ideology  
      Liberal      10  34  3  63  
      Moderate      29  37  3  59  
      Conservative     61  65  6  29  
 
Ideology  
      Very Liberal    3  0  0  0  
      Somewhat Liberal    8  32  3  65  
      Moderate      29  37  3  59  
      Somewhat Conservative.    37  59  4  37  
      Very Conservative    24  74  10  16  
 
Family's Financial Situation  
      Better      45  49  5  46  
      Worse      9  57  7  35  
      Same      41  57  5  37  
 
Member of Religious Right?  
      Yes      34  68  8  24  
      No      61  46  2  52  
 
Born in South Carolina?  
      Yes      52  58  5  37  
      No      48  49  6  46  
 
Abortion Should Be Legal...  
      Always     13  40  4  56  
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      Most Cases     26  43  2  56  
      Few Cases     41  58  4  37  
      Never      17  67  13  19  
 
When Did You Decide To Vote?  
      Today      9  57  9  34  
      Last 3 Days     10  59  7  34  
      Last Week     19  47  9  44  
      Earlier This Year    46  47  3  50  
      Last Year     16  71  3  26  
 
Satisfied With GOP Candidates?  
      Yes      88  55  4  40  
      No      9  35  13  53  
 
Did You Watch Debate?  
      Yes      43  50  6  44  
      No      56 57 5  39  
 
Opinion of Bush  
      Favourable     73  73  5  22  
      Unfavourable     26  3  6  92  
 
Opinion of McCain  
      Favourable     67  37  3  59  
      Unfavourable     30  88 9  3  
 
Did Bush Attack Unfairly?  
      Yes      35  17  4  79  
      No      59  76  6  19  
 
Did McCain Attack Unfairly?  
      Yes      43  70 6  24  
      No      50  39  4  57  
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 Who is a Real Reformer?  
      Only Bush     24  9 5  2 3  
      Only McCain     17  5  1  94  
      Both      36  56  3  41  
      Neither      15  38  19  43  
 
Is Bush a Real Reformer?  
      Yes      59  71  3  26  
      No      32 20  9  71  
 
Is McCain a Real Reformer?  
      Yes      53  39  2  58  
      No      39  73  9  19  
 
Bush Knows Enough?  
      Yes      77  68  5  27  
      No      21  2  5  94  
 
McCain on Campaign Finance  
      Not Consistent     43  77  6  16  
      Consistent     50  30  4  67  
 
More Likely To Win in November  
      Bush      57  89  5  6  
      McCain      38  4  3  93  
 
Who Says What He Believes?  
      Only Bush     37 95  3  2  
      Only McCain     37  5  2  93  
      Both      14  71  4  24  
      Neither      9  50  26 24  
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Bush Says What He Believes?  
      Yes      52  89  3  8  
      No      46  14 7  80  
 
McCain Says What He Believes?  
      Yes      51  24  3  74  
      No      46  87  7  6  
 
More Important to Your Vote  
      Issues      41  61  8  30  
      Personal Qualities    55  48  3  49  
 
Republican Who Prefer...  
      Loyal to GOP     57  83  2  15  
      Not Tied to Party     39  49  8  43  
 
Higher Priority  
      Tax Cut      44  70  7  23  
      Social Security     52  40  3  57  
 
Confederate Flag Over Capitol  
      Approve      47  61  4   35  
      Disapprove     48  45  6   49  
 
Use Internet Regularly?  
      Yes      53  52  6  43  
      No      47  54  5   41  
 
Most Important Issue  
      World Affairs     10  50  1  49  
      Campaign Finance   6  21   1   78  
      Abortion      6  65   13   22  
      Social Security     19  40   2   58  
      Moral Values     37  55   9   36  
  153
      Taxes      13  78  2  20  
      Tobacco      0  0  0  0  
 
Most Important Quality  
      Stand Up For Beliefs    31  38  8  54  
      Not Typical Politics    6  12  13  75  
      Can Win in November    9  78  1  21  
      Conservative Values    18  80  7  13  
      Strong Leader     20  60  1  39  
      Military Record     4  2  0  98  
      Experience     8  60  0  40  
 
                                                 
i  Source: <http://wwwedition.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/primaries/SC/poll.rep.html>  
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APPENDICES C 
 
 
How the religious groups voted in the 2000 Presidential Election.1 
 
Vote by religion   Bush   Gore 
 
White Evangelical Protestants  
 More Observant  84%   16% 
 Less Observant  55%   45% 
 
White Mainline Protestants 
 More Observant  65%   35% 
 Less Observant  57%   43% 
 
Black Protestants   4%   96% 
 
Hispanic Protestants   33%   67% 
 
Hispanic Catholics   24%   76% 
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Roman Catholics 
 More Observant  57%   43% 
 Less Observant  41%   59% 
 
Mormons    88%   12% 
 
Other Christians   28%   72%   
 
Jews     23%    77% 
 
Other non-Christians   20%    80%  
 
Seculars     35%   65% 
 
All Voters    49.8%   50.2% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  Faith and Values in Politics. How Religious Groups Voted in the 2000 Presidential Election. 
Beliefnet. Source: The Third National Survey of Religion and Politics, Conducted by the University of 
Akron Survey Research Center. 
<http://www.restoreamerica.org/takeaction_vote.shtml> 08/04/07 
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